ZERO HUNGER- NOT A LONG TERM SOLUTION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001783 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC, AND EEB USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/MSIEGELMAN 3134/ITA/USFCS/OIO/WH/MKESHISHIAN/BARTHUR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ECON PGOV NU SUBJECT: ZERO HUNGER- NOT A LONG TERM SOLUTION ¶1. (SBU) Summary: President Ortega has held several splashy ceremonies promoting his Hambre Cero (Zero Hunger) program, which aims to end hunger in Nicaragua within five years by offering standardized packages of livestock and other goods to families living in extreme poverty. The program has come under fire from civil society and opposition political parties, however, who claim that Ortega is excluding organizations with proven development expertise while funneling the benefits exclusively to FSLN loyalists. Meanwhile, GON officials are seeking foreign assistance to fund the program, which is expected to cost $150 million and benefit a total of 75,000 families by 2012. Even if the desired funding is secured, the controversial Hambre Cero program is unlikely to live up to the lofty promises and feisty rhetoric used by Ortega and other GON officials to promote it. End summary. The Facts on Hambre Cero -------------- ¶2. (U) On July 17, President Ortega made an appearance in the Roberto Huembes Market Plaza to promote the inauguration of his Hambre Cero (Zero Hunger) program in Managua. This was the fourth inauguration attended by the President, following similar events in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) on May 4, the Department of Esteli on July 7, and the Nueva Segovia region on July 14. Formally known as the Productive Food Project (PPA),the objective of Hambre Cero is ambitious and yet deceptively simple--to eliminate hunger from the poorest regions of the country by 2012. ¶3. (SBU) According to Hambre Cero founder and administrator Orlando Nunez, the program is expected to benefit 75,000 peasant families over five years, with a total cost of $150 million. Each participating family will receive an allotment of goods and services valued at approximately $2,000, including $1,500 worth of goods and $500 worth of technical assistance and administrative costs. A standard PPA allotment consists of one pregnant cow, one pig, five chickens, one rooster, seeds, fruit and tree plants, a biodigestor (which converts manure into methane cooking gas),and access to revolving credit. The allotments are transferred in the name of the female head of each household, although Agriculture and Forestry (MAGFOR) Vice Minister Benjamin Dixon has said that only women who are married with children will be eligible for participation. This decision was condemned by Puerto Cabezas Mayor Nancy Elizabeth Enriquez, who claimed that the government was actively discriminating against single mothers. (Comment: This is not an effective poverty reduction strategy in a country with one of the world's highest incidences of single motherhood. End comment.) While the initial Hambre Cero allotment is free of charge, the beneficiaries are expected to return 20% of its estimated value to a revolving collective fund organized in part by the Rural Credit Fund (FCR). Charges of NGO Exclusion and FSLN Vote-Buying -------------- ¶4. (U) In the two months since its launch in the indigenous RAAN community of Raiti, Hambre Cero has received significant criticism from both civil society and opposition political parties. No independent media outlets were invited to the Raiti installation, leaving only official government sources to cover the event. According to one NGO representative, the veil of secrecy surrounding Hambre Cero has generated skepticism about its potential effectiveness. At the beginning of February, approximately 100 representatives from dozens of Nicaraguan NGOs were convened by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to discuss their role in the execution of the program. Five months later, however, several of these organizations have spoken out about their exclusion from Hambre Cero, which they say is politically-motivated. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MAGFOR) will execute the program, but the agency claims it is delegating responsibilities to several NGOs, whose identities it has refused to release. ¶5. (U) According to a report released by the Nicaraguan Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUNIDES),the GON has not clearly defined its objectives for the program or the criteria by which it will select its beneficiaries. Nunez has stated that peasant families will be evaluated for program eligibility based on the vague criteria of "necessity, capacity, and commitment." Nicaraguan political opposition parties claim that the FSLN is using Hambre Cero as a means to generate votes for the 2008 municipal elections. According to Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) representative Wilfredo Navarro, program benefits are currently being delivered only to "militant Sandinistas." For his part, PLC head Maximino Rodriguez claimed to hold concrete evidence that the Hambre Cero funds in Murra, Nueva Segovia have been handed over directly to the department's FSLN political secretary for distribution. GON officials have denied the charges, insisting that of the 300 women who have received Hambre Cero allotments in the Department of Nueva Segovia, only half are FSLN members, and that the GON intends to work with peasant women "independent of their political color." (Note: Non-FSLN women receiving Hambre Cero benefits tend to be independents. End note.) ¶6. (U) MAGFOR delegate Martin Rosales stated that the Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) in each region will be responsible for distributing the Hambre Cero allotments. The PLC, along with the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS),are currently seeking legal reform that would eliminate the CPCs, which they view to be an instrument of political consolidation and exclusion on the part of FSLN. The three opposition parties have also announced they will push for a law mandating that the 185 million cordobas designated for the Hambre Cero program in 2007 be administered by individual municipalities rather than FSLN political secretaries. Questionable Development Strategies -------------- ¶7. (U) Although GON officials stress that the goal of Hambre Cero is to enable peasant families to produce for themselves and have excess to sell in markets, FUNIDES specialists expressed concern that the dire immediate needs of program participants will deter them from appreciating the value of long-term production. The Hambre Cero program is said to be based on a revolving loan program developed by the civil society organization CIPRES in the mid-1990s. The CIPRES initiative, however, involved intensive training and follow-up with its recipients--it is not clear that Hambre Cero incorporates either of these critical features. Many have also questioned whether the GON has the internal capacity to replicate CIPRES' small-scale program on a nation-wide level, and how Hambre Cero's standardized approach to development will correspond with the diverse socioeconomic and cultural realities of the Nicaraguan people. Additionally, the FUNIDES report emphasized that every successful poverty-reduction program, including the highly-touted "Oportunidades" program in Mexico, has had an independent monitoring and evaluation component, which does not exist in the GON's Hambre Cero model. Nicaragua's Poor Left Waiting For Funding, Results -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) FUNIDES also criticized the GON for refusing to release a detailed line-item budget for the Hambre Cero program. All that is currently known is that administrative costs will account for 25% of the $10 million budget for 2007, which is considered high by development experts. The National Assembly approved $10 million for the program in 2007, just one-third of the funding Ortega had originally requested. MAGFOR Vice Minister Dixon announced in July that his agency is seeking international assistance from donors like Japan and the EU to finance the $140 million needed to operate Hambre Cero until 2012. Yet even with an infusion of foreign aid, Hambre Cero appears unlikely to achieve its professed goal of eliminating hunger in Nicaragua. According to the World Bank's "Evaluation of Poverty in Nicaragua," the country is estimated to have more than 2,300,000 individuals living below the poverty line in 2005, while the Hambre Cero program is expected to reach only 75,000 families. Indeed, members of the three indigenous groups that inhabit the banks of the Coco and Bocay Rivers-in the remote northeast of Nicaragua where the Cero Hambre program was first launched in May--have already complained that the assistance being provided by the GON is not nearly enough to fulfill their needs. Comment -------------- ¶9. (SBU) President Ortega's Hambre Cero program seems destined for failure. Even if the GON is able to secure the political and financial support it needs to achieve the program's goals--a tenuous proposition at best--it will still benefit only a fraction of Nicaraguans living in extreme poverty. Moreover, although many key aspects of Hambre Cero have remained out of the public view, from those details that have been released, there is little reason to believe that the program is based on sound and sustainable development strategies. Indeed, it appears to have been developed without any regard for the experiences of other Latin American countries in implementing income transfer programs or for the extensive literature written on the economics of these programs. Having alienated members of both the NGO community and the National Assembly, Ortega seems content to use Hambre Cero as a vehicle through which to reward loyal FSLN supporters and consolidate support for the 2008 municipal elections. Alternatively, widespread discontent with the program's administration could serve as a rallying point for a previously-fragmented political opposition. Either way, we are all expecting some serious "parrilla" (BBQ) in the Hambre Cero sites starting in November. End comment. TRIVELLI