Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MANAGUA241
2007-01-26 22:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

A BLOW TO DEMOCRACY: LIBERALS DELIVER MORE POWER

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU 
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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8840
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000241 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: A BLOW TO DEMOCRACY: LIBERALS DELIVER MORE POWER
TO ORTEGA

REF: A. MANAGUA 0179

B. MANAGUA 0175

C. MANAGUA 0081

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000241 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: A BLOW TO DEMOCRACY: LIBERALS DELIVER MORE POWER TO ORTEGA REF: A. MANAGUA 0179 ¶B. MANAGUA 0175 ¶C. MANAGUA 0081 Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Nicaraguan National Assembly approved on January 24 a series of reforms to Law 290 -- which defines the roles of the ministries and other executive institutions -- that grant more authority to the Presidency and reduce transparency by considerably reducing civilian controls over the military and police. After a series of compromises that de-fanged the reforms to some degree, the reforms were approved by Sandinista Front (FSLN) and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) lawmakers, with the opposition Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) remaining largely silent. Only a handful of deputies opposed the reforms from the PLC, ALN and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) caucuses. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Despite our efforts to convince the parties to oppose the fast tracking of President Daniel Ortega's proposed reforms to Law 290 (reftels),the PLC and ALN allowed the reforms to pass without review in commission after the FSLN acceded to some compromises over the extent of the President's authority. Some of the most damaging provisions -- such as granting extensive powers to "citizen councils" controlled by the Presidency, giving the President direct control over the National Police, and reducing the Minister of Defense's role in the formulation of defense and security policy -- were removed, but the end result still represents a considerable erosion of civilian checks and balances. La Chayo's "Citizen Councils" are Approved - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) The reforms submitted by the FSLN included provisions to create citizen councils -- an idea contributed by the Sandinistas' ideological brothers in Venezuela, Cuba, and Libya -- that would be managed by the Presidency and have budgets and power at the level of cabinet ministries. The Liberals allowed the creation of the councils, but with the caveat that they be subordinated to the ministries and not draw funds from the national budget. (Comment: The councils will be managed by Ortega's wife, Rosario Murillo. Contacts have observed that, despite the official prohibition against using government funds, Murillo will not have difficulty �
0A;funding the councils with support from Venezuela, Libya, and other sponsors. Because these councils will not receive funds from the national budget, they will not have to depend on the National Assembly to operate. End Comment.) Role of Defense and Government Ministers Reduced - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (U) FSLN changes to Law 290 would have reduced the Ministry of Defense to a shadow, redistributing powers to the Presidency and military. The Liberals modified the proposals so that the Minister of Defense remains in charge of "directing" the formulation of national defense policy, rather than merely "contributing." The Ministry will also retain the lead role in representing the government in international organisms that deal in defense policy and in formulating aerial navigation regulations. Significantly, the Defense Information Directorate (DID) intelligence service was officially returned to the control of the Army, and the Ministry was reduced to collaborating (instead of directing) the development of the national defense budget with the Army. ¶5. (C) We met with Dr. Juan Umana, Ortega's designated interim caretaker for the Ministry of Defense (ref C) on January 18 to voice our concerns over the proposed Law 290 reforms. Umana admitted that the Ministry is a "shell" with "few professionals" that will "not likely receive any significant budget increases" under the new administration. He argued that the reforms merely reflect "reality" since the Ministry was never given the resources to fully implement the authority granted to it under Law 290. We argued that a preferable solution would be to strengthen the civilian authority and continue on the path to modernization in the defense sector established by previous governments. (Comment: Umana's comment that the reforms reflect "reality" is largely accurate. The Army has jealously guarded its privileges, including management of the DID and control of the military budget. End Comment.) ¶6. (U) The Ministry of Government also suffered a similar reduction in authority, although the Liberals insisted that the Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) report directly to the Minister of Government instead of the President. Nevertheless, the President will now have the right to receive public security information reports directly; audit the NNP budget; appoint officials down to the level of Deputy Director General; approve, reduce, or increase the number of positions in the NNP and regulate salaries; and request the resignation of the top officials on the advice of the Director General. All of these powers were previously allocated to the Minister of Government and enabled the Ministry to exercise its authority over the NNP. Voices in the Desert - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Javier Melendez, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies and Public Policy, attended the plenary and was disappointed with the lack of opposition from the ALN and PLC. After two-hour discussions with IEEPP on January 19, both parties had pledged to propose the fast-tracking of the reforms. Melendez witnessed a heated debate among the PLC deputies during the session, but the caucus ultimately followed Aleman's orders to support the reforms. The ALN did not oppose Ortega's fast-track request and, according to Melendez, only made half-hearted attempts to modify the reforms. Colleagues of Melendez close to ALN deputy and party leader Eduardo Montealegre pleaded with Montealegre to at least table a proposal to keep military budget oversight under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. Montealegre reportedly responded that he did not want to "provoke" the military. (Note: Melendez witnessed uniformed lobbyists from the armed forces actively working the plenary. End Note.) ¶8. (U) A few deputies did speak out against the reforms. ALN deputy Pedro Joaquin Chamorro read a prepared statement lamenting the decay of civilian oversight and the transfer of authority to unaccountable organizations controlled by the Presidency. PLC deputy Carlos Noguera broke with his caucus to denounce the reforms and argue that Law 290 should not be modified. Victor Hugo Tinoco, representing the MRS, argued for the need of civilian control over the military and commented that the reforms are a setback to years of modernization and professionalization in the defense sector. Deputies Alejandro Bolanos (ALN),Monica Baltodano (MRS) and Enrique Saenz (MRS) also spoke out against the reforms and proposed modifications. Comment: Does Ortega Have Any Opposition? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) This scenario has become very familiar: every time the PLC shows some will to oppose the FSLN's plans, Ortega uses his control of the court system to force convicted PLC leader and ex-President Arnoldo Aleman to bring his party back into line. Discontent within the PLC is growing, but so far has not proved sufficient to break Aleman's stranglehold. We will continue to foster resistance to the Ortega-Aleman pact with moderate PLC deputies. ¶10. (C) The ALN's lack of action was a more unexpected disappointment. Melendez commented that the ALN lacks a coherent agenda, vision, and leadership. He believes that Montealegre fears that active opposition from the ALN will prompt Ortega to support the PLC's aspirations to prosecute Montealegre for his alleged participation in the Cenis banking scandal. Moreover, many of the ALN's deputies are new, inexperienced and untested and unable to effectively respond to the FSLN's legislative blitzkriegs. We are exploring ways to respond to ALN requests for professional assistance. TRIVELLI

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