PLC VICE PRESIDENT: WE MUST ALLY WITH THE ALN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000987 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: PLC VICE PRESIDENT: WE MUST ALLY WITH THE ALN REF: A. MANAGUA 0982 ¶B. MANAGUA 0953 ¶C. MANAGUA 0905 Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) vice president and National Assembly deputy Wilfredo Navarro informed poloffs that the PLC must form an alliance with the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) before the 2008 municipal elections or his party will face a devastating route. Navarro explained how he is working with the ALN on symbolic measures to oppose the Ortega administration and agreed that the Liberal parties should work on a joint legislative strategy. He admitted that convicted PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman is the primary obstacle to Liberal unity, but insisted that Aleman must work out an agreement with ALN president Eduardo Montealegre to end the Liberal fratricide. End Summary. ¶2. (C) PLC deputy Wilfredo Navarro reported to poloffs on April 18 that the ALN and PLC have begun to take symbolic actions against the Ortega administration (ref A). Using his position as First Secretary of the National Assembly's Executive Board, Navarro has instituted a policy of not accepting government letterhead with the FSLN's redesigned national seal. In addition, the PLC will support an ALN proposal to insist that President Ortega govern from the traditional Presidency building instead of the FSLN party headquarters. ¶3. (C) Navarro acknowledged that, without an alliance with the ALN, the PLC would only win "maybe 20" municipalities (out of 153) in the 2008 local elections. He commented that the PLC national leadership would accept consensus mayoral candidates proposed by local unity councils (reftels),but doubted that the two parties would easily reach agreement. Aleman is pushing to postpone the date of the municipal elections to coincide with the presidential elections in 2011, but this proposal has been flatly rejected by the PLC mayors, he reported. Navarro also asserted that the PLC caucus will not/not support the postponement of the 2008 municipal elections, even if Aleman presses them to. ¶4. (C) Navarro agreed that the PLC and ALN caucuses should seek consensus in the National Assembly on a common legislative agenda, which would give momentum to an alliance in 2008. He noted that the official unification committee is still active and may gain a new impetus now that the divisive issue of the Supreme Court nominations has passed. Navarro identified the teachers' strike, the large-scale firings of civil servants, and the draft Water and Coast Law as areas of potential cooperation between the two parties and requested technical assistance with these laws. He also stated that the PLC would reject any constitutional reform regarding continuous re-election for presidents. ¶5. (C) Navarro criticized the leaders of both Liberal parties for failing to meet and reach an agreement on unity, but insisted that Aleman and Montealegre must give their personal approval for any successful accord. Navarro faulted Montealegre for his lack of leadership and rhetorical skills and predicted that the ALN leader would eventually capitulate to political persecution from the FSLN. He claimed that Aleman's leadership of the PLC is waning -- the caudillo has received a cold reception on his current tour of the country. Navarro stated that the majority of the PLC deputies have "a commitment" to Aleman to help him with his "problem" (20-year conviction for fraud and money laundering),which, if resolved, would greatly weaken Aleman's and the FSLN's influence over the party. ¶6. (C) Comment: Navarro has been criticized by local PLC leaders and several of his fellow deputies for working too closely with the FSLN and failing to use his leadership positions in the party and National Assembly to challenge Aleman's leadership. As a former presidential pre-candidate for the PLC, Navarro's personal ambitions are well-known. By waiting for Aleman's power to deteriorate further, however, Navarro may be destroying his chances to replace the caudillo. A number of other PLC lawmakers have also privately taken a firm stance in opposition to certain aspects of the FSLN's legislative agenda, but when it comes to their votes, they invariably fall in line with Aleman's instructions in response to Ortega's orders. For the record, we also believe that any direct negotiations between Montealegre and Aleman on these issues would seriously (perhaps totally) erode the ALN's credibility. TRIVELLI