REGIONAL AMBASSADORS SHARE THOUGHTS ON ORTEGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000157 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: REGIONAL AMBASSADORS SHARE THOUGHTS ON ORTEGA GOVERNMENT REF: A. MANAGUA 0140 ¶B. MANAGUA 0106 Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassadors to Nicaragua from Spain, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, and Colombia are concerned that the authoritarian tendencies and lack of experience of many officials in the Ortega administration, combined with the "destabilizing" influence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, may negatively influence regional cooperation and bilateral relations. They also believe that Ortega's first actions suggest he may intend to "transform" Nicaragua's democratic system and replace it with one more in line with Venezuela's authoritarian, populist regime. Several also agree that as long as the Liberals are divided politically, they cannot form an effective opposition, thereby allowing the Sandinistas to manipulate and dominate the National Assembly. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Subsequent to his meeting with Central American ambassadors to discuss the initial actions of the Ortega administration (ref A),the Ambassador hosted a breakfast on January 18 for a group of ambassadors from other regional countries and Spain, whose governments could influence the direction of the new government. The following ambassadors attended the breakfast: - Brazil: Victoria Alice Cleaver, Ambassador - Chile: Natacha Molina Garcia, Ambassador - Colombia: Melba Martinez Lopez, Ambassador - Mexico: Columba Marisela Calvo, Ambassador - Spain: Jaime Lacadena e Higuera, Ambassador ¶3. (C) Most of the ambassadors were concerned about the populist rhetoric of the inauguration (ref B) and President Ortega's attempts during his first days in office to ram through laws increasing the power of the presidency. Several ambassadors, led by Columba Calvo of Mexico, bemoaned the disorganization of the inauguration events and the numerous protocol faux pas committed by its Sandinista organizers. Calvo and Colombian ambassador Melba Martinez commented that the Sandinistas lack experience running a government, and that the scarcity of qualified officials could impact the efficiency of regional programs, such as Plan Puebla-Panama. Calvo, Martinez, and Lacadena openly wondered about the future of bilateral relations with Nicaragua. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Victoria Cleaver of Brazil recounted her experience at the ceremony organized by the National University of Engineering (UNI) to grant Chavez an honorary doctorate. The ceremony started four hours late, but Cleaver, who was exhausted from enduring the chaotic inauguration the day before, was prevented from leaving "early" by security personnel until she insisted. It was an offense that she will not soon forget. ¶5. (C) Chilean Ambassador Natacha Molina tempered the discussion by noting "the behavior of eight days does not necessarily establish a pattern." She commented that the Sandinistas were correct to make poverty eradication their first priority and stated that Chile has the experience and expertise to assist Nicaragua in this regard. Ambassador Trivelli responded that Sandinista officials so far seem to be hastily assembling dozens of pet projects and initiatives, but these efforts are not coordinated in a coherent and efficient manner. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Cleaver expressed her doubt over whether or not Nicaragua would be able to avoid becoming a satellite of Venezuela. She noted that Brasilia has suffered a "Venezuelan invasion" and "we are not even taking money from Chavez." Cleaver commented on Brazil's role as a moderating influence over Chavez' ambitions in the region, and opined that her government may be able to pull Ortega towards the moderate left. Ambassador Martinez responded that her government shares these concerns and is worried that Chavez may destabilize Central America through Nicaragua, further opening the door to drug trafficking and the movement of terrorists. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Trivelli asked the group to comment on the state of the opposition and any steps we could take to reinforce the democratic forces. Ambassador Lacadena stated that so far, only the tiny Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) has vocally opposed Ortega's actions. He opined that former MRS presidential candidate Edmundo Jarquin could play an important role analyzing the policies and actions of the Sandinista Front (FSLN),but unfortunately he holds no official position within the MRS or civil society. Lacadena agreed that certain deputies in the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) may be willing to pull away from PLC leader and convicted ex-President Arnoldo Aleman to form an alternative leadership that would cooperate with the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN). ¶8. (C) Comment: Lacadena is well-known and has influence with the Nicaraguan political class. He seems willing to continue pre-election efforts to bring the Liberals together and was receptive to a suggestion by Ambassador Trivelli to encourage former El Salvadoran President Calderon Sol to return to Nicaragua and help pull the PLC away from Aleman. The ambassadors agreed that the FSLN will continue efforts to keep the Liberals divided and pre-empt concerted opposition in the National Assembly. The left-leaning Brazilian and Chilean governments have the opportunity to influence Ortega and possibly convince him that their democratic left model is a better option than falling under Chavez' orbit of influence. Those ambassadors did seem to warm to the suggestions that their governments take small steps in that direction, e.g., providing technical assistance on biofuels (Brazil) and perhaps sponsoring an economic conference on poverty reduction via liberalization (Chile). TRIVELLI