HUMAN RIGHTS NGO TERMS ORTEGA GOVERNMENT "WORST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000182 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR KDEM NU PREL SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS NGO TERMS ORTEGA GOVERNMENT "WORST NIGHTMARE SCENARIO" Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Members of the Permanent Human Rights Council (CPDH) believe that the turn the Ortega government has taken since it assumed power is the "worst-nightmare scenario." They recently warned the Ambassador that President Ortega will not leave office for at least ten years unless Nicaragua's democratic forces unite to block him, and argued that civil society must take the lead in countering Ortega's rush to consolidate power. The CPDH will continue its cases filed before the IAHCR against Ortega and a number of other Sandinista leaders for their alleged atrocities committed against Nicaragua's indigenous population during the 1980s and will also file the cases before the Spanish courts. Ortega will do his utmost to keep the liberals and other opposition forces divided. After all, these divisions allowed him to win the election, and if they continue, will facilitate his plans. End Summary. "Worst Scenario" Came to Pass - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On January 19, CPDH VP Carlos Huembes, Board member Raymond Genie, and Executive Director Marcos Carmona met with the Ambassador, USAID director, and Poloffs to discuss views on the current political situation and how it affects human rights. Genie lamented that with Ortega's election and his clear efforts to consolidate his power from the start of his term in office meant that the "worst nightmare" had come to pass. He warned that Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) President Daniel Ortega will not leave office for at least ten years unless Nicaragua's democratic forces unite to block him. Civil Society Must Take the Lead - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Huembes remarked that the opposition parties are weak and divided. He asserted that these parties have not seriously contested Ortega's efforts to expedite a number of revisions to Law 290, which if passed, will play into Ortega's desired objective, an authoritarian state. Thus, civil society must take the lead in countering Ortega's rush to consolidate power. ¶4. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query regarding which of Ortega's actions are most serious, Genie cited the risk that the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) will fall into the FSLN "trap" of constitutional reforms. If the ALN enters into this "game," it could lose, as the FSLN will make sure the game advantages Ortega, warned Genie. Huembes lamented that the ALN and the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) are jockeying for the FSLN's favor, while they should instead be trying to unite against Ortega's party. He indicated that the crux of the problem is PLC leader/convicted money launderer Arnoldo Aleman's dependence on Ortega and his fear that Ortega will pop him back in jail if PLC lawmakers do not cooperate with the FSLN's legislative agenda. If enough of the PLC deputies oppose Ortega, he would no longer enjoy a simple majority (47 votes) and certainly not a qualified majority (56 votes) required for constitutional reforms. Genie was at a loss, however, how to break Ortega's hold on Aleman. ¶5. (C) (Comment: If one combines the votes of FSLN and PLC Assembly deputies, plus three others who could also vote for the FSLN (ALN's Salvador Talavera and MRS' Juan Ramon Jimenez and Mario Valle),the FSLN could achieve the 2/3 majority. On the other hand, the opposition would probably require a few votes from the FSLN-associated Convergencia to even achieve a simple majority, as we can expect some of the PLC deputies to remain loyal to Aleman.) Media Also on the Front Line - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) The Ambassador raised the special vulnerabilities of the media and the education sectors. Huembes, who shared these concerns, commented that the media has been fairly active in questioning Ortega's recent actions, including PLC-affiliated Radio Corporacion. The risk is that as the "intimidation factor" escalates, the media will become increasingly reluctant to speak up, underscoring the need for strong support for the opposition media to counter these fears. Genie warned that Cuban and Venezuelan educators and military advisers are already starting to arrive and could quickly change the panorama. Oxfam in Ortega's Orbit? - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Expanding on the subject of civil society, Carmona estimated that about 96% of Nicaragua's NGOs are pro-Sandinista, many existing on paper only (this is also true for non-Sandinista NGOs). Of the 470 or so who benefit from foreign aid, about 98% are Sandinista, claimed Carmona, who noted that clearly the liberals are disadvantaged in this field. He then alerted us to Ortega's appointment of Valdrack Jaentschke (former Sandinista-sympathizing coordinator of the UNDP's Atlantic Coast programs),to lead the Foreign Ministry's office that controls the disbursements of donor funds (largely European) to NGOs that are likely to support Ortega's agenda. Further, Oxfam -- which he claimed has been designated by the Scandinavian countries to coordinate some $10 million of their assistance to Nicaragua -- is sympathetic to Ortega. CPDH to Continue Cases before IAHCR, Approach Spain - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Moving on to CPDH's plans, Carmona assured the Ambassador that it will continue its cases filed before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHCR) against Daniel Ortega and a number of other Sandinista leaders for their alleged atrocities committed against Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast indigenous Miskito population during the 1980s. He explained that these continued efforts will dispel Sandinista campaign allegations that the CPDH's defense of the Miskitos was purely a political ploy to discredit Ortega. ¶9. (C) Carmona added that the CPDH intends to bring the cases before the Spanish courts, probably by March; the CPDH is currently working with a Spanish lawyer to prepare the litigation. Carmona added that some CARICOM member states have also shown an interest in helping the Miskitos. The biggest challenge will be financial backing; while the Taiwanese used to contribute through the Foreign Ministry, now that it is in the hands of the Sandinista government, the Taiwanese must find another way to support CPDH's efforts, explained Carmona. Unions Can Also Play a Role - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Huembes, who is also a leader of CTN, one of Nicaragua's unions unaffiliated with the FSLN, suggested that labor and union power could also help counter Ortega's excesses. He remarked that a number of FSLN-affiliated unions had recently received a letter from FSLN lawmaker Gustavo Porras (who owns a number of small private clinics) "instructing" these unions that out of loyalty to President Ortega they must refrain from striking or collective bargaining. The Ambassador offered to meet with independent unions and suggested that Huembes contact the AFL-CIO regional representative in Guatemala to seek his guidance. At the close of the meeting, the CPDH presented a plaque in recognition of the Ambassador's contributions to defending human rights in Nicaragua. Comment - - - - ¶11. (C) We can be certain that Ortega will do his utmost to keep the liberals and other opposition forces divided. After all, these divisions allowed him to win the election, and if they continue, will facilitate his plans. Huembes' description of the letter ordering labor unions to refrain from striking is a flashback from the 1980s Sandinista era and suggests that his mindset has not substantially changed. TRIVELLI