ATLANTIC COAST - THE LONG (WINDING) ROAD BACK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002211 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN FEELEY AND LERSTEN DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/FO AND CA/OCS DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/W, USAID/DCHA AND USAID/OFDA USAID/W FOR A/AID HFORE USAID/OFDA FOR KLUU, AFERRERA, ACONVERY, RTHAYER, AND SBISWAS USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS AND GGOTTLIEB NSC FOR ALVARADO AND TSHORTLEY SAN JOSE FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: EAID PGOV MOPS AEMR KPAO CASC NU SUBJECT: ATLANTIC COAST - THE LONG (WINDING) ROAD BACK REF: A. MANAGUA 2148 ¶B. MANAGUA 2117 ¶C. MANAGUA 2102 ¶D. MANAGUA 2070 ¶E. MANAGUA 2059 ¶F. MANAGUA 2044 ¶G. MANAGUA 2032 ¶H. MANAGUA 2026 (NOTAL) ¶I. MANAGUA 2025 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The indigenous Miskito indians of Nicaragua's North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) believe the Nicaraguan government (GON) failed to adequately warn them of Hurricane Felix's September 4 arrival and has not done enough to help them. Miskito leaders believe the true death toll is more than 500, but claim the government is pressuring the Miskitos to keep the official numbers lower. Looking past the initial crisis, community leaders see the following priorities over the short term: reducing forest fire risk, opening roadways, providing seeds and farm implements, restoring religious/community centers, caring for orphans and widows, and providing materials for school children. Democratic-leaning civil society groups believe reconstruction efforts can help unify them, but fear their lack of experience working with donors will preclude them from participating. They believe the national and regional governments will use reconstruction as a political tool to buy votes for the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and its YATAMA allies in the 2008 regional elections. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Having emerged from the initial shock of Hurricane Felix, there is growing resentment and anger in the indigenous Miskito community towards the national, regional, and local governments for their poor performance before and after Felix. The Miskitos claim that the Nicaraguan government failed to provide sufficient warning about Felix and did not provide a means of evacuating residents -- especially the hundreds of people living in the Miskito Cays, a few miles off the coast. While assistance streamed-in from all quarters immediately following the hurricane, locals credit the USG, other governments, and international NGOs for coordinating and delivering much needed supplies. Catholic priest Rodolfo French, a normally careful and measured speaker, categorized as "totally disorganized" the national (through the GON disaster relief agency SINAPRED),regional, and local responses and indicated that the regional council and local government were unable to cooperate. ¶3. (C) Miskito anger has been targeted at the most visible leaders in the RAAN: Umberto Campbell - the National Assembly deputy regarded as President Daniel Ortega's right-hand on the Atlantic Coast; Brooklyn Rivera - the president of the indigenous YATAMA political party, who sided with the FSLN in the April 2006 regional elections; and, Elizabeth Henriquez - the YATAMA mayor of Puerto Cabezas whose sister is a well-known drug smuggler in the RAAN. Over the past two weeks, contacts report protests denouncing the government's failure. Rivera has made efforts to calm the Miskitos, but with little apparent success. ¶4. (SBU) Although nearly destroyed in the hurricane, Radio Miskut - the indigenous radio station operating out the wrecked shell of a home - has been highlighting the situation by featuring a stream of interviews with local Miskito women -- mostly from the Cays -- who lost families and livelihoods. As a result of these interviews, a group of Miskito women recently appeared on national television with the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH) and a foreign missionary who sponsored their travel to draw attention to their plight. ¶5. (C) Fishermen in the RAAN have reported to local Miskito leaders that government authorities have instructed fisherman not to report additional hurricane-related deaths on grounds that the USG will "initiate international action" to prohibit fishermen from returning to the Cay if the death count goes "too high." Leaders believe the regional and local governments are trying to save face and believe the real death toll is at least 500. (NOTE: The daily newspaper "El Nuevo Diario" ran a front-page article on September 24 indicating that Ortega acknowledged the death count from Felix could surpass 300 despite official SINAPRED reports of only 102 deaths. This is the first time the government has publicly mentioned numbers above the official death count. END NOTE) ¶6. (SBU) Smaller fishermen and lobster trappers have alleged that the government is not allowing them to return to their livelihood. They report that only larger commercial vessels are back in operation. (COMMENT: If true, this delay is especially painful for lobstermen whose economic situation was already precarious due to a three-month ban on lobster harvesting that only ended at the end of July. END COMMENT.) In addition, leaders are hearing claims from inland communities that the government is not permitting any harvesting of trees downed in the hurricane. It is unclear if this includes any harvesting of wood or only harvesting for commercial purposes, a likely step until the government develops a more comprehensive plan. ¶7. (U) Looking beyond the initial crisis, community leaders highlighted several short-term priorities to help "stabilize" life in the RAAN. A summary of these priorities follows: -- Reducing risk of forest fires: Rice planting begins in January. To prepare the ground, farmers burn the organic waste from their corn and bean crops. With so many downed trees and other organic waste from the hurricane expected still on the ground, there is grave concern about fires getting out of control and "devastating what remains." Community leaders and agricultural cooperatives stressed the importance of outreach efforts to warn farmers of this danger and of finding alternative crops with short production cycles that will not require pre-burning. Aikuki Wal, an indigenous agricultural cooperative operating in 62 RAAN communities, is preparing a proposal for USG consideration to address these issues. -- Opening roadways: Following the hurricane, initial efforts focused on opening main roadways to deliver disaster relief supplies. However, the vast majority of the roads and tracks remain blocked by fallen trees. Leaders from inland communities were emphatic about re-opening these roads to enable farmers to access their outlying farmland to start the re-planting process. Quick action would assure that most farmers could get something in the ground over the next month to help alleviate a medium-term food shortage. -- Providing seeds and tools: Along with road clearance, farmers urgently need seeds -- corn and beans -- and farm implements, particularly axes, machetes, and hoes. Farming in the RAAN is largely a non-industrialized subsistence activity and the vast majority of farmers' rudimentary tools were lost or destroyed in the hurricane. -- Restoring religious / community centers: Much of community life in the RAAN revolves around the Moravian and Catholic churches. In addition to addressing the spiritual needs of the communities, they often run schools, clinics, community centers, and care for the most disadvantaged. Hurricane Felix destroyed or seriously damaged churches in nearly every affected community. According to Moravian authorities, 44 of 56 churches were destroyed and another 11 severely damaged. While the Catholic Church did not provide specific figures, Father French indicated that damage was extensive in parishes throughout the RAAN. -- Assisting orphans and widows: Following its initial efforts to distribute food in coordination with Catholic Relief Services (CRS),Father French indicated that the church is shifting its focus to care for orphans and widows created by Felix. In addition, Father French stressed -- as he did in his first meeting with the Ambassador -- the need for scholarships which he said were more important than ever, given even fewer local alternatives. -- School repairs and supplies: Community leaders and NGO CEDECHA stressed the importance of reopening schools to normalize children's routines while reducing their exposure to post-hurricane dangers such as open latrines, uncovered and polluted wells, wild animals, etc. Given that school repair and reconstruction will take time, CEDECHA urged U.S. support to provide school supplies and materials, enabling students to re-start their studies, even if in temporary structures. Reconstruction as a Political Tool? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) While the GON, at all levels, should assume responsibility for rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, there is growing concern among Miskito civil society leaders that the government will use the reconstruction process (as leaders allege the regional government has done with emergency aid) as a political tool - favoring pro-Sandinistas or buying support through reconstruction for non-Sandinistas in the lead up to the 2008 elections. Similarly, leaders of democratically-oriented civil society groups believe the reconstruction process can help them unify if they can participate in the rehabilitation process. However, these groups are at a severe disadvantage for two reasons. First, they have historically been scattered and disorganized and efforts to unify them over the past year have yielded few tangible results. Second, most have never worked with international donors and lack the internal systems required to qualify for and administer programs. Thus, in the wake of Hurricane Felix, the underlying fear of democractic-leaning civil society is that the GON, with the unwitting aid of international donors, will silence any voice of opposition during the rebuilding phase. Comment - - - - ¶10. (C) Seeing the hurricane as an opportunity to overcome the RAAN's historical resistance to the Sandinistas since the conflict in the 1980s, we believe that the regional Sandinista-leaning YATAMA government -- with backing from the national government -- will push hard to directly control post-hurricane reconstruction efforts (the regional government has officially taken over control from SINAPRED) or use its network of NGOs. Therefore, we will remain vigilent about how our assistance to the region is used to ensure that we do not aid the Sandinistas in their effort to use reconstruction assitance to further their own political agenda in the RAAN. TRIVELLI