MISKITOS READY TO MOBILIZE BUT LACK RESOURCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001350

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN SCHIFFER, DRL FOR MAGGIO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM NU
SUBJECT: MISKITOS READY TO MOBILIZE BUT LACK RESOURCES

REF: MANAGUA 1078 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reason 1.4B


1. (C) SUMMARY: Diverse anti-Sandinista Miskito groups in
Nicaragua's North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) are
slowly unifying into a single movement. Significant
challenges remain, but the group is convinced of the need to
win the municipal elections in four key RAAN municipalities
in 2008 as a first step to wrest control of the indigenous
YATAMA organization from the hands of President Ortega's
important Atlantic Coast ally, Brooklyn Rivera (reftel).
Miskito leaders warned that their communities are highly
susceptible to manipulation due to poor education and severe
economic hardship. They stressed the need for community
level civic education, democracy and leadership training, and
technical skills development to limit the impact of such
manipulation in the 2008 elections. Leaders have vowed to
break from the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance party (ALN) in the
2008 elections if party leadership cannot resolve its
differences with the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC)
and unify. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On May 18, Poloff met with 14 leaders of various
pro-democracy Miskito groups opposing President Daniel Ortega
to discuss the progress of unification efforts among the
anti-Sandinista factions of the RAAN's Miskito population.
Represented in the meeting were YATAMA No-Sandinista, two
Miskito NGOs, the Council of Elders, an anti-Sandinista
splinter group of the women's association AMICA, the Miskito
political party PAMUC, and three religious organizations.

Anti-Ortega Opposition Groups Unified...Almost
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3. (C) Over the past several months, pro-democracy Miskito
community leaders opposing Ortega have started working
together to keep the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) from gaining complete control over the Atlantic Coast
region. Whereas economic hardship has traditionally divided
the community -- as each group seeks short-term solutions to
their specific problems -- the larger threat of Sandinista
domination of the coast, to the exclusion of non-Sandinistas,
is forcing the various community factions to work together.
As a result, meeting participants indicated that some 90
percent of the opposition groups have united and signed a
memorandum of understanding.


4. (C) However, significant challenges remain. While the
various groups -- women, youth, elders, NGOs, business
associations, political parties, religious communities, etc.
-- have agreed in principal to work together, there is no
formal structure to this new indigenous pro-democratic
"movement" and no consensus on whether such a structure is
required before initiating outreach and education efforts in
the broader Miskito communities. Further, the movement has
not yet defined its strategy, core set of objectives, or the
roles and responsibilities of the constituent groups within
the strategy framework. Doing so is essential to identify
and prioritize activities, articulate projects, and
understand how individual projects and activities support the
movement's objectives. (NOTE: To date, post has received
proposals from various opposition groups asking for
assistance specifically related to their narrow interest
areas without demonstrating how their projects would support
and advance the unified movement. END NOTE.)


5. (C) Although representatives recognized the need for some
form of "umbrella" structure linking the various groups
within the movement, they had given little thought to
"branding" the movement. They had not discussed how to
ensure that the beneficiaries of potential projects
implemented within the Miskito communities would associate a
specific project to the movement and its underlying
democratic objectives. Poloff explained that project-level
visibility for the movement -- demonstrating that the
movement is responsible for the project and its subsequent
benefits, even if executed through a particular NGO or
organization -- is absolutely crucial to winning converts.

Step 1 2008 Elections, Step 2 Control of YATAMA
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6. (C) Despite the relative nascence of the group's
planning, there is consensus that all efforts must focus on
winning the 2008 municipal elections in the RAAN's principal
municipalities of Waspam, Prinzapolka, Rio Coco, and Puerto
Cabezas. Doing so would severely undermine the power base of
Brooklyn Rivera, president of the indigenous YATAMA
organization and President Ortega's key ally, enforcer, and
policy implementer in the RAAN. Although the majority of the
Miskito people oppose Rivera, he has simply ignored previous
general assemblies' calls for his resignation as YATAMA
president because they lack the power to remove him.
However, opposition victories in these municipalities,
according to meeting attendees, would remove Rivera's formal
power base, virtually guaranteeing that he would be forced to
accept the election results of any subsequent general
assembly held to elect new YATAMA leadership. Meeting
participants clearly indicated that, more than the municipal
victories themselves, removing Rivera and regaining control
of YATAMA is their primary objective since they see it as the
best way to thwart Ortega's efforts in the RAAN.

Underlying Goal - Local Capacity Building
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7. (C) The participants universally agreed that the key to
victory in the 2008 elections -- and thus in their bid to
change YATAMA leadership -- is providing civic education,
democracy training, leadership training, technical skills
development, and micro-credit at the community level.
Miskito leaders warned that Miskito communities are highly
susceptible to manipulation due to generally low education
levels and severe economic hardship. They added that the
FSLN will exploit this weakness in the lead-up to the 2008
elections -- as it did in 2006 by misleading Miskitos about
their rights under Nicaraguan laws and by doling out token
assistance with promises of more in return for votes.
Teaching the Miskitos about their basic rights, identifying
and training leaders to think critically and ask tough
questions, and providing micro-economic prospects will help
ensure that communities are stronger and more independent.
(NOTE: Post has received separate proposals from two Miskito
NGOs -- FURCA for civic education and Aikuki Wal for
leadership development and cooperative formation. Although
the proposals were developed independently, we are
encouraging the two organizations to synchronize community
selection and coordinate development of training materials.
Both have agreed to do so. We forwarded the FURCA proposal
to DRL two months ago for funding consideration and the
Aikuki Wal proposal is in the final stage of translation.
END NOTE.)

Alliance with ALN in 2008 not Guaranteed
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8. (C) Members from the YATAMA No-Sandinista movement and
the indigenous PAMUC party underscored that their support for
ALN candidates in 2008 is far from assured if the ALN cannot
resolve its differences with the PLC at the national level.
Recalling how the Liberal schism hurt the anti-Sandinista
forces in the RAAN in the November 2006 elections, Miskito
leaders have vowed to go their own way, if necessary, and the
president of PAMUC declared that his party is ready to carry
the standard for the Miskito population in 2008.

Comment
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9. (C) Anti-Sandinista Miskito community leaders have hit
the nail on the head. They understand perfectly that victory
in the 2008 municipal elections is their only way to remove
President Ortega's key Atlantic Coast ally, Brooklyn Rivera.
They also understand with painful clarity that they will
never achieve their goal without outside assistance. These
pro-democracy leaders in the Miskito community are extremely
poor, lacking the funds to visit even communities close to
the RAAN's capital of Puerto Cabezas. Without assistance,
visiting distant communities -- let alone providing intensive
training -- will be impossible. The leaders were emphatic
that now, more than ever before, is the time to act. Rivera
has been weakened, the FSLN has yet to deliver on promised
assistance, and the people of the RAAN are looking for help.
They repeatedly warned that if the FSLN -- or its YATAMA
allies -- win the 2008 elections, Ortega will be able to
consolidate his position in the RAAN and it will be too late.

TRIVELLI