REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000659 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL BA POL SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT REF: A. REF. MANAMA 476 ¶B. REF. 06 MANAMA 1214 Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In this, al-Wifaq's first legislative session in Bahrain's Council of Representatives (COR),the society has fielded inexperienced MPs and endured poor relations with the government and other political societies as a result of al-Wifaq's boycott of the 2002 elections. However, al-Wifaq has built trust among the other COR blocs and the government, which has allowed it to pass proposals that are held in common by other blocs. Al-Wifaq supported a 15% public sector pay increase, income subsidies for those awaiting public housing, a welfare system, and unemployment insurance. On the more controversial issues of political rights, individual freedoms, and constitutional reform, however, al-Wifaq has seen a lack of support from other parliamentary blocs, due largely to government influence over them. The lack of cooperation from the government and other blocs has led to increasing constituent discontent for al-Wifaq, which has pushed the party to place a premium on widely supported standard of living and general services legislation to retain constituent support. Al-Wifaq also contends with the rejectionist Haq, which actively discredits al-Wifaq to advance its own cause. By allowing al-Wifaq to achieve more results in the COR, the government can continue to bolster al-Wifaq's legitimacy among its constituents and encourage participation in government, rather than with Haq. However, by continuing to limit al-Wifaq,s ability to pass legislation, the government may risk delegitimizing al-Wifaq and increasing the credibility of Haq in what may be a zero sum game between the two Shiite groups. End Summary. -------------- Al-Wifaq,s Experience in the First Session -------------- ¶2. (C) Meeting with Emboffs June 19, head of leading Shia political society al-Wifaq,s 2006 election campaign Jassim Redha said that he had been dissatisfied with his society's election candidates because many were religious figures without political experience. He explained that al-Wifaq officials had been limited in how much they could influence the slate of candidates because constituents recommended candidates to the party. While society officials could veto a choice, they worried that doing so widely would alienate constituents. Instead, al-Wifaq accepted the nominations of religious figures because it needed as many votes in parliament as possible. The result, according to Redha, has been a crop of MPs among which only five or six are qualified and capable of producing results in parliament, while the rest were elected for religious reasons. ¶3. (C) Al-Wifaq,s boycott of the 2002 elections resulted in poor relations with the government and participating political societies. When al-Wifaq,s MPs assumed their roles in parliament following the 2006 elections, they were initially faced with the need to repair those relationships. Regarding the building of trust with the government, al-Wifaq MP Dr. Jassim Hussein expressed satisfaction at al-Wifaq,s access to ministers and the ministers, willingness to listen and act on al-Wifaq,s concerns, with the exception of the Sunni-dominated Ministry of Defense. (Note: Hussein, a former Bahrain University professor who currently authors several economic columns in the local press, told Econoff July 15 that ministers were afraid not to respond to him. "They always answer me quickly. They know I can make trouble for them." End note.) According to al-Wifaq MP Jawad Fairooz, when they started working with the other societies in parliament, they found agreement on 40-50% of their agenda, including raising the standard of living and improving general services. However, while al-Wifaq had additional issues on their agenda, Fairooz indicated that the other societies did not. Thus, in order to gain political allies and build trust, al-Wifaq chose to focus primarily on these common issues of wages, housing, welfare, unemployment, education, and the building of additional health centers. They delayed pursuing the political reform portion of their agenda, namely political rights, individual freedoms, and constitutional amendments. ¶4. (C) Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq supported a wage proposal increasing salaries by 15% in the public sector. Al-Wifaq also supported a bill that provided income subsidies for those awaiting government housing. For poor families in need of financial assistance, al-Wifaq supported a one-time MANAMA 00000659 002 OF 004 BD100 ($265) payout and a monthly BD150 ($398) welfare payment from the Ministry of Social Development. All three of these measures have passed the COR with al-Wifaq,s support and are awaiting a government response. Al-Wifaq supported an unemployment insurance program approved by the government by Royal Decree. As it became clear that the program would include a 1% mandatory deduction from employees' salaries, al-Wifaq's constituents became unsettled. (Note: This issue has since become a political and religious issue and al-Wifaq has clarified that it supports the program in principle, but does not support mandatory salary deductions. The deductions began from June's salary. End note.) -------------- Challenges on Controversial Legislation -------------- ¶5. (C) Political rights and individual freedoms, Fairooz explained, are points of contention among the parliamentary blocs. While other blocs do not include these issues in their agenda, al-Wifaq considers them essential in building a functioning democracy. Despite low support from other blocs, al-Wifaq expects to receive drafts of a freedom of assembly law and a press freedom law in the next session. However, Fairooz speculated that the government would delay that process as long as is legally permissible because the proposed legislation was not supported by the government or by pro-government blocs. ¶6. (C) According to Fairooz, al-Wifaq considers the eventual transformation of the government into a constitutional monarchy critical to the long-term viability of the state. However, no other bloc shares al-Wifaq,s interest in constitutional reform, thus limiting their ability to pass amendments to the constitution. In this parliamentary session, Fairooz explained, al-Wifaq tested the political will of the other blocs by submitting two proposals for changes to the lawmaking process. First, al-Wifaq proposed to eliminate Article 87, which created a "fast track" process for laws related to finance or the economy, allowing the King to enact them by Royal Decree if the COR or Shura failed to express approval or disapproval of it. (Comment: The GOB's use of Article 87, though sparing, has been controversial. Ref. B. End Comment.) Al-Wifaq,s second proposed amendment was to eliminate Article 109C, which allowed the government to pass a two year budget instead of an annual budget. Deleting the article would make the process revert to a one year budget by default. Fairooz indicated that other blocs in parliament had agreed to support all three measures in private discussions, but the support disappeared on the day of the vote. Fourteen MPs were absent that day, making it impossible for the proposed amendments to secure the 2/3 majority (27 votes) required for the amendments to move to the Shura. -------------- Government Response to al-Wifaq Initiatives -------------- ¶7. (C) The largest opposition to al-Wifaq,s parliamentary initiatives is the government and those who benefit from the status quo. The foundation of this resistance, according to Jassim Redha, is the parliament's established structure, which includes the elected COR and the appointed Shura Council. With a 2/3 approval requirement from both houses to change the constitution, Redha said that parliament would only be able to pass such an amendment if the government supported the changes and appointed reformist members to the Shura Council. Furthermore, Redha asserted that the Prime Minister's preference is to show that "majlis democracy" is better suited to Bahrain than a constitutional monarchy. In this "majlis democracy," instead of allowing legislation to work its way through parliament a system of patronage from the Prime Minister and King allows those capable of gaining an audience with the royal family to push through change without involving the parliament and thereby undermining the parliamentary system. For further evidence of government resistance to change, Redha cited eight bills and 52 proposals that al-Wifaq initiated, added to 42 bills put forth by the rest of the parliamentary blocs, to which the government responded to zero within the parliamentary session. (Note: The constitution does not require a government response within the same session, but allows for a response in the succeeding year's legislative session. End note.) ¶8. (C) In light of the relationships other parliamentary blocs had built with each other and the government in the 2002-2006 parliament, Jawad Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq was at a disadvantage in trying to form its own coalition and MANAMA 00000659 003 OF 004 support base within parliament. He said that the Royal Court's influence over the Sunni parliamentary blocs was so significant that the Court could deliver "suggestions" to MPs to vote for or against a particular bill, a concern echoed by Dr. Jassim Hussein. Examples Fairooz provided were issues on which al-Wifaq thought it had secured the support of other blocs in private discussions, but later the blocs voted against. According to Fairooz, for one such vote a Sunni MP came from the hospital, where he was scheduled to undergo an operation that day, in order to cast his dissenting vote. A second example was of a Sunni MP who left his dying mother to vote against an al-Wifaq supported bill, causing him to miss the final moments of his mother's life. Fairooz presented these as obvious evidence of government influence over the Sunni blocs, saying that this represents "control" over their votes. -------------- Constituent Impatience -------------- ¶9. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein explained that al-Wifaq MPs meet regularly with their constituents to gauge public opinion of the society. He felt that while their constituents continue to support the society and remain dedicated to the parliamentary process, they are increasingly discontent with al-Wifaq's inability to pass reform legislation. Mohammed al-Shaikh and Yousif Zainal, former MPs defeated by al-Wifaq candidates in the 2006 elections, asserted that al-Wifaq,s action in this first session was more reactive to constituent discontent over perceived al-Wifaq ineffectiveness than proactive. Both cited the last-minute proposal to question Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin Atiyatullah al-Khalifa on corruption allegations as a direct response to constituent impatience and displeasure. ¶10. (C) Regarding constituent impatience, Fairooz explained that the society's constituents are inexperienced in the political process. He admitted that while al-Wifaq was building trust with members of the other blocs, progress on al-Wifaq's agenda was too slow for some of its constituents, due in part to al-Wifaq MPs' inexperience. Fairooz explained that al-Wifaq was further distracted from its parliamentary duties by the need to defuse growing tensions between its constituents and security forces over continuing demonstrations. While al-Wifaq MPs felt a sense of accomplishment at the end of this legislative session, more tangible action to improve the standard of living and general services needs to be taken in order to retain constituent support. -------------- The Haq Challenge -------------- ¶11. (C) Al-Wifaq MPs Dr. Jassim Hussein and Jawad Fairooz and Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent Sunni MP who aligns himself with al-Wifaq on non-religious issues, convey a sense of urgency that al-Wifaq needs to attain tangible results in the next parliamentary session to prevent al-Wifaq,s constituents from changing their allegiance to Haq. Hussein explained that in the first parliamentary session al-Wifaq MPs in areas where Haq is strongly supported have already experienced strong discontent from their constituents. Abul explained that in his own district a portion of his constituents felt al-Wifaq was too passive in parliament and wanted a more hard-line stance in line with Haq. Fairooz asserted that Haq actively discredits al-Wifaq by claiming it passes negative laws, such as the 1% salary deduction, so as to draw al-Wifaq supporters to Haq. Mohammed al-Shaikh explained that since Haq and al-Wifaq pull from the same Shiite pool, if current al-Wifaq supporters view the bloc as inactive, they are likely to reject political participation and support Haq. Al-Shaikh explained that the more support Haq takes from al-Wifaq, the harder it will be for al-Wifaq to achieve political solutions to constituent issues, and the more likely it will be for Haq to act on its rejectionist rhetoric. -------------- Looking Ahead -------------- ¶12. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein indicated that al-Wifaq intends to draft concrete proposals on salaries and living conditions over the summer recess. Jawad Fairooz expressed optimism over the cooperation al-Wifaq has built with Sunni blocs in parliament and believed that cooperation would continue in the next session as al-Wifaq pursues its standard of living agenda. In addition, he explained that al-Wifaq remained concerned that working strictly through parliament may take MANAMA 00000659 004 OF 004 too long or be ultimately too ineffective for the society to maintain its support base. Thus, he indicated that al-Wifaq will seek to open channels of communication with the government outside of parliament so as to use every resource at its disposal to realize its agenda. Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul indicated that the al-Wifaq bloc would support a parliamentary audit of government finances in the following legislative session; including an approval of the 2004-2005 budget and an inquiry into the 2005-2006 budget. ¶13. (C) Even though al-Wifaq failed to gain enough support to question Shaikh Ahmed in the closing days of the session, Jassim Redha indicated that al-Wifaq will renew the call for an investigation into corruption allegations of Shaikh Ahmed. Yousif Zainal speculated that the King may reassign Sheikh Ahmed during the parliamentary recess to a position outside of COR oversight so as to avoid questioning of his activities. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) While al-Wifaq,s inexperience in governance is itself a significant challenge to realizing tangible progress, the extent of government resistance to future al-Wifaq efforts remains to be seen. To create political legitimacy for al-Wifaq and counter Haq support, the government has granted al-Wifaq public relations victories regarding security and Haq. The highest profile such incident was al-Wifaq leader Shaikh Ali Salman receiving partial credit for the King's order to drop the criminal case against Haq's leader, Hasan Mushaima, and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja on the eve of their trial for promoting change to the political system through illegitimate means and inciting hatred of the political system (Ref. A). However, public relations victories are not sufficient to counter government efforts to block parliamentary accomplishments. In order to avoid boosting the profile of Haq and perhaps inviting increasingly violent demonstrations from the group, the government could allow al-Wifaq some success in parliament to reward them and their constituents for participating in the democratic process. ********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ ********************************************* ******** MONROE