MISKITO COMMUNITY COMMITTED BUT FRACTURED

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000385

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN SCHIFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: KDEM KIRF PGOV PINS PREL PHUM SOCI EAID NU
SUBJECT: MISKITO COMMUNITY COMMITTED BUT FRACTURED

REF: A. 2006 MANAGUA 02441

B. MANAGUA 00268

C. MANAGUA 00334

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador P. Trivelli for reasons 1.4b


1. (C) SUMMARY: Poloff talked with political and civil
society leaders in Puerto Cabezas, Northern Autonomous Region
(RAAN) about the situation there and their views on the
Ortega Administration. Leaders of the Moravian church, the
historical bedrock of the indigenous Miskito community,
admitted the church is weak, leaving pastors and parishioners
vulnerable to Sandinista influence. Miskitos insist that
YATAMA leader Brooklyn Rivera works as a "hatchet man" for
Ortega, but they lack the coordination and resources to oust
him from power. Miskitos may lose their right to
democratically elect their leaders if Rivera succeeds in
amending the law of autonomy for the Atlantic Coast. Despite
Ortega's election campaign promises of peace and
reconciliation, non-Sandinista Miskitos face mounting
economic and social discrimination. These non-Sandinista
forces seek our assistance in forming a coordinating
committee composed of Miskito political and civil society
organizations to define a common vision and priorities and
fund specific programs developed to achieve these priorities.
Without assistance, the Miskito community will remain
divided, leaving it vulnerable to the Sandinistas' aggressive
efforts to win hearts and minds in the region. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On February 2-3, poloff visited Puerto Cabezas RAAN
to meet with political and civil society leaders to discuss
their views on the opportunities and challenges presented by
the Ortega Administration. During the visit, poloff met with
the newly-elected Superintendent of the Moravian Church;
leaders of the YATAMA No-Sandinista movement; several
interfaith religious leaders forming an indigenous advisory
committee; representatives from the Council of Elders; a
splinter group of women from the indigenous women's
organization AMICA who have aligned themselves with YATAMA
No-Sandinista; representatives of YATAMA President and
National Assembly deputy Brooklyn Rivera; and, leaders from
the indigenous political party PAMUC. While each group
talked of their particular needs, a number of common themes
emerged which could help unify the indigenous communities.

Moravian Church on the Decline
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3. (C) According to Cora Antonia, the first-ever woman
elected as Superintendent of the Moravian Church, the church
has been on the decline since the Sandinistas came to power
in 1979. Prior to 1979, the church ran a seminary, a nursing
school, two hospitals, and several schools. Never wealthy,
the church provided the communities with spiritual guidance,
education, and health services. It formed the core of the
Miskito community and was important in protecting and
maintaining Miskito culture. Antonia revealed that the
situation has changed. The church faces growing pressure
from pastors and parishioners to provide material assistance
that the church is unable to provide.


4. (C) Although Antonia affirmed that the church is "open to
all, both YATAMA and Sandinistas", she admitted that she and
other church and community leaders are "worried about
changes, given our past experience" and that "we must analyze
Ortega's true intentions." She cited Ortega's recent attempt
to change the National seal as a "bad sign of the President's
behavior" that "makes the population fear him." Despite this
wariness, the church's limited effectiveness in recent years
to help the communities is forcing the communities to look
elsewhere for assistance.


5. (C) Of particular concern to Antonia are the church's
pastors. They are extremely influential in the communities,
but their poverty -- pastors earn just 350 Cordobas ($19
dollars) per month -- and lack of political astuteness may
make them vulnerable to influence. Working through the
pastors, she believes, the Sandinistas could gain the
confidence of the communities, overcoming their natural
skepticism (Ref. A). To counter this, she highlighted the
need for better salaries and specific training on the
electoral process with emphasis on civic responsibilities /
participation and ethics. (Comment: If the Sandinistas
employ the Moravian pastors as a tool to increase their
influence in the communities, opposition parties could lose
more ground to the Sandinistas in the 2008 municipal
elections. End Comment).


6. (C) To combat the challenges facing the Moravian church
and the Miskito communities, Antonia is formulating a
five-point plan focusing on communication, administration,
social programs, education, and inter-gender / generation
relations. Because so many Miskito communities are isolated,
Antonia hopes to first create a church newsletter -- written
in native languages -- that would deliver unified news and
information and act as a counterweight to the local
activities of the Sandinistas.

YATAMA Leader Without Support
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7. (C) There was universal agreement among the Miskito
leaders that YATAMA President Brooklyn Rivera does not
represent the will of the Miskito people. They believe he
struck a deal with the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) and Daniel Ortega to stay in power and now works as a
"hatchet man" for Ortega. They insisted that Rivera is a
traitor and the biggest threat to the Miskito community.
Despite this widespread discontent, the Miskito community has
not been able to move him from power. According to YATAMA
bi-laws, a sitting president can only be removed by the
majority vote of a General Assembly. However, the Miskitos
have not been able to convene a General Assembly due to lack
of inter-community coordination and financial resources.
Until Brooklyn is removed, leaders insisted, little can be
done to stop the influx of Sandinista money and influence.

Liberal Supporters Black-Listed
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8. (C) Since the elections, Rivera has publicly threatened
opposition leader Osorno Coleman ("Comandante Blas") (Ref. B)
and repeatedly warned people who voted for the Liberal
opposition parties that "their time is coming." Leaders
reported that Rivera has publicly promised to channel
government and NGO support and programs to FSLN supporters,
creating fear and confusion in the Miskito communities.
Further, it appears that Brooklyn has created a "black list"
of people who voted for the opposition. People on the list
cannot get government jobs, qualify for loans or
scholarships, or get jobs with FSLN-aligned private
businesses in the communities. Opposition supporters have
also been ostracized and excluded in neighborhoods and
communities.

Law 28 Reforms - Undermines Democratic Elections
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9. (C) As a National Assembly deputy, Rivera also reportedly
seeks to amend Law 28, the law that defines the terms of the
RAAN's autonomy. According to Miskito leaders, Rivera is
coordinating an effort with FSLN supporters in the RAAN to
introduce legislation that would eliminate popular elections.
Instead, insisted the leaders, pre-selected candidates would
be put before a General Assembly only for the purpose of
ratification. Leaders believe Rivera is trying to justify
this subversion of democracy under the guise of the Miskito's
traditional practice of convening popular assemblies to vote
on issues affecting the community. If this legislation is
introduced, stressed the leaders, support from the Liberal
parties will be critical to defeat the measure.

Opposition Skeptical of Sandinista Promises, but Offers Little
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10. (C) In light of Ortega and the Sandinistas' history in
the RAAN, there was unanimous skepticism among the various
leaders that Ortega will be able to fulfill his election
promises. Instead, they suspect that programs and support --
as Rivera has announced -- will be strategically targeted at
FSLN supporters and key influencers in the communities,
including former Contra fighters, to maximize the political
and public relations impact. Leaders acknowledged that
"assistance is assistance," but believe the FSLN's intentions
are disingenuous, designed only to win enough support to tip
the scales in the FSLN's favor in 2008 municipal elections.


11. (C) Miskito leaders begrudgingly admitted, however, that
while they are skeptical and critical of the FSLN and
Rivera's offers of support, they have little to offer their
communities aside from anti-Sandinista rhetoric emphasizing
the atrocities of the past. They understand that they must
counter-balance the Sandinistas with programs and support of
their own, but complained that they lack the robust social
infrastructure of the Sandinistas vis-a-vis a network of
NGOs and community organizations. With a Sandinista
government now in power that has a declared intention to help
FSLN supporters, leaders lamented that they will fall even
further behind in the race to win hearts and minds in the
RAAN.

Battle for Identity Within YATAMA
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12. (C) Given the damage inflicted on the RAAN by Rivera,
leaders expressed a strong desire to disassociate from him
either by forming a new indigenous movement or by expelling
him from YATAMA. Many of the Miskito leaders favored the
formation of a new movement. Poloff mentioned that forming a
new movement poses two immediate problems. First, doing so
does not remove Rivera from his official position as the
leader of YATAMA, but simply creates a competing
organization. Second, YATAMA has universal name recognition
in the RAAN. A new movement would have to create name
awareness which, even in the best of circumstances takes
time, good communications, and resources, none of which the
YATAMA No-Sandinista movement has. Further, Rivera --
through his alliance with Ortega -- would certainly stir up
strong resistance to such an effort. Instead, poloff
suggested creating an integrated plan that unites the
factions of the YATAMA No-Sandinista movement around a common
goal of convening a General Assembly to elect new YATAMA
leadership. Removing Rivera from YATAMA would rob Ortega of
his most valuable ally in the RAAN and could impede Ortega's
aspirations in the region.

YATAMA in Lock-Step with Ortega Government
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13. (C) Rivera's representatives were keenly aware of the
resistance and resentment among the Miskito people towards
Rivera and the FSLN, but believe it stems from fear of change
and lack of understanding. Upon aligning itself with the
FSLN, they explained, YATAMA proposed -- and the FSLN
accepted -- a 17-point plan to help the region. They
insisted that the alliance will continue only as long as the
FSLN complies with its obligations under the plan. The
plan's key initiatives include:

- election of one national deputy and one regional deputy to
the National Assembly and one deputy to the Central American
Parliament (Note: This objective was accomplished. End Note);

- continuing with property demarcation and titling of
indigenous lands (Ref. C);

- payment of indemnities in the Rio Coco area for loses
caused by the Sandinistas in the 1980s (Ref. B);

- resolution of a case before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights that prohibited YATAMA participation in the
2000 elections as well as electoral reforms; and

- reform of Law 28 in support of candidate approval by
General Assembly;

Montealegre Continues to Ignore RAAN
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14. (C) While YATAMA and the FSLN are moving forward on a
common strategy, the YATAMA No-Sandinista leaders complained
that they continue to be ignored by the leadership of the
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN),despite having won 17,000
votes for the ALN in the RAAN in the 2006 presidential
elections (Ref. B). Leaders blasted ALN candidate Eduardo
Montealegre for never acknowledging their efforts in the RAAN
on his behalf and opined that he lacks the strength to lead
the ALN in the lead-up to the 2008 municipal elections.
Poloff suggested that the YATAMA No-Sandinista leadership
provide a specific list of "good faith" gestures to
Montealegre that would demonstrate his continued commitment
to his allies in the RAAN.

Comment - Miskito Risk - Failure to Launch
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15. (C) Without exception, the leaders of the various
anti-Sandinista groups, including the Moravian
Superintendent, stressed the need to organize community
assemblies to discuss their problems and strategize
solutions. With the exception of the inter-faith religious
leaders, however, each group did so with the intention of
solving its own particular problems -- even though each group
used almost identical vocabulary and identified common
obstacles to achieving their goals. What they lack is a
coordinating committee to identify common problems and
develop common solutions. When the idea of such a committee
was raised, each group saw the advantage, but thought their
organization should take the lead, even though most of the
groups have no legal charter, no experience in developing
plans or implementing projects, and little understanding of
the work and resources required.


16. (C) To start, these anti-Sandinista groups must agree to
the concept of a coordinating committee, select
representatives from their groups, identify a leader, and
develop a set of common priorities around which they can
begin to formulate a plan. This coordinating committee must
include a representative from a legally chartered
organization with capacity and experience in project
development and execution through which it can eventually
implement its strategy. Both the Miskito NGO FURCA and the
indigenous government of Karata - established under
Nicaraguan law as a parallel structure to the State's
municipal government system - are strong candidates. Failure
to take these initial steps will result in more of the same -
words without action. The USG can play a strategic role by
encouraging these groups to meet, facilitating their initial
planning, and funding specific programs and projects within
the overall plan. Doing so will promote a democratic
counterweight in the RAAN and could help keep the
Sandinistas' efforts in check.




TRIVELLI