AL WIFAQ COURTS SUNNIS AND GOVERNMENT BUT RISKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000263

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM BA POL
SUBJECT: AL WIFAQ COURTS SUNNIS AND GOVERNMENT BUT RISKS
SHIA IMPATIENCE

REF: A. MANAMA 0225

B. MANAMA 0224

C. MANAMA 0096

Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Shia opposition political society Al Wifaq,s strategy
since entering the Council of Representatives (COR) in
December has been to build trust and consensus with the royal
family and Sunni legislators, saving more inflammatory
debates over constitutional reform and corruption for later.
These efforts have borne some fruit. The ruling family has
treated Al Wifaq to a greater degree as a legitimate
representative of the Shia community, and the generally
government-allied Sunni blocs have signaled their openness to
cooperation on some issues. Elements of Al Wifaq,s support
base, however, have expressed frustration with the society's
perceived quiescent approach. Last year,s election
demonstrated mainstream Shia support for Al Wifaq,s entry
into the political system, but this will not last forever.
The question remains how long Al Wifaq has before its
adherents transfer their support from those in the assembly
hall to those in the streets. End Summary.

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OPPOSITION BUILDING TRUST BEFORE PUSHING MAJOR CHANGES
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2. (C) Al Wifaq MP Jawad Fairuz told EmbOffs that Al Wifaq
has three legislative priorities: to improve Bahraini
citizens' standard of living, reduce government corruption,
and revise the constitution. In the first year, Fairuz said
the society aims for concrete results on the first, which he
perceives as the least controversial and the most likely to
build trust with the government and the Sunni blocs in the
COR. Al Wifaq thus far has not tabled a major economic
proposal - its most significant action in this area was to
ratify a royal decree increasing unemployment benefits. It
has instead used its new position cautiously to lobby for
more jobs and housing in Shia areas. Fairuz said Al Wifaq
plans only behind-the-scenes work on the more sensitive
corruption and constitution issues during this period, but
will issue a statement at the end of the term listing them as
goals for next year. As Al Wifaq Secretary General Shaikh
Ali Salman told the press last month, "priority should go to
building trust inside the COR and with the government first."



3. (C) One tangible benefit of Al Wifaq's entry into the
political system has been the government's willingness to use
the society as an intermediary with more hardline Shia.
Interior Ministry officials meet with Al Wifaq MPs, allow
them to lobby for Shia youths' release from detention, and
sometimes enlist their help in quelling riots peacefully,
notably following the February arrest and quick release of
two of Bahrain's most prominent Shia leaders (Ref. C). Al
Wifaq MPs privately describe this position as a double-edged
sword, because it causes some Shia to consider them
accomplices to an unpopular government, and reduces the time
MPs can spend legislating, especially those representing the
districts that are most often the sites of clashes with the
police.

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EARLY SIGNS POSITIVE, BUT CONSTITUTION A BIG CHALLENGE
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4. (C) A modest discussion of political reform has started
early in the legislative session, thanks largely to the
initiative of the Sunni Islamist blocs, Al Asala and Al
Minbar. The impetus was the government's failure to act on
25 of 27 laws the COR proposed in its 2002-2006 session.
(Note: Under the 2002 Constitution, the parliament can
propose legislation for the government to draft, but cannot
draft legislation on its own.) Both Sunni blocs complained
publicly that the government was not taking the COR
seriously, and the next week Al Asala tabled a proposal to

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amend 40 of the 220 bylaws governing the COR's operations to
increase government accountability to elected legislators.
The most significant proposed change provides for publicly
questioning cabinet ministers before the full COR, in
contrast with the more common current practice of closed-door
discussions before individual COR committees. All four COR
blocs (Al Wifaq, Al Minbar, Al Asala, and the non-Islamist,
pro-government Al Mustaqbal) are creating an informal
committee to discuss these amendments, which Al Wifaq MP
Khalil Al Marzooq told EmbOffs would be a testing ground for
broader political reform.


5. (C) This cooperation is unlikely to continue if and when
Al Wifaq turns its attention to the constitution and
government corruption. A possible constitutional change Al
Wifaq leaders have cited as an important first step would be
elections - direct or indirect - for at least some seats on
the Shura Council, the upper legislative house which is
appointed by the King and has effective veto power over the
COR. Nizar Al Qari, a member of the internal advisory
council which governs many of Al Wifaq's activities, told
EmbOffs the society also hopes to increase the number of
cabinet ministers from outside the ruling family, citing the
Jordanian monarchy as a model. Al Wifaq leaders also
repeatedly have demanded redrawing electoral districts to
reflect more accurately Bahrain's demographics. Al Wifaq
members have not focused on near-term plans for vigorous
debate on what they call corruption issues - ruling family
ownership of much of Bahrain's most valuable land, for
example, or the alleged naturalization of thousands of
foreigners loyal to the government - but both issues remain
crucial to Al Wifaq leaders.

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SUNNIS STILL DEPEND ON GOVERNMENT, QUESTION SHIA LOYALTY
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6. (C) From the Sunni side, Al Asala and Al Minbar MPs risk
alienating their allies and supporters in both the government
and the population if they are perceived as siding with the
Shia. A recent debate over approving five decrees King Hamad
issued while the COR was in recess illustrates this divide.
Al Wifaq argued the King had attempted to bypass the COR by
issuing the decrees instead of waiting for the new MPs to
take their seats. Firm support from all three of the COR's
other blocs effectively mooted this objection, however, and
all five decrees are expected to be approved. A single
pro-government MP, Latifa Al Qaoud, initially voted against
one of the decrees. The next day, a poem in a Sunni-run
newspaper called Al Qaoud's vote a "betrayal." Al Wifaq MP
Muhammad Al Mizal told us Al Qaoud came under intense
criticism from her community and immediate family, which
accused her of selling out to the Shia. When the decree came
up for a final vote, Al Qaoud sided with the government; Al
Mizal predicted that she would not vote with Al Wifaq again.


7. (C) Sunni MPs are quick to point out that even if they
agreed with Al Wifaq on revising the constitution or
challenging royal family prerogatives, such sweeping reforms
would face greater obstacles. Al Asala bloc leader Ghanim Al
Buainain told the Ambassador that government supporters in
the Shura Council would reject any constitutional reform bill
that the COR passed (Ref. B). Isa Abul Fateh, who ran as an
independent but subsequently joined Al Asala, said his advice
to Al Wifaq is "don't waste your time." Only the King's
blessing can secure constitutional reform, he explained, and
attempting this futile struggle would cost Al Wifaq time and
credibility that it could use on more feasible initiatives to
improve the economy, fight corruption, and strengthen the
COR.


8. (C) Sunni Islamist MPs remain suspicious that the Shia
community's true loyalty is to Iran. Al Buainain suggested
Bahraini Shia would one day follow an order from the Iranian
Supreme Leader to rebel against their government. Abul Fateh
said that whenever Shia politicians want "advice" on a
political issue, they conveniently travel to Iran. Though
both MPs made clear their willingness to work with Al Wifaq
in the COR, their comments illustrate the sectarian mistrust
underlying the body's work.


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AL WIFAQ'S OLD ALLY DISENCHANTED
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9. (C) Leaders of the Al Waad society, a liberal,
non-sectarian group that for years cooperated with Al Wifaq
but won no COR seats in last year's election, have criticized
Al Wifaq's initial performance on two points. First, Al Waad
supports an aggressive approach in the COR with regard to
constitutional reform, in spite of the unlikelihood the
government would agree to such systemic change. Al Waad
President Ibrahim Sharif told EmbOff that entering the COR as
an oppositionist was useful only as a platform for raising
contentious issues, not to pass legislation. He thought it
was a mistake to keep quiet on constitutional issues in hopes
of creating a Sunni-Shia-government consensus that, in his
view, would never deliver significant results. Al Waad
leaders' second complaint is that Al Wifaq has not consulted
them on any substantive issues since the elections, despite a
pledge among opposition societies they would remain united.
Al Waad Central Committee Chairman Abdul Rahman Al Nuaimi
earlier this month publicly excoriated Al Wifaq on this
point. Al Waad member Abdul Nabi Al Ekri said there has not
been such great distance among the four groups who boycotted
Bahrain's 2002 elections in years.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) The pivotal question hanging over the new COR is
where the loyalty of Bahraini Shia lie - with Al Wifaq and
political participation, or with the more hardline Haq
Movement and its calls for street action. For now, the
balance favors Al Wifaq, but this support will not last
forever. Abdul Nabi Al Ekri - a critic of Al Wifaq's recent
performance, but still a shrewd and longstanding observer of
the Shia opposition - told us Al Wifaq already is losing
support to Haq, and that Haq could now mobilize crowds
rivaling those of its larger counterpart. We consider Shia
cleric Shaikh Isa Qassem's views the most important factor in
delivering street support for one group or the other. Qassem
remains strongly supportive of Al Wifaq and Shia political
participation, although he had not been so during the 2002
elections, which Al Wifaq boycotted.


11. (C) Al Wifaq needs a victory on some tangible piece of
legislation to show its constituents the controversial
decision to enter what they consider a flawed political
system was a wise one. The society's own members are vague
about how much time they have to do this, understanding that
a meaningful victory will require greater buy-in from the
government, the Shura Council, and the other COR blocs. Ali
Salman on 19 March told a press conference, "if the
government obstructs Al Wifaq's national priorities in this
legislative term, I do not guarantee civil and social peace
will continue...The issue will be out of our hands, and those
obstacles will be considered a justification to end civil
peace."

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