SPANISH VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000807 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PASS TO NPT COLLECTIVE; DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS); GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016 TAGS: ENRG MNUC PARM PREL KNNP NPT SP SUBJECT: SPANISH VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM REF: SECSTATE 54147 Classified By: Hugo Llorens, Deputy Chief of Mission, Reasons: 1.4 b & d ¶1. (U) ESTHOFF passed reftel points April 24 to MFA Deputy Director General Ignacio Sanchez, requesting Spanish thoughts on the U.S. agenda for the May PrepCom for the 2010 NPT RevCon. Sanchez, who had clearly given considerable thought to the U.S. nonpaper, relayed GOS views to ESTHOFF during an April 27 meeting. ¶2. (C) Sanchez said that Spain agreed with most of the points related to the review process, but lamented our lack of reference to the importance of universality (i.e., the fact that India, Pakistan and Israel are not NPT signatories). Spain believes the NPT is in crisis. Many states believe the core NPT bargain has not being respected and that the treaty has lost validity. Spain, however, believes the NPT remains a cornerstone of the global nonproliferation architecture. At least 140 of the 144 members are complying with their obligations. ¶3. (C) The task, according to Sanchez, is to reverse the trend of the NPT's declining credibility and to start to reinforce it. This will not be possible without engaging on the universality issue. Spain realizes that an overly forceful approach on universality could stall the 2010 RevCon, but believes there is a way to include the theme without deadlocking the RevCon. ¶4. (C) Spain, according to Sanchez, would also like to see a greater U.S. emphasis on disarmament. Article 6 of the NPT talks about disarmament and the 1968 NPT bargain was not supposed to be freeze the arsenals of the nuclear power states but to instead create a framework for the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. Madrid understands that the key is U.S.-Russian strategic arms reductions, but believes that a stronger emphasis on disarmament during the RevCon, combined with demonstrable progress on the ground (e.g, further U.S.-Russian reductions),would serve to build the NPT's credibility among the non-nuclear weapons states. ¶5. (C) Warming to the theme, Sanchez said that many non-nuclear weapons states think that they have carried the burden while the nuclear weapons states have not made serious disarmament efforts and the three states outside the framework (India, Pakistan, and Israel) have in many ways benefited from staying outside (e.g., India gaining better access to U.S. and Russian nuclear technology). ¶6. (C) Sanchez said that Spain mostly liked our points on compliance and verification. Spain agrees that the Additional Protocol needs to be made universal and supports the U.S. view that while the overall verification system works for declared nuclear materials, it is failing to effectively curb clandestine nuclear programs. ¶7. (C) Regarding the nonproliferation points, Spain takes a more holistic view than the U.S. Spain thinks that nuclear materials can't be effectively controlled unless the nuclear fuel cycle is better regulated via the FMCT and CTBT. 10 countries, including the U.S., have still not ratified the CTBT and Spain would like to see Washington reconsider. ¶8. (C) Sanchez said it was clear that there is growing global interest in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The international community needs to develop a consensus on the terms for expanded global use of nuclear energy. Should countries be allowed to master the entire fuel cycle or only parts of it? Objective criteria need to be developed. There can be no double standards or "arbitrary access criteria". Spain thus supports international strategic management of the fuel cycle with clear rules of the road. Spain's preference is that new entrants into the nuclear power circle not be allowed to master the entire fuel cycle (for obvious nonproliferation concerns),but this needs to be clarified and rules-based. Aguirre