EX-SANDINISTA VP SERGIO RAMIREZ: RECENT ORTEGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000155 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: EX-SANDINISTA VP SERGIO RAMIREZ: RECENT ORTEGA ACTIONS DO NOT AUGER WELL FOR NICARAGUA REF: A. MANAGUA 0140 ¶B. MANAGUA 0106 ¶C. 2006 MANAGUA 2059 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Sergio Ramirez, a renowned author and Vice President during the 1980s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) era who is estranged from the FSLN, paints a discouraging map of the course the new Ortega government has set over the past week. He recently warned the Ambassador that President Ortega is bent on a course to transform Nicaragua's democratic system to mirror Venezuela's authoritarian regime. He believes that most of the Ortega government's ministries will serve as mere "shells" and exercise little authority, while a shadow government controlled directly by Ortega and his inner circle will call the shots via the tutelage and funding of the Chavez regime. End Summary. Ortega Incapable of Governing, Chooses Loyalty over Capability -- with Some Exceptions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On January 16, Sergio Ramirez, a renowned author and Vice President during the 1980s Sandinista era, provided Ambassador, DCM, and PolCouns a discouraging prognosis of the course the new Ortega government has set over the past week. Ramirez -- who has long since broken with Daniel Ortega and who first endorsed the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) presidential candidate and closer to election day called for Nicaraguans to rally around Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance candidate Eduardo Montealegre - - asserted that President Ortega is "incapable of running a government." He coincided with the Ambassador's description of typical Sandinista traits: informality, improvisation, disorganization, tardiness, and a strong bent for secretiveness. ¶3. (C) Ramirez remarked that most of Ortega's cabinet picks are lackluster: Central Bank President Antenor Rosales is a "fifth-rate" official, new Minister of Environment Amanda Lorio is Ortega spouse Rosario's personal foot masseuse, and Minister of Health Maritza Quant's main qualification is her "handling" of fellow Sandinista union leader/National Assembly deputy Gustavo Porras' medical clinics, claimed Ramirez. Ramirez noted that one encouraging exception in Ortega's choices is Arturo Cruz, Jr., who will represent the GON in Washington. According to Ramirez, shortly after his election, Daniel Ortega consulted with President Carter regarding a suitable choice. Carter raised the matter with some members of the Carter Center's "Friends of the Democratic Charter," including Ramirez and Antonio Lacayo. The consensus was that Cruz, the "man for all seasons," would be an excellent choice. (Note: This version of Cruz's selection has been confirmed to us by Cruz and others as well.) At this juncture, Ortega appeared to seek a pluralistic cabinet that would promote unity and reconciliation as he had promised during his campaign, but events over the past week suggest Ortega is now taking another course of action, remarked Ramirez. Red Flags: Efforts to Control Police and Military - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Ramirez concurred with the Ambassador that President Ortega's recent attempts to secure direct control over the military and police and emasculate the powers of the Defense and Government Ministries are disconcerting. Ortega's vigorous efforts to consolidate his power through drastic changes in Nicaraguan legislation (Laws 290 and 228) present a stark contrast to his apparent delays and bumbling in standing up his cabinet, remarked Ramirez, who added that Ortega appears to be concurrently expanding the central government apparatus, while removing a number of government entities from ministries and placing them under his direct control through new "councils" that will report to Ortega and oversee the ministries. Ramirez warned that Ortega intends to directly oversee defense, security, and foreign affairs interests; the Ministers of Defense, Government, and Foreign Affairs will serve as mere placeholders. He concurred with reports we have received from other interlocutors that Lenin Cerna - "the fixer" - - will play an "inevitable" role in the MANAGUA 00000155 002 OF 004 Ortega government, even though Rosario Murillo clashes with him. Rosario Reigns Supreme - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Continuing on the subject of Rosario, Ramirez noted a shift in the Ortega-Rosario relationship, citing the fact that she spoke before her husband at Ortega's popular inaugural event held at the Plaza La Fe. This breach of protocol was remarkable and signals her growing influence, opined Ramirez. (Comment: Rosario's sway over Ortega is evident, both in public and private venues. Ortega's reported health problems and the information Rosario holds over him on his reported pedophilic inclination may explain her dominance.) Ramirez predicted that Rosario will command considerable influence through her position as "communications director." Chavez Calls the Shots - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) For Ramirez, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez "calls the shots" in the new Ortega government, remarking that Iranian President Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Managua was likely hosted by the new GON on Chavez' "instructions." As for ALBA, Chavez' counteroffer to CAFTA, nobody has seen the document and it will require a "careful peeling away the leaves of this ALBA 'cabbage' to get to the heart of it," he said. (Note: We have asked Foreign Minister Samuel Santos to provide a copy of the document.) ¶7. (C) Ramirez warned that while most Nicaraguans are focusing on Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' many offers of assistance to their country, they do not realize that sudden cash inflows could spur a 2%-3% inflation spike, a phenomenon that in turn could create panic, as many Nicaraguans and their trade partners would likely fear a return to the triple digit inflation of the 1980s. ¶8. (C) Ramirez concurred with the Ambassador that Chavez' "philanthropic" treatment of Nicaragua is clouded by the fact that, while Chavez has offered Ortega seemingly attractive loan terms to purchase Venezuelan oil, he is also lobbying to raise world oil prices. High oil prices especially hurt the world's poor, the very people Chavez claims he champions. On the other hand, Chavez feels pressed to maintain high world oil prices or risk losing his "revolutionary project," opined Ramirez. As for building a refinery in Nicaragua and possibly a trans-coastal pipeline, Ramirez predicted that Chavez will use the refinery's excess production to help supply China's growing energy needs. The Decline of a Sandinista Alternative - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Ramirez termed the Sandinista Renovation Movement's (MRS) decline "an unfortunate turn of events,' citing the recent expulsion of MRS National Assembly Deputy Juan Ramon Jimenez from the party after Jimenez reportedly colluded with rival FSLN and PLC parties to gain a seat in the Assembly's Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) behind the backs of his party's formal negotiations to select another MRS lawmaker. Ramirez, who was surprised by Jimenez' apparent betrayal, commented that Jimenez is a strong, capable, and respected leader in Carazo department. He conjectured that the FSLN may have offered to help Jimenez obtain medical treatment for his wife who is seriously ill with cancer. (Note: Political parties need at least four National Assembly seats to form a caucus and receive the corresponding administrative benefits.) ¶10. (C) Comment: On the evening of January 16, MRS caucus leader Monica Baltodano told the press that, while Fernandez may have been expelled from the MRS, he remains in the MRS National Assembly caucus. Jimenez has previously publicly asserted he wishes to remain within the party, but on January 17 he indicated his plans to be "independent" instead. The FSLN is renowned for its ability to target weak political opponents and buy or blackmail them to the point that they bend to the FSLN's wishes. Salvador Talavera's desertion (Reftel) from the ALN to the Sandinista camp is an example of this tactic. End Comment. MANAGUA 00000155 003 OF 004 Keeping the Opposition off Balance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) In addition to the MRS crisis, the continuing spat between the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) and the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) advantages the Ortega regime, opined Ramirez. The FSLN is taking advantage of the opposition's disarray to bombard the National Assembly with alarming proposed revisions to Laws 290 and 228. If promulgated, these changes would further consolidate the FSLN's power by allowing Ortega to directly control the Armed Forces and the National Police, as well as a number of socially-oriented state entities, warned Ramirez. Low Regard for Nica Private Sector - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query regarding the possible role Nicaragua's private sector could take in ensuring Ortega does not stray off the democratic path, Ramirez offered mostly disdain for what he called "a bunch of rent-seeking individuals," who place their narrow personal business interests above anything else. He contrasted Nicaragua's politically "shortsighted" private sector with the its more mature counterparts in other Central American countries, especially El Salvador, where the private sector rallied around one candidate (Saca) and provided him the financial backing he needed to win. Ramirez also warned that the short-sighted Nicaraguan private sector may be tempted in the near future to support Ortega's reasonable economic policies in exchange for turning a blind eye towards creeping authoritarianism. Holding Ortega's Feet to the Fire on Democracy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) Concurring with the Ambassador that Ortega may not be content with merely assuming the leadership of the new government, but instead, attempt to transform the democratic system into an authoritarian regime, Ramirez noted the important role of international donors, who must hold Ortega accountable to his campaign promises that he would govern democratically. It is not enough for the Ortega government to improve economic indicators and adhere to IMF standards. For example, if Ortega begins to erode basic freedoms and institutions, or restricts the media, donors should tie their assistance to the GON's remedying these behaviors. ¶14. (C) Ramirez outlined three poles of influence that can help check Chavez' influence on Ortega: the EU, Latin American democratic left-leaning countries, and other Central American countries. As major donors, the EU and a number of member countries should tie their assistance to the GON's continuation along a democratic path, while the leftist governments of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina could help offer Ortega an alternative to the Chavez' populist-authoritarian model. Similarly, as neighbors, the other Central American countries can "corral" Ortega within a democratic context and regional instruments such as CAFTA and SIECA. Ramirez cited Honduras President Zelaya and Panamanian President Torrijos as leaders who "are on the good side of Ortega," and can influence him, while Ortega considers Saca his adversary, Guatemalan President Berger is "on his way out," and Costa Rican President Arias suffers longstanding personal issues with Ortega. U.S. Approach on the Mark, Vatican off Base - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶15. (C) Ramirez lauded the USG's approach towards President Ortega thus far, terming President Bush's call to Ortega days before the inauguration an "excellent move." He suggested that an Ortega visit to Washington "sooner rather than later" would also be effective. Ramirez criticized the Vatican's passive stance vis a vis Ortega confident Cardenal Obando y Bravo, decrying Obando's unabashed ingratiation before President Chavez, including seeing him off at the airport. He added that many Nicaraguans were insulted by the hypocrisy of the Cardinal's inaugural prayer to combat corruption, while one of Ortega's "guests of honor" -- Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) caudillo/convicted money launder Arnoldo Aleman -- looked on. MANAGUA 00000155 004 OF 004 Municipals Elections - or Bust - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶16. (C) Ramirez warned that the FSLN-PLC pact will thrive under the Ortega government; pact leaders Ortega and Aleman will pre-arrange the 2008 municipal election results to favor their candidates, as they did in the 2005 national elections. Thanks to Supreme Electoral Council President Roberto Rivas, the FSLN and PLC probably stole four to five Assembly seats from the ALN and probably two from the MRS, calculated Ramirez. Cuban Scenarios - - - - - - - - ¶17. (C) Touching on Cuban leader Fidel Castro's apparent imminent death, the Ambassador outlined three possible scenarios: Raul Castro will remain in power and maintain the party line; Raul Castro will remain at the helm, but as a pragmatist, he will gradually open the economy and implement other modest reforms; or, Cuba will experience a transformative change of government in response to popular cries for democracy. Ramirez predicted that Raul Castro and a number of fellow Army cronies will likely remain in power, but because of their pragmatism and business interests, they will be inclined to take steps to open the Cuban economy. Comment - - - - ¶18. (C) Ramirez' assessment of the current political dynamics tracks with the views of a number of other interlocutors, including third country ambassadors resident in Managua (reftels). Since our meeting with Ramirez, pressure from opposition parties, the media, civil society, and the diplomatic community thankfully prompted the FSLN to "reconsider" some of its proposed modifications to Laws 290 and 228. Under these latest modifications, the supervision of the Police will remain under the Ministry of Government. However, the FSLN has not retracted the revision mandating the formation of "advisory councils" reporting directly to the President and "guiding" ministerial operations, as well as the establishment of popular community councils that will "orient" the National Assembly committees and inform the national councils. How Nicaragua will pay for and organize these new councils is unclear, but if the Assembly accords Ortega the authority to create them, he will be well on his way towards establishing a parallel government network, which would facilitate his apparent efforts to transform Nicaragua's political model to one more to his liking -- and control. TRIVELLI