PLC VICE PRESIDENT: WE MUST ALLY WITH THE ALN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000987

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: PLC VICE PRESIDENT: WE MUST ALLY WITH THE ALN

REF: A. MANAGUA 0982

B. MANAGUA 0953

C. MANAGUA 0905

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) vice
president and National Assembly deputy Wilfredo Navarro
informed poloffs that the PLC must form an alliance with the
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) before the 2008 municipal
elections or his party will face a devastating route.
Navarro explained how he is working with the ALN on symbolic
measures to oppose the Ortega administration and agreed that
the Liberal parties should work on a joint legislative
strategy. He admitted that convicted PLC leader Arnoldo
Aleman is the primary obstacle to Liberal unity, but insisted
that Aleman must work out an agreement with ALN president
Eduardo Montealegre to end the Liberal fratricide. End
Summary.


2. (C) PLC deputy Wilfredo Navarro reported to poloffs on
April 18 that the ALN and PLC have begun to take symbolic
actions against the Ortega administration (ref A). Using his
position as First Secretary of the National Assembly's
Executive Board, Navarro has instituted a policy of not
accepting government letterhead with the FSLN's redesigned
national seal. In addition, the PLC will support an ALN
proposal to insist that President Ortega govern from the
traditional Presidency building instead of the FSLN party
headquarters.


3. (C) Navarro acknowledged that, without an alliance with
the ALN, the PLC would only win "maybe 20" municipalities
(out of 153) in the 2008 local elections. He commented that
the PLC national leadership would accept consensus mayoral
candidates proposed by local unity councils (reftels),but
doubted that the two parties would easily reach agreement.
Aleman is pushing to postpone the date of the municipal
elections to coincide with the presidential elections in
2011, but this proposal has been flatly rejected by the PLC
mayors, he reported. Navarro also asserted that the PLC
caucus will not/not support the postponement of the 2008
municipal elections, even if Aleman presses them to.


4. (C) Navarro agreed that the PLC and ALN caucuses should
seek consensus in the National Assembly on a common
legislative agenda, which would give momentum to an alliance
in 2008. He noted that the official unification committee is
still active and may gain a new impetus now that the divisive
issue of the Supreme Court nominations has passed. Navarro
identified the teachers' strike, the large-scale firings of
civil servants, and the draft Water and Coast Law as areas of
potential cooperation between the two parties and requested
technical assistance with these laws. He also stated that
the PLC would reject any constitutional reform regarding
continuous re-election for presidents.


5. (C) Navarro criticized the leaders of both Liberal parties
for failing to meet and reach an agreement on unity, but
insisted that Aleman and Montealegre must give their personal
approval for any successful accord. Navarro faulted
Montealegre for his lack of leadership and rhetorical skills
and predicted that the ALN leader would eventually capitulate
to political persecution from the FSLN. He claimed that
Aleman's leadership of the PLC is waning -- the caudillo has
received a cold reception on his current tour of the country.
Navarro stated that the majority of the PLC deputies have "a
commitment" to Aleman to help him with his "problem" (20-year
conviction for fraud and money laundering),which, if
resolved, would greatly weaken Aleman's and the FSLN's
influence over the party.


6. (C) Comment: Navarro has been criticized by local PLC
leaders and several of his fellow deputies for working too
closely with the FSLN and failing to use his leadership
positions in the party and National Assembly to challenge
Aleman's leadership. As a former presidential pre-candidate
for the PLC, Navarro's personal ambitions are well-known. By
waiting for Aleman's power to deteriorate further, however,
Navarro may be destroying his chances to replace the
caudillo. A number of other PLC lawmakers have also
privately taken a firm stance in opposition to certain
aspects of the FSLN's legislative agenda, but when it comes
to their votes, they invariably fall in line with Aleman's
instructions in response to Ortega's orders. For the record,
we also believe that any direct negotiations between
Montealegre and Aleman on these issues would seriously
(perhaps totally) erode the ALN's credibility.
TRIVELLI