Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MADRID950
2007-05-18 17:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:
DEPUTY FM LEON ON KOSOVO, IRAQ, IRAN/VENEZUELA,
VZCZCXRO0041 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHMD #0950/01 1381727 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 181727Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2549 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3938 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0167 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0036 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 5198 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0532 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0115 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1164 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0131 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0328 RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0123 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0844 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 1149 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 6020 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0188 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2706
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000950
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: PREL SP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM LEON ON KOSOVO, IRAQ, IRAN/VENEZUELA,
WESTERN SAHARA, RUSSIA
REF: A. STATE 64975
B. STATE 61378
C. STATE 57275
D. STATE 59249
MADRID 00000950 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000950
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: PREL SP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM LEON ON KOSOVO, IRAQ, IRAN/VENEZUELA,
WESTERN SAHARA, RUSSIA
REF: A. STATE 64975
B. STATE 61378
C. STATE 57275
D. STATE 59249
MADRID 00000950 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Summary. Charge met with MFA Secretary of State
Bernardino Leon on May 17 at the Charge's residence. Leon
said Spain was looking forward to the visit of Secretary Rice
and said that there was concern that the visit not be
manipulated by "either side" of the Spanish political
spectrum. Charge thanked Leon for Spain's recent $28 million
contribution to Iraqi reconstruction; Leon reconfirmed
Spain's commitment to the International Compact with Iraq.
On Kosovo, Leon reiterated Spain's commitment to the EU
position on Kosovo, but also the position that Spain could
not likely keep forces in Kosovo if there was not a UNSC
resolution supporting the Ahtissari Plan and Kosovo
unilaterally declared independence in the absence of such a
resolution, citing implications for Spain's own problems with
national minorities. Charge relayed USG concerns regarding
growing ties between Venezuela and Iran. Leon said Spain had
deep concerns regarding the overall direction of events in
Venezuela (with which Spain expects a more difficult and
strained relationship over the next months) and had
specifically cautioned Caracas regarding its links to Iran.
On Russian President Putin's comments on the CFE Treaty and
Russia's position on missile defense, Leon expressed support
for USG positions. Leon praised the role of DNSA Elliot
Abrams in pressing forward on the Western Sahara issue,
saying he believed the Polisario may be prepared to negotiate
but that the USG and others would likely have to work Algeria
further to bring them on board. Lastly, Leon discussed his
role in leading Spain's diplomatic engagement with African
nations to stem the flow of illegal immigration to the Canary
Islands. End Summary.
//VISIT TO SPAIN OF SECRETARY RICE//
2. (C) Regarding the anticipated June 1 visit to Madrid by
the Secretary, Leon said that Spain was focused on laying the
groundwork for an effective and successful visit. He said
that the Zapatero Government did not want the visit to be
manipulated "by either side" and hinted that the USG could
urge the opposition Popular Party to avoid making the visit a
partisan event. The Charge said that the USG had worked with
both the PP and the PSOE for some time to keep Spanish
relations with the USG from being used for partisan purposes,
but that we could not control how any party in Spain would
respond to the Secretary's presence in Spain. Leon and the
Charge discussed possible agenda items for the Secretary's
bilateral meetings in Spain.
//IRAQ//
3. (C) Charge thanked Leon for Spain's pledge of $28 million
for Iraqi reconstruction at the last meeting at
Sharm-el-Sheik. He said Spain's support for stability in
Iraq and support for the International Compact with Iraq was
an important signal of Spain,s support for democracy and
stability. Leon said that, whatever differences between the
U.S. and Spain on Iraq, Spain did not want the U.S. to fail
in Iraq. He emphasized Spain's support for the Compact as
part of its overall policy of promoting regional stability.
//KOSOVO//
4. (C) Charge relayed REF A points, underscoring USG support
for the Ahtissari Plan, which includes Kosovo independence
and finally provides a vehicle for a comprehensive resolution
of the issue. In this context, Spain's presence in Kosovo
was critical. Leon said that Spain was a disciplined
supporter of the EU position on Kosovo and would continue to
promote a UN-led resolution of the issue. However, Leon said
MADRID 00000950 002.2 OF 003
that if there was no UNSC resolution supporting the Ahtissari
Plan, and Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, it would
be highly likely that Spain would withdraw its forces from
Kosovo. Spain understands that Kosovo is a special case,
given Serbia's history of ethnic cleansing, and that this
special history separated it from Spain's own problems with
national minorities, such as the Basques. But, if the Kosovo
issue were to be mishandled, it could have a domestic impact
for Spain, with some minority nationalist groups claiming the
Kosovo example as a pathway to greater independence. Leon
urged a deliberate approach on the UN resolution, saying the
Russians were posturing and "gaming"supporters of the
Ahtissari Plan, but could be brought around eventually. "We
would prefer a quick resolution of the matter, but it's more
important to have a plan that is acceptable to all parties
than to rush through a plan that is unacceptable to one of
the major parties." Leon ventured that the formation of the
new Serbian Government constituted a positive development.
//IRAN-VENEZUELA LINKS//
4. (C) Charge discussed the USG's concerns regarding the
deepening relationship between Venezuela and Iran (REF B),
which undermines both our effort to strengthen regional
capacity to fight transnational crime and our broader effort
to compel Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions on its nuclear
program. Leon said that Spain was concerned with
developments in Venezuela at virtually every level. He said
Spain expected its relationship with Venezuela to enter into
a difficult period in the near future, since Spain was
shifting its approach from emphasizing engagement with the
Chavez Government (which Leon acknowledged had provided
access to Chavez, but nothing more) to an approach in which
the new Spanish Ambassador would be laying down markers for
the Venezuelan authorities. On Venezuelan-Iranian relations,
Leon said that Spanish officials had raised this issue with
Caracas, asking the Venezuelan authorities how closer
relations with Iran would diminish the alleged USG security
threat against Venezuela. The Venezuelans "did not listen at
all" to Spain's concerns. Leon said that the Spanish
Government had also raised the RCTV closure with senior
Venezuelan officials, and failed to make headway on this
issue as well. The Charge urged Spain to voice its concerns
regarding the direction of events in Venezuela.
//RUSSIA, CFE, MISSLE DEFENSE//
5. (C) On Russia, Charge expressed concern regarding Putin's
April 26 remarks on the CFE treaty and the USG's puzzlement
with Russia's suggestion that NATO is not fulfilling its
obligations under the CFE (REF C). He also underscored the
importance of the Allies standing together and delivering the
message, publicly and privately, that the Alliance remains
fully committed to NATO compliance with the CFE. Charge
noted that the USG does not accept Russian linkage of
disagreements over the CFE and U.S. and NATO missile defense
plans (REF D). Leon agreed on the need to present a united
front on the CFE issue. On missile defense, Leon said that
Spain would not take a leading role in addressing the issue,
but would work within NATO in support of the U.S. position.
He said Spain understood that the USG had acted appropriately
to advise Russia of USG plans related to missile defense.
//WESTERN SAHARA//
6. (C) Turning to the Western Sahara, Charge told Leon that
it was essential to maintain the momentum in the aftermath of
the successful UNSC resolution on the extension of Minurso.
Leon agreed and said that the GOS remained extremely pleased
and gratified by the level of U.S. policy interest in the
issue. He said it was a great example of positive U.S.
foreign policy engagement, and he praised the leadership of
DNSA Abrams. He said that the Spanish are committed to
working with Special Envoy van Walsum to get negotiations
moving under UN auspices. He noted that the U.S. is perhaps
MADRID 00000950 003.2 OF 003
more eager than Spain to move the process quickly, but he
said that there is a good chance to achieve a solution to the
Western Sahara issue this time. He stated his belief that
the Polisario are genuinely ready to negotiate at last, and
he added that Algeria would remain the wild card in forging a
successful negotiated settlement. Leon told DCM that the
U.S. should use its influence with Bouteflika to press
Algeria to work constructively to settle the question. He
suggested that in Spain's view the U.S. has increased
leverage over Algeria, more than any other member of the
Group of Friends.
//LEON MANAGING IMMIGRATION ISSUES//
7. (C) Leon regretted the brevity of his meeting with the
Charge, as he had to leave immediately after for a trip to
Senegal to work on countering the ongoing illegal migration
flows from West Africa to the Canary Islands. He confided to
the Charge that he had been handed this relatively hopeless
portfolio and was frustrated both by his inability to gain
traction with West African governments and by the EU's
unwillingness to take serious collective action on the
crisis. He said that West African ministers seemed genuinely
interested in addressing their population and economic
difficulties but were hamstrung by a lack of capacity. With
respect to the consistent flow of migrants to the Canary
Islands, he speculated that this could become increasingly
problematic for Spain and the EU.
LLORENS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: PREL SP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM LEON ON KOSOVO, IRAQ, IRAN/VENEZUELA,
WESTERN SAHARA, RUSSIA
REF: A. STATE 64975
B. STATE 61378
C. STATE 57275
D. STATE 59249
MADRID 00000950 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Summary. Charge met with MFA Secretary of State
Bernardino Leon on May 17 at the Charge's residence. Leon
said Spain was looking forward to the visit of Secretary Rice
and said that there was concern that the visit not be
manipulated by "either side" of the Spanish political
spectrum. Charge thanked Leon for Spain's recent $28 million
contribution to Iraqi reconstruction; Leon reconfirmed
Spain's commitment to the International Compact with Iraq.
On Kosovo, Leon reiterated Spain's commitment to the EU
position on Kosovo, but also the position that Spain could
not likely keep forces in Kosovo if there was not a UNSC
resolution supporting the Ahtissari Plan and Kosovo
unilaterally declared independence in the absence of such a
resolution, citing implications for Spain's own problems with
national minorities. Charge relayed USG concerns regarding
growing ties between Venezuela and Iran. Leon said Spain had
deep concerns regarding the overall direction of events in
Venezuela (with which Spain expects a more difficult and
strained relationship over the next months) and had
specifically cautioned Caracas regarding its links to Iran.
On Russian President Putin's comments on the CFE Treaty and
Russia's position on missile defense, Leon expressed support
for USG positions. Leon praised the role of DNSA Elliot
Abrams in pressing forward on the Western Sahara issue,
saying he believed the Polisario may be prepared to negotiate
but that the USG and others would likely have to work Algeria
further to bring them on board. Lastly, Leon discussed his
role in leading Spain's diplomatic engagement with African
nations to stem the flow of illegal immigration to the Canary
Islands. End Summary.
//VISIT TO SPAIN OF SECRETARY RICE//
2. (C) Regarding the anticipated June 1 visit to Madrid by
the Secretary, Leon said that Spain was focused on laying the
groundwork for an effective and successful visit. He said
that the Zapatero Government did not want the visit to be
manipulated "by either side" and hinted that the USG could
urge the opposition Popular Party to avoid making the visit a
partisan event. The Charge said that the USG had worked with
both the PP and the PSOE for some time to keep Spanish
relations with the USG from being used for partisan purposes,
but that we could not control how any party in Spain would
respond to the Secretary's presence in Spain. Leon and the
Charge discussed possible agenda items for the Secretary's
bilateral meetings in Spain.
//IRAQ//
3. (C) Charge thanked Leon for Spain's pledge of $28 million
for Iraqi reconstruction at the last meeting at
Sharm-el-Sheik. He said Spain's support for stability in
Iraq and support for the International Compact with Iraq was
an important signal of Spain,s support for democracy and
stability. Leon said that, whatever differences between the
U.S. and Spain on Iraq, Spain did not want the U.S. to fail
in Iraq. He emphasized Spain's support for the Compact as
part of its overall policy of promoting regional stability.
//KOSOVO//
4. (C) Charge relayed REF A points, underscoring USG support
for the Ahtissari Plan, which includes Kosovo independence
and finally provides a vehicle for a comprehensive resolution
of the issue. In this context, Spain's presence in Kosovo
was critical. Leon said that Spain was a disciplined
supporter of the EU position on Kosovo and would continue to
promote a UN-led resolution of the issue. However, Leon said
MADRID 00000950 002.2 OF 003
that if there was no UNSC resolution supporting the Ahtissari
Plan, and Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, it would
be highly likely that Spain would withdraw its forces from
Kosovo. Spain understands that Kosovo is a special case,
given Serbia's history of ethnic cleansing, and that this
special history separated it from Spain's own problems with
national minorities, such as the Basques. But, if the Kosovo
issue were to be mishandled, it could have a domestic impact
for Spain, with some minority nationalist groups claiming the
Kosovo example as a pathway to greater independence. Leon
urged a deliberate approach on the UN resolution, saying the
Russians were posturing and "gaming"supporters of the
Ahtissari Plan, but could be brought around eventually. "We
would prefer a quick resolution of the matter, but it's more
important to have a plan that is acceptable to all parties
than to rush through a plan that is unacceptable to one of
the major parties." Leon ventured that the formation of the
new Serbian Government constituted a positive development.
//IRAN-VENEZUELA LINKS//
4. (C) Charge discussed the USG's concerns regarding the
deepening relationship between Venezuela and Iran (REF B),
which undermines both our effort to strengthen regional
capacity to fight transnational crime and our broader effort
to compel Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions on its nuclear
program. Leon said that Spain was concerned with
developments in Venezuela at virtually every level. He said
Spain expected its relationship with Venezuela to enter into
a difficult period in the near future, since Spain was
shifting its approach from emphasizing engagement with the
Chavez Government (which Leon acknowledged had provided
access to Chavez, but nothing more) to an approach in which
the new Spanish Ambassador would be laying down markers for
the Venezuelan authorities. On Venezuelan-Iranian relations,
Leon said that Spanish officials had raised this issue with
Caracas, asking the Venezuelan authorities how closer
relations with Iran would diminish the alleged USG security
threat against Venezuela. The Venezuelans "did not listen at
all" to Spain's concerns. Leon said that the Spanish
Government had also raised the RCTV closure with senior
Venezuelan officials, and failed to make headway on this
issue as well. The Charge urged Spain to voice its concerns
regarding the direction of events in Venezuela.
//RUSSIA, CFE, MISSLE DEFENSE//
5. (C) On Russia, Charge expressed concern regarding Putin's
April 26 remarks on the CFE treaty and the USG's puzzlement
with Russia's suggestion that NATO is not fulfilling its
obligations under the CFE (REF C). He also underscored the
importance of the Allies standing together and delivering the
message, publicly and privately, that the Alliance remains
fully committed to NATO compliance with the CFE. Charge
noted that the USG does not accept Russian linkage of
disagreements over the CFE and U.S. and NATO missile defense
plans (REF D). Leon agreed on the need to present a united
front on the CFE issue. On missile defense, Leon said that
Spain would not take a leading role in addressing the issue,
but would work within NATO in support of the U.S. position.
He said Spain understood that the USG had acted appropriately
to advise Russia of USG plans related to missile defense.
//WESTERN SAHARA//
6. (C) Turning to the Western Sahara, Charge told Leon that
it was essential to maintain the momentum in the aftermath of
the successful UNSC resolution on the extension of Minurso.
Leon agreed and said that the GOS remained extremely pleased
and gratified by the level of U.S. policy interest in the
issue. He said it was a great example of positive U.S.
foreign policy engagement, and he praised the leadership of
DNSA Abrams. He said that the Spanish are committed to
working with Special Envoy van Walsum to get negotiations
moving under UN auspices. He noted that the U.S. is perhaps
MADRID 00000950 003.2 OF 003
more eager than Spain to move the process quickly, but he
said that there is a good chance to achieve a solution to the
Western Sahara issue this time. He stated his belief that
the Polisario are genuinely ready to negotiate at last, and
he added that Algeria would remain the wild card in forging a
successful negotiated settlement. Leon told DCM that the
U.S. should use its influence with Bouteflika to press
Algeria to work constructively to settle the question. He
suggested that in Spain's view the U.S. has increased
leverage over Algeria, more than any other member of the
Group of Friends.
//LEON MANAGING IMMIGRATION ISSUES//
7. (C) Leon regretted the brevity of his meeting with the
Charge, as he had to leave immediately after for a trip to
Senegal to work on countering the ongoing illegal migration
flows from West Africa to the Canary Islands. He confided to
the Charge that he had been handed this relatively hopeless
portfolio and was frustrated both by his inability to gain
traction with West African governments and by the EU's
unwillingness to take serious collective action on the
crisis. He said that West African ministers seemed genuinely
interested in addressing their population and economic
difficulties but were hamstrung by a lack of capacity. With
respect to the consistent flow of migrants to the Canary
Islands, he speculated that this could become increasingly
problematic for Spain and the EU.
LLORENS