NICARAGUAN EDUCATION SYSTEM IN CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001083 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL MAGGIO, WHA/CEN SCHIFFER E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017 TAGS: KDEM PGOV ECON ELAB NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN EDUCATION SYSTEM IN CRISIS REF: MANAGUA 585 Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4(B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Over the past month, Nicaragua's chronically under-funded and fragile education system suffered turmoil over wage disputes, worsened by political rivalries. Teachers demanding a larger salary increase have paralyzed schools throughout the country through partial or complete work stoppages. Deepening the crisis, Sandinista Education Minister Miguel de Castilla (reftel),vowing to change the education system, terminated Nicaragua's autonomous school system by recentralizing budget control and prohibiting collection of voluntary fees. He fired some 1,000 cashiers employed under the old system and closed the offices of the opposition teachers union. Further, he sacked the directors of five of Managua's largest high schools on grounds of misappropriation without proof, triggering a two-week takeover of the schools by parents, students, and teachers. Liberals have called for a formal hearing to investigate De Castilla. To date, President Ortega has remained silent; opposition leaders believe he seeks the right moment to intervene as "The Savior," maximizing his political gain. END SUMMARY. Background - - - - - - ¶2. (U) In 1993, the government of Violeta Chamorro passed the Law of Participative Education (Law 413),transforming the education system in three important ways: First, it authorized schools to form advisory councils comprised of teachers, students, parents, and a school director; second, it empowered schools to begin collecting voluntary fees from willing parents to help cover schools costs; and, finally, it placed the advisory councils in charge of school budgets, which included both funds allocated by the government and funds collected through voluntary contributions. Under this system, the local school advisory councils were responsible for determining the schools' spending priorities and reserved the right to hire and fire school directors for non-performance. The salaries of the school directors, at the discretion of the council, could be augmented by the voluntary fees, based on performance. ¶3. (U) Set within the context of Nicaragua's severely under-funded educational system, these "autonomous" schools performed admirably well in urban areas, responding to the needs of the specific communities served. However, the system has always had its detractors, chief among which is the current Minister of Education, Miguel De Castilla, who claims the fee system evolved from being "voluntary" to "obligatory," excluding tens of thousands of poorer students, especially in rural communities. Jose Zepeda, Secretary General of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)-leaning General Confederation of Nicaraguan Education Workers (ANDEN) claims to have opposed the system since its implementation, but waited quietly during the past three Liberal administrations. Critics also believe that the councils and directors have been corrupted by their fiscal responsibilities, alleging that the directors of some of Managua's larger schools received exorbitant salaries. Where the Trouble Begins - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (U) On January 11, 2007 -- within 24 hours of taking office -- Education Minister De Castilla issued Ministerial Accords 017-2007 and 018-2007, which terminated all "ministerial accords, conventions of autonomy, normatives, and other administrative dispositions" issued under Law 413 and prohibited the collection of "voluntary fees," respectively. On February 10, 2007, De Castilla declared that school advisory councils could no longer authorize additional compensation to directors and sub-directors using either their voluntary fee budget or surplus government funds. ¶5. (U) By eliminating the councils' control over the budget, De Castilla effectively ended the autonomous school system. Although the councils will remain in place to decide administrative matters, De Castilla re-centralized all budget controls in the Ministry. After 13 years of relative autonomy, this overnight change sent shock waves through an already stressed education system, setting it at odds with the Minister, especially in the secondary school system, where voluntary fees comprised a larger percentage of the budget. ¶6. (U) Adding to the pending crisis, on February 21 De Castilla signed a salary readjustment accord with ANDEN, the Sandinista union, authorizing a "salary adjustment" package of 206 million Cordoba, equal to a monthly salary increase of 308 Cordoba (US$ 17.00) for each of Nicaragua's 39,000-plus teachers, retroactive to the first of the year. However, De Castilla did not consult with the liberal-leaning United Teachers Union (USM),an affiliation of 23 smaller unions representing over 16,000 teachers. He justified his decision on grounds that the law requires the minister to negotiate only with unions that have "national representation" and that ANDEN -- with offices in each of the 16 departments and some 23,000 members -- is the only "nationally recognized" union. ¶7. (U) Apparently expecting a larger salary increase, the announcement evoked a strong reaction. Teachers, parents, and students were outraged. Across the country teachers from both unions called for work stoppages and strikes. (NOTE: In a meeting with poloff, Zepeda denied that ANDEN teachers had participated. END NOTE.) Within days, the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH) had received nearly 100 formal denunciations. Small Scale Work Stoppages Begin - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (U) On March 9, CPDH, together with members of the USM unions, announced that weekly Friday-only work stoppages would begin on March 17 and called on schools throughout the country to participate. In mid-March, teachers repeatedly warned that failure to resolve the salary issue would result in full work stoppages, strikes, and street protests beginning on April 9, after the conclusion of Holy Week (April 2-8). De Castilla Dissolves Payment System... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (U) In a Ministry of Education (MINED) circular distributed to the directors of Managua's high schools, De Castilla requested that school directors solicit, by March 31, the resignation of the cashiers employed as part of the voluntary fee system. While MINED estimates the change will affect 660 cashiers nationwide, media sources reported that a minimum of 900-1,000 jobs would be lost in the restructuring. Commenting on the decision, De Castilla offered those with high school diplomas employment as teachers since "there exists a need for around 4,000 teachers." Offended by De Castilla's brazen pronouncement, teachers immediately rejected his idea, insisting that a high school diploma does not qualify someone to teach and that any such redeployment of cashiers would violate the Teaching Career Law. ... Closes Union Offices... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (U) On March 23, De Castilla ordered USM's offices closed. Located in the Civic Center, where they had operated for years, De Castilla justified the closure as a cost-savings measure, claiming the Ministry was spending 95,000 Cordobas (US$5,300) per month on rent that could be better spent "for the better satisfaction of the needs of our population." Locked and guarded by MINED guards, employees in USM's offices were only allowed back in to pick up their personal items. In a denunciation before CPDH, USM members alleged that De Castilla closed their offices in retribution for their work stoppages and strong criticism of his actions -- claims De Castilla roundly denied. ... And Fires School Directors - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) On Friday, March 30, De Castilla announced the immediate firing of the directors of five of Managua's largest autonomous high schools for alleged misappropriation of funds. According to the Law of Participative Education (Law 413),the Minister can directly interfere in school affairs only when there is proven evidence of misuse of funds or other corruption. However, three of the fired directors -- Vismar Cruz (Villa Austria School),Jairo Caceres (Miguel Ramirez Goyena) and Miriam Trana (14 de Septiembre) -- as well as National Assembly Education Commission president Mario Valle, assured poloff that none of the schools had been audited and there was no evidence of misappropriation. What's more, they insisted that De Castilla violated Law 413 by taking action without conclusive evidence, a position confirmed by National Assembly Labor Commission president Alejandro Bolanos. ¶12. (C) According to a letter from De Castilla to Jairo Caceres -- delivered to him at the time of his physical removal from his school -- the basis for De Castilla's misappropriation claim was a supposed violation of the February 10 declaration that school directors were no longer authorized to receive additional compensation. According to the directors, De Castilla alleged they had received payments in February and March, after the declaration. The directors rebuffed this allegation, explaining to poloff that they had not received the declaration until the end of February, after the month's payment had been made, and the council had authorized payment for March. When asked why they thought they might have been singled out, they explained that all five fired directors were members of a Managua-wide education council that De Castilla considers a threat to his power. Students and Teachers Take Over Schools - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) De Castilla's announcement, on the heels of the wage dispute, the union office closure, and the cashier firings, set off a maelstrom. Parents, students, and teachers immediately denounced De Castilla's decision and took over and barricaded four of the five schools in protest and to prevent ministry officials from removing the directors. Of the five directors, only Jairo Caceres from Miguel Ramirez Goyena left voluntarily following the announced dismissals. In his meeting with poloff, he recounted that a team of 7-8 MINED officials showed up in his office, presented him with the aforementioned letter, and without further justification of their actions, forcefully removed him from his office without allowing him time to gather his personal effects. The sub-director was installed as interim director under the watchful eye of a "team of ministry officials" that, according to Caceres, remains in place. The other fired directors indicated that MINED installed similar teams in their schools. ¶14. (U) De Castilla announced the dismissals on the Friday before Holy Week vacation commenced, intending to use the vacation time as a transition for the interim directors and as a mental buffer for the teachers and students to recover from the decision. However, this plan did not work. Instead, parents, teachers, and students in the other four schools -- Villa Austria, 14 de Septiembre, Miguel de Cervantes, and Benjamin Zeledon -- declared that they would remain in lockdown and no MINED official would be allowed to enter until De Castilla rescinded his allegations of fund misappropriations. Still at an impasse over wage negotiations, the teachers vowed to intensify their work stoppage after the holiday, moving from a single day per week to a complete work stoppage. 1980s Flashback - - - - - - - - ¶15. (U) In the early morning hours of April 10, nearly two weeks after the school takeover, 14 hooded members of the Federation of Secondary Students (FES) under the command of Cuban-born Sandinista radical Victor Cienfuegos, stormed the Miguel de Cervantes school, allegedly sporting homemade pistols and other weapons, and removed school director Juan Narvaez under threat of violence. Questioned by the media following the incident, Cienfuegos justified his actions stating "This is a social struggle, we are rescuing the school for the students of this district. All (those who took over the school) are students and asked for my help and I went with them." (NOTE: Contrary to Cienfuego's statement, none of the 14 FES members were active students at Miguel de Cervantes, all had been expelled for bad behavior. Additionally, FES leader, Javier Espana, according to media reports, is not a student, had never studied in public schools, and has served as the non-elected leader of FES for years. END NOTE). De Castilla Implicated in Takeover Planning - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶16. (C) Following the takeover -- which served as a vivid reminder to the Nicaraguan people of Cienfuego's school takeovers in the 1980s -- De Castilla vehemently denied any knowledge of the event. However, Gustavo Bermudez, a commentator for "Radio Corporacion," reported to poloff that he was sitting in De Castilla,s office, with the Minister present, while two men were on the phone discussing plans for the takeover. From the conversation, Bermudez reported that it appeared the original plan was to take over all four still-guarded schools, but the other schools were too heavily protected by families and human rights organization representatives. Bermudez recounted that he denounced the Minister's knowledge of the takeovers on his radio program, but lamented that it appeared to have no affect. (NOTE: In a previous conversation with ANDEN director Zepeda, poloff asked why Miguel de Cervantes had been the target of the takeover. Zepeda commented that "it was something personal between Narvaez and Cienfuegos." END NOTE). De Castilla Acquiesces on Misappropriation Claim - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (SBU) On April 12, in what was largely perceived as a defeat for the Minister, De Castilla signed an accord with the five directors guaranteeing that "the records of the directors will remain clean of any administrative sanctions." In addition, the accord acknowledges, "the procedures used to intervene in the schools were not the most appropriate," and that "under labor law, the directors had a right to know about any auditory process or cause for sanctions." Although the agreement required the directors to renounce their jobs, the letter also clearly showed that De Castilla had badly fumbled the dismissal of the school directors. Strikes and Work Stoppages Continue - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶18. (U) While De Castilla's acquiescence ended the school takeovers, it did nothing to halt the work stoppages slowly spreading around the country. The full work stoppages announced before the Holy Week holiday began, in limited numbers, on April 9 and continue. While the exact number of schools and teachers that have participated in some form of partial or full work stoppage over the past four weeks is not clear, National Assembly Education Commission president Mario Valle opined that less than 10 percent of the nations 39,000-plus teachers have participated. Independent analysis of media coverage would seem to confirm this estimate, showing that approximately 4,000 teachers from at least eight departments -- Carazo, Chinandega, Chontales, Esteli, Leon, Managua, Matagalpa, and Nuevo Segovia -- have participated. Although the Ministry of Education has been quick to point out that fewer than perhaps 50 of Nicaragua's 9,000-plus schools have been affected by the stoppages, because they have been concentrated in Managua and other urban centers, the proportion of students affected is much more significant. Budget Confusion Fueled Problems - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶19. (C) Underlying the initial work stoppages was confusion over the approved wage increase. According to news reports, teachers had expected to receive a 516 Cordoba (US$27) monthly salary increase based on what appears to have been either a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the education budget. Poloff consulted with the presidents of the Education Commission, Labor Commission, and Economic Commission in the National Assembly and all denied such an increase was included in the 2007 education budget. However, Mario Valle, Zepeda from ANDEN and Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, president of the Economic Commission did comment that the budget calculations may not have correctly factored in employee insurance and other mandatory payments that would reduce the net salary paid to employees. Valle and Sacasa estimated the number to be 24 and 56 million Cordobas, respectively, while USM leader Jose Siero was quoted saying 68 million Cordobas. ¶20. (C) In an attempt to rectify the situation and avert further strikes and work stoppages, Aguirre Sacasa reported sitting down with USM leaders, De Castilla and others on April 16 to present a counter-offer. Sacasa's package included an additional 50-60 million Cordobas, bringing the total monthly compensation adjustment to US$21-23. He lamented that the offer was not accepted, but would not or could not reveal what had happened to sour the deal. In a counter proposal reported in the media on April 23, teachers asked the government to pay out the full 206 million Cordobas as a salary increase and to cover upwards of 78 million Cordobas in insurance and other payments, a request that, assured Valle and Aguirre Sacasa, is strictly forbidden by law. Salary Increase Could Jeopardize International Funding - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶21. (C) Aguirre Sacasa readily asserted that the Nicaraguan government cannot afford to offer teachers a US$30 monthly salary increase. Although he characterized the current national budget as "surprisingly austere," he warned that such an increase would certainly place at risk future international funding. A member of the PLC, Aguirre Sacasa blamed political rivals in the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN),claiming they sided with the striking teachers for short-term political gain instead of Nicaragua's long-term interests. He emphasized that any wage adjustment decisions for public sector employees must be evaluated within the context of access to international funding. ¶22. (C) Aguirre Sacasa further warned that giving teachers the demanded increase could trigger other public sector workers to ask for salary increases. Under intense pressure from one of his key constituent bases, President Ortega could invoke populist rhetoric, underwriting across the board increases by reneging on outstanding debt service. According to Aguirre Sacasa, Ortega might also see this as a way to punish Liberals who supported striking teachers (ALN), believing that these Liberals would come under intense criticism from the private sector for not adequately defending private sector interests should funding be cut and the economy suffer. National Assembly Willing to Summon De Castilla? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶23. (SBU) Attempts by Valle, Bolanos, and Aguirre Sacasa, as well as by USM leaders and teachers to sit down with De Castilla to discuss complaints and legal violations have been largely unsuccessful. He has cancelled meetings, not shown up, and, on April 17, snuck out the back door minutes before a scheduled meeting with Valle, Bolanos, and Aguirre Sacasa. On April 18, De Castilla finally appeared before the National Assembly, but refused to answer questions. Instead, according to Aguirre Sacasa, he stood before the Assembly and lamented in an "articulate and compelling manner" about the state of Nicaragua's education system. ¶24. (C) Unable to get satisfactory explanations under voluntary circumstances, Liberal national assembly deputies -- led by Labor Commission president Bolanos -- are seeking approval to call De Castilla before a formal hearing ("interpelacion") in the National Assembly. In a rare show of Liberal unity, the presidents of both the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) and the ALN caucuses signed the motion, giving it the votes necessary to put the motion on the Assembly's agenda. While Bolanos was confident the formal hearing would move forward, Valle confided that the Executive Committee lacked the political will to put the motion on the agenda and that it would never "see the light of day." To date, the Assembly has not summoned De Castilla to a formal hearing. ¶25. (C) The motion filed by Bolanos declares that De Castilla's actions since teachers first declared their work stoppage in early March have violated the Nicaraguan Constitution (Articles 26, 34, 58, 118),the Law of Participative Education (Articles 4, 5, 6, 16),Law of the Teaching Profession (Articles 36, 88),the Teachers' Collective Bargaining agreement, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 11, 12, 23). Commenting on Bolanos' motion, Valle accused him and the ALN of getting involved in the education crisis for "purely political reasons," stating that the ALN wouldn't "make a strong stand." Setting Stage for "El Salvador" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶26. (C) Throughout this ordeal, which has seen De Castilla come under tremendous pressure and criticism, President Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo have remained silent. Valle opined that Ortega is "watching very closely, waiting for the ideal moment - politically - to react." He predicted Ortega would "take action within 30 days" (by mid-May), perhaps coordinated with the arrival of school supplies from Venezuela. Aguirre Sacasa agreed that he believes Ortega is waiting for the ideal moment, but stated that Ortega may use the symbolically important May 1 Workers' Day to make his move. Aguirre Sacasa warned, however, that Ortega runs the risk of losing control of the situation if he waits too long. Further, he believes that Ortega will use the much bigger and better organized ANDEN to control and quell the USM teachers, keeping them from getting out of control until Ortega is ready to present himself as "The Savior." Comment: - - - - ¶27. (C) It is possible that Ortega firmly believes in De Castilla's initial efforts to reform the education system and recognizes that the economy, as Aguirre Sacasa indicated, simply cannot absorb the additional increase in teachers' salaries without threatening the country's future economic viability. Thus, he is willing to suffer the shorter-term consequences for the longer-term political pay-off. Certainly, Ortega and the Sandinistas demonstrated ample patience in waiting 16 years to regain the presidency. If so, he could indeed emerge as a true "champion" of education and reap political gains. That said, Ortega cannot afford to get this wrong. Education formed a cornerstone of his election campaign and education, as a cause, is symbolically -- and thus strategically -- important to the Sandinista socialist ideology. Therefore, Ortega's absolute silence during this period of turmoil is puzzling. He has neither criticized nor defended his embattled Minister of Education and has not responded to the pleas of teachers and families. ¶28. (C) Opposition leaders believe he is simply waiting for the perfect time to take action to maximize his political gains, a strategy that becomes increasingly risky as time goes on. Perhaps, however, Ortega's opponents give him too much credit. It is hard to imagine a single "quick fix" that will undo the acrimony built up over the past month towards the Minister and Ortega. If, in fact, Ortega is playing this game purely for personal political power, without true interest for the welfare of the teachers, parents, and students, then any gain will certainly be tempered by the loss of disillusioned Sandinistas looking for other options. Further, the longer the education crisis continues, the more time Ortega gives his Liberal opponents to form a unified opposition against him. The ALN, PLC, and Sandinista Renovationist Movement (MRS) have all publicly criticized De Castilla's handling of the situation and all three caucuses signed the motion to summon De Castilla to the National Assembly. As long as the issue remains an obvious soft target, the opposition will continue hitting it, emboldened through the growing sympathy of a public fed-up with being ignored by De Castilla and Ortega. TRIVELLI