LIBERAL UNITY OR DISUNITY COULD DETERMINE OUTCOME OF NICARAGUA,S 2008 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, COUNTRY,S FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000905 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017 TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SUBJECT: LIBERAL UNITY OR DISUNITY COULD DETERMINE OUTCOME OF NICARAGUA,S 2008 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, COUNTRY,S FUTURE REF: A. MANAGUA 0745 ¶B. MANAGUA 0616 ¶C. MANAGUA 0577 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: According to a recent New Link study, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) could win 77 of the 153 municipalities in Nicaragua's 2008 municipal elections if the two estranged liberal parties run separately. This outcome would boost the FSLN's chances to win the 2011 presidential race. On the other hand, if the liberals ally for the mayoral races, combined they stand to win 124 out of 153 municipalities. In the event the Sandinista dissident party joined a liberal alliance, the opposition could win up to 18 additional races, and guarantee solid victories in strategic departmental capitals, including Managua, Matagalpa, and Leon. President Ortega's determination to keep the liberals divided enabled him to win the presidential election and offers him the most viable route to remain in power. We expect Ortega will do whatever it takes to keep the status quo, including delaying the municipal elections until 2011 to coincide with the national election calendar if the liberals start uniting. End Summary. ¶2. (C) According to projections by a New Link Political senior consultant Gilberto Valdez, who recently met with PolCouns, if Nicaragua's two estranged liberal parties run separately for the November 2008 municipal elections, the FSLN could win 77 of the 153 municipalities. Basing his projections on the results of the 2006 presidential race, Valdez warned that this outcome would enhance the FSLN's chances to win the 2011 presidential race. On the other hand, if the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) and the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) ally for the mayoral elections, combined they stand to win 124 out of 153 municipalities, including 13 of the 17 department capitals. This second scenario would favor the opposition and greatly diminish the FSLN's chances to remain in power, opined Valdez. ¶3. (C) Valdez, who later forwarded an electronic copy of the results (forwarded to desk on 10 April),highlighted the following two scenarios to make his point: Divided Liberals Scenario United Liberals Scenario FSLN: 77 29 PLC: 54 73 ALN: 22 51 Department Capitals FSLN: 11 4 PLC: 2 4 ALN: 4 9 Comment - - - - ¶4. (C) New Link's projections do not factor in other considerations that could benefit Ortega's party. In the past, the lower voter turnout for municipal elections has advantaged the FSLN, as its disciplined supporters are more likely to vote than their liberal counterparts. Further, the current government will certainly play its patronage card to the hilt to gain municipal support. ¶5. (C) While the study does not highlight the possible effects of the Sandinista dissident party (MRS) joining an ALN-PLC alliance, according to the data, MRS support could add an additional 14 to 18 municipalities to the opposition's belt and probably ensure solid victories in the departmental capitals of Managua, Leon, Matagalpa, and Ocotol (Nueva Segovia). On the other hand, if the ALN allied solely with the MRS, this alliance could stand to win 7 or 8 additional races, including the strategic department seats of Managua, Leon, Carazo, and Chinandega. ¶6. (C) Ortega's determination to keep the liberals divided is understandable. The split vote enabled him to win the presidential election and offers him the most viable route to remain in power. His government's recent decision to grant PLC caudillo/convicted money launderer Arnoldo Aleman country-wide "house arrest" was likely driven by this calculation. We expect Ortega will do whatever it takes to keep the status quo, including delaying the municipal elections until 2011 to coincide with the national electoral calendar if the liberals start uniting. We also expect Aleman will do his utmost to maintain his hegemony over the PLC, even attempting to thwart allied/consensus candidacies if necessary. ¶7. (C) Former MRS presidential candidate Edmundo Jarquin has publicly and privately called for a strategic alliance between his party and Eduardo Montealegre's ALN for the municipal elections. The two leaders have discussed the possibility, and it has gained some traction among a number of supporters in the two parties. According to a pro-ALN member of the Liberal Forum (Foro Liberal),an association comprising a mix of ALN and PLC sympathizers, the ALN should first ally with the MRS to build the critical mass required to draw popular support from disaffected PLC militants who feel betrayed by Aleman's complicity with Ortega. TRIVELLI