ORTEGA RAMPS-UP CITIZEN COUNCILS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001944 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR V. ALVARADO E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON KDEM NU SUBJECT: ORTEGA RAMPS-UP CITIZEN COUNCILS REF: A. MANAGUA 1083 ¶B. MANAGUA 1588 ¶C. MANAGUA 1782 ¶D. MANAGUA 1783 ¶E. MANAGUA 1921 Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4b,d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Legal reforms pushed through the National Assembly early in the year have enabled President Daniel Ortega to put in play his "direct democracy" gambit through Citizen Councils (CPC). Under the control of the First Lady, Rosario Murillo, Ortega plans to have nearly 17,000 CPCs (with nearly one million members) in place at the neighborhood, district, departmental, and national level to oversee State institutions by September 14. Political opponents and civil society have sharply criticized the CPCs, claiming they are illegal, partisan, and pose a threat to freedom of expression. Once united, National Assembly efforts to muster enough votes to strike the CPCs from the law, have largely disintegrated. At this point, the structure, role, and potential long-term success of Ortega's CPC experiment are far from clear. The ultimate power and influence of the CPC structure will likely be determined by Ortega's ability channel formal and informal State programs through it, creating a national patronage system. END SUMMARY. CPC Background and Structure - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) After taking power on January 10, 2007, President Daniel Ortega -- using the Sandinista National Liberation Front's (FSLN) 37 seats and those of Liberal Constitutional Party members loyal to Arnoldo Aleman, and taking advantage of the relative inexperience of the Nicarguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) deputies -- pushed through reforms to Law 290 (Organization, Competence, and Procedures of the Executive Power) in late January. Specifically, Ortega modified Article 11 to read "The President of the Republic can, by Decree, create Secretaries and Councils that s/he deems convenient for the better development of the Government and (the President) will determine the organization and functioning of these (Secretaries and Councils)." Further, Article 11 states that "These referred to Councils...will act as instances for intersectoral coordination, participation, and consultation." ¶3. (U) Following the passage of Law 290 reforms, Ortega's first move was to appoint his wife, Rosario Murillo, as head of the newly created Council of Communication and Citizenry (Consejo de Comunicacion y Cuidadana),making her the architect for the development of a national network of Citizens' Councils (Consejos de Poder Cuidadano - CPCs). ¶4. (U) Inspired by Venezuela's Community Councils and Cuba's Defense Committees for the Revolution, the CPCs are the mechanism by which Ortega and Murillo have promised to bring "direct democracy" to the Nicaraguan people. A pyramid structure, CPCs are being formed at the neighborhood, district, municipal, departmental, and national levels. According to Elias Chevez, substitute Sandinista National Assembly deputy and CPC coordinator in Managua, the neighborhood CPCs consist of a committe of 16 elected members. ¶5. (U) Each committee member is responsible for overseeing a different sector of State services, including security, women's issues, youth, employment, health, education, environment, transportation, culture, sports, and elderly care. In the case of education and medical care, neighborhood level cabinet members -- or their representatives -- will be physically located at the school or clinic to oversee the teachers, doctors, administrators, etc. Since schools, clinics, and hospitals in urban areas are shared among a dozen or more neighborhoods, multiple neighborhood cabinets will be overseeing single institutions. It is not clear how these multiple representatives will be coordinated. ¶6. (U) District CPCs will be drawn from neighborhood committees, municipal CPCS from district CPCs, and so on up to the national CPC. Only the neighborhood CPCs have 16-member committees. According to Chevez, the other levels in the structure may have up to 100 members drawn in a yet-to-be-determined proportion from the level below. (For example, if there are 100 neighborhood committees in a district, 5 representatives from each of the 16 sectors - 80 people - would form the district CPC.) ¶7. (U) On top of the CPC structure will be a national cabinet formed from departmental representatives and headed by Ortega. According to Chevez, the national committee will function as a watchdog over Ortega's cabinet, verifying through an upward flow of information from the neighborhoods through the CPC structure, if and how well the ministries are delivering mandated services. It is unclear how much, if any, direct influence or control the national CPCs will have over the ministries. ¶8. (SBU) While the CPC cabinet structure appears standardized, individual CPCs seem to have a great deal of operational latitude. For example, in Leon, the CPC announced that it would begin reviewing the city's budget after July 19, while a neighborhood CPC in Managua announced the formation of a voluntary police unit. (NOTE: When asked whether the CPCs have had any impact on police activities, Police Commissioner Aminta Granera remarked that she has "heard nothing" -- believed to imply that she has not received orders from Ortega instructing her to work with the CPCs -- and that "there could be conflict if CPC activities interfere with police procedures." END NOTE.) ¶9. (U) On July 19, Murillo announced that 6,334 CPCs out of a planned total of 16,957 CPCs (representing nearly one million members) had already been formed and that the remaining 9,000-plus would be in place by September 14. In Managua alone, there will be an estimated 12,800 members, representing 800 neighborhoods. In Leon and Boaco, an estimated 517 and 300 CPCs, respectively, will be created. Chinandega will have some 600 members. CPCs - Likely Focal Point for Government Programs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (U) In a July 7 speech -- and on several occasions since -- Murillo announced that the CPCs will locally administer the government program Zero Hunger (reftel C). Although the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture (MAGFOR) will run the program, Murillo declared that CPCs would monitor the application review and selection process and distribute the program's allotments. Murillo anticipated that the CPCs would also administer the Zero Usury program -- a low-interest micro-credit lending program for women -- that she intends to have up and running later this year. ¶11. (U) The CPCs may also play a role in facilitating youth employment. On July 13, the government announced that it would assist upwards of 2,000 men and women under the age of 30 find jobs - primarily in the maquilla sector. As part of the application process, applicants must provide a letter of reference and complete an interview. According to press reports, applicants claimed that a reference letter from an FSLN member - preferably the local FSLN party secretary - was instrumental to passing on to the interview phase and that interviewers specifically asked about party affiliations. The sub-director of the program, Benita Arvizu, corroborate this when she told the press "the letter from the party secretary or the (local) youth director is indispensable because in some way we will coordinate with the (CPC) youth directors in each neighborhood." ¶12. (U) Ortega recently announced that he may use the CPC structure to name FSLN candidates for the 2008 municipal elections, suspending internal elections. His announcement drew sharp criticism from Sandinistas who claim Ortega is violating the FSLN's party statutes. It appears that Ortega's announcement may have pushed some Sandinistas concerned about the CPCs, but previously too nervous to speak out, to become more vocal in their opposition to the CPCs. Civil Society, Opposition Parties Push Back - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (U) Opposition political parties and civil society organizations are increasingly concerned about the CPCs. They argue three main points: First, the Consejos violate Law 290 reforms; second, the CPCs are partisan; and third, the CPCs are a purposeful mechanism to suffocate civil society organizations. ¶14. (U) While modifications to Law 290 allow Ortega to establish counsels, the law states that "To these said Councils cannot be transferred any functions or faculties of the Ministries of State or of any other Power of State and they cannot exercise any executive function" (reftel A). As such, opposition legislators agrue that Ortega's intention to establish a "national cabinet" of CPC representatives at the ministerial level, violates the law. Prior to his public announcement on July 7 to create a national cabinet, Ortega had repeatedly asserted his intention to make the Ministries accountable to the citizens' councils. ¶15. (C) In July, National Assembly Deputies from the Sandinista Renovationist Movement (MRS),Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN),and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) vowed to vote together on a resolution to declare the CPCs illegal when the issue comes up for vote in mid-August. As a member of the National Assembly's Executive Council, PLC vice president Wilfredo Navarro told poloffs that he would put the CPC issue on the legislative agenda, but he, along with PLC presidential hopeful Enrique Quinonez, as well as a number of PLC mayors voiced concerns in private that as many as 6 or 7 PLC deputies loyal to former Nicaraguan President Arnoldo Aleman are likely to vote against any measure to curb CPC power (reftel E). ¶16. (U) The FSLN does not control a majority in the National Assembly, but the potential opposition block totals only 50 votes (ALN-22, PLC-25, MRS-3). A minimum of 22 PLC votes would be necessary to reach the 47-vote minimum required to pass the resolution. In other words, only 3 or 4 PLC defections from the anti-CPC forces in the Assembly would give Ortega the votes he needs. Members Only, Thank You - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (U) Despite Murillo's assurances that the CPCs are open to people of all political stripes, there have been widespread complaints that non-FSLN citizens are being excluded. Most indications show that the CPC election process is controlled by the FSLN. The local CPC commissions created to manage the local elections are overseen by local FSLN party secretaries and FSLN offices and resources are being used to set-up and host the elections. Residents complain there is little or no prior announcement of election details and that CPC members are exclusively Sandinista. In defense, a CPC member in Managua reported that trucks mounted with loudspeakers drive through neighborhoods the day before and the day of CPC elections, broadcasting election details. ¶18. (U) Thus far, CPCs have been operating out of local FSLN party offices, a fact readily admitted by FSLN leaders who claim that using party infrastructure is the only viable solution since these volunteer committees do not have operating budgets. To date, Ortega has not announced plans to create independent offices for the CPCs. Civil Society Won't Take it Laying Down - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶19. (U) As the structure and scope of the CPCs has crystallized over the past few weeks, opposition from civil society groups has hardened. On June 28, the Nicaraguan Network for Democracy and Development and the office of the Civil Coordinator -- a network of over 600 civil society NGOs -- staged a march in opposition to the CPCs. March leaders stressed the importance of having a free and open space for public participation and underlined the existence of legislation facilitating participation - the Law of Citizen Participation and the Municipal Law, both of which have created non-partisan legal structures for civil participation down to the local level. ¶20. (C) In addition to the civil coordinator, the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) is coordinating a coalition of 20 civil society organizations opposed to the CPCs. Among the leading members of the coalition are the Movement for Nicaragua (MpN),the Autonomous Women's Movement (MAM),the Violeta Chamorro Foundation, and the Network of Women Against Violence. Coalition members meet each week to discuss tactics, plan events, and develop a common framework to oppose what they see as a growing infringement on democracy and freedom of expression. ¶21. (C) MAM, one of the most outspoken and passionate members of the coalition, has historically been pro-Sandinista. However, the NGO's leadership has become concerned with Ortega's aggressive rhetoric and centralization of power, a sentiment echoed by CENIDH, a human rights organization also traditionally Sandinista. MAM and CENIDH represent a growing number of Sandinista civil society organizations struggling to find common ground with Ortega's polemic behavior. ¶22. (U) In its first public event, on July 17, two days before the 28th anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, the coalition held a press conference demanding the dismantling of the CPCs on grounds that they violate existing laws and violate the human rights of Nicaraguans. Coalition members told poloff that Ortega's anti-democratic actions only serve to further galvanize civil society opposition and that the coalition will continue to oppose Ortega issue by issue. Government Labels Opposition as "Conspirators" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶23. (SBU) In response to the coalition's July 17 press conference, FSLN National Assembly deputy Gustavo Porras, warned that the FSLN would "take to the streets" and "close the National Assembly" if Article 11 was struck from Law 290. In his July 19 speech, Ortega lashed out, saying that those who oppose the CPCs "have committed a crime against the people" and that "the people don't ask for revenge, but they ask for justice" (reftel D). Ortega went on to label his political opponents as "conspirators" for attempting to legally block the CPCs and, specifically, his plan to use the CPCs to implement his Zero Hunger program. Cleverly, Ortega declared that those opposed to the CPCs and Zero Hunger were also opposed to the Nicaraguan people. ¶24. (SBU) Ortega has used the coalition's criticism of the CPCs to bolster his attacks on NGOs, citing their opposition as evidence that NGOs represent special interest groups and do not speak for the people. As he has done on previous occasions (reftel B),Ortega accused NGOs -- among them the Civil Coordinator's office -- of being "conspirators" funded by the U.S. government. Atlantic Coast - CPCs are not Welcome - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶25. (C) During a recent two-day visit to the Atlantic Coast, the Ambassador heard the governors and regional council leaders in the Autonomous Northern and Southern Regions state their strong opposition to the CPCs. Leaders see the CPCs as a direct violation of the Law of Autonomy and another attempt by leaders from the Pacific to "meddle" in the affairs of the Atlantic Coast. Declaring their rightful authority as directly elected leaders under the Law of Autonomy, they characterized the attempted imposition of CPCs as "inappropriate" and "intrusive". While leaders were not opposed to the establishment of civic organizations nor to working closely with them to improve the lives of the coastal peoples, they were not disposed to receiving orders from such groups. Comment - Controlling Access to State Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶26. (C) While much remains unclear about the ultimate structure, role, and eventual impact of the CPCs on Nicaraguan society, they appear to be a party-centric structure, tightly controlled by the FSLN down to the neighborhood level. Established under the auspices of making all levels of government more directly accountable to the people, we think it is clear that CPCs will be used to control access to government services and to super-impose a "civil society" structure loyal to Ortega that will suffocate freedom of expression. ¶27. (C) The impact of the CPCs are likely be limited in Managua and larger urban centers, but they may wield considerable leverage in rural areas where access to public resources can be more easily controlled and where Ortega may focus the majority of his government programs -- like Zero Hunger. Tight control and distribution of services and resources based on party affiliates could have dramatic implications in the 2008 municipal elections because they can easily influence voting behavior. If the CPCs gain sufficient traction in rural areas, rural voters -- the majority of whom are Liberal -- may feel they have little choice but to vote for Sandinista candidates in order to get access to needed services. Following the Venezuelen model, we agree with those critics who believe the CPCs may be the first step in a process to reform the Constitution to enable Ortega to remain in power at the end of his 5-year term in office. ¶28. (C) It appears the National Assembly may fail to unite to stop the CPCs. If so, the threat to democracy posed by the CPCs will depend on Ortega's ability to channel formal and informal programs, like Zero Hunger, through them. If CPCs evolve into a "one-stop shop" for government services, regulating access to the array of State-provided goods and services, they are likely to become a powerful anti-democratic force. Right now, we are faced with the frightening reality that the fate of Ortega's CPC project lies with a few votes in the National Assembly, votes that Arnoldo Aleman firmly controls. TRIVELLI