SPANISH MFA READOUT OF MORATINOS TRIP TO CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000687 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM CU SP SUBJECT: SPANISH MFA READOUT OF MORATINOS TRIP TO CUBA REF: A. MADRID 629 ¶B. HAVANA 352 MADRID 00000687 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With FM Moratinos traveling in Central Asia as OSCE chairman and thus unable to meet with the Ambassador, MFA Secretary of State for Latin America Trinidad Jimenez gave DCM an initial readout on April 12 of Moratinos' trip to Cuba. Jimenez said that the trip's objective was to re-engage with Cuba, based on Moratinos' assessment that the GOS policy of minimal contact had proven an ineffective tactic. Cuban leaders, including Raul Castro, told Moratinos that Raul is in charge, Fidel is not coming back, and they plan no move to democracy. Raul does appear willing to consider certain changes to the economic model in hopes of relieving Cuba's ongoing economic problems. Jimenez claimed that the trip paid off in its agreement with CUBA to establish an ongoing political dialogue in which they will discuss subjects including human rights and political prisoners. Jimenez also said that Spain's renewed development assistance and business engagement would help push CUBA to make reforms. DCM expressed the USG's "deep disappointment" at the trip and provided a detailed review of why this approach had undermined US-EU cooperation in support of a democratic opening in Cuba. DCM suggested that senior Spanish officials consider issuing public statements in support of Cuban democracy as a way to mitigate some of the damage done. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) As reported in ref A, Moratinos, accompanied by Jimenez and DG for Latin America Javier Sandomingo, met in Havana on April 2-3 with Raul Castro, FM Perez Roque, VP Lage, and others. Moratinos did not meet with dissidents, although Sandomingo subsequently did after Moratinos' departure. ¶3. (C) In their April 12 meeting, DCM told Jimenez that while EUR PDAS Kurt Volker and MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar had recently discussed Cuba, he looked forward to a complete report from her because she had been at Moratinos' side throughout the trip. Jimenez said that the purpose of the trip was to "find space to work in Cuba." She said that the trip came about because Moratinos felt that the existing hardline policy of minimal contact with the Cuban regime hadn't worked. While Spain continues to support the EU 
Common Policy, it hasn't worked tactically. Moratinos determined that now was the time for dialogue with the people in power. -- RAUL IS NEW LEADER; POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE ECONOMIC MODEL -- ¶4. (C) Jimenez said that Moratinos had raised the need for political and economic reforms in all of his meetings with Raul Castro and other officials, but that the officials planned to continue with business as usual. They all separately told Mortainos that Fidel will not return to power and that Raul is the new leader. Raul told Moratinos that there would be no move to democracy, but that "the existing Cuban economic model would not be repeated." Jimenez said that it is MFA's sense that while Raul is well entrenched, the Cuban leaders do feel some vulnerability at the international level as a result of the uncertainty attached to Fidel's departure from the scene. She also said that MFA sees Raul, while no democrat, as more pragmatic than Fidel, with an "engineer's sense" of the need to tinker with things that aren't working. Her assessment is that while the Cuban economic situation continues to be dire, the combination of Chinese and Venezuelan funding with higher natural resource prices have taken a bit of stress off the system. Jimenez said that Spain's role is to push the Cuban government to take "baby steps" toward economic reform and hope it can lead towards change as in Vietnam and China so as to improve living conditions for the Cuban people. ¶5. (C) According to Jimenez, Moratinos also raised the need to release political prisoners in every one of his meetings, only to have Cuban leaders reply that now was not a good time because of the "threat that the US embargo poses to Cuba." DCM interjected that Cuban leaders always produce an excuse for maintaining their repressive human rights practices, a point that Jimenez acknowledged. In any case, Jimenez said that while there was no immediate movement on the political prisoner issue, they hoped that the Cubans would take some action later, when it didn't seem to be related to Spanish pressure. -- MFA SEES THREE POSITIVE OUTCOMES -- ¶6. (C) Jimenez enumerated three successes of Moratinos' trip. MADRID 00000687 002.3 OF 003 First, an ongoing political dialogue that will provide Spain with a mechanism to raise all issues. She said that the US should ignore Perez Roque's public statements on this issue and simply read the text of the agreement, which allows for discussion of any and all issues, including human rights and release of political prisoners. Jimenez confirmed that Dezcallar would run the dialogue for Spain, and that the first meeting would be in Havana in May and that the venue will rotate between the two capitals. Second, while Moratinos didn't manage to get the Spanish Cultural Center re-opened, he did get CUBA to begin accepting Spanish development aid again. Because the Spanish aid plan focuses on civil society, this could lead to important results, Jimenez claimed. Finally, Jimenez said that both Spain and Cuba were looking at the economic relationship, including an investment agreement that could lead to better treatment of Spanish companies and a discussion of Cuban debt. She said that if Raul begins any economic reforms, Spain would be there to support those reforms. DG Sandomingo said that the USG could measure the effectiveness of Spanish engagement by tracking progress on these three key outcomes: the bilateral political dialogue, Spanish development assistance to encourage the growth of civil society, and Spanish support for Cuban economic reforms. -- DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT -- ¶7. (C) DCM acknowledged the significant Spanish interests in Cuba and expressed respect for Spain's right to use different tactics, but told Jimenez that it was important for her to understand the USG's "deep disappointment" over the form and substance of Moratinos' trip. He said that despite MFA informing us several months back of the possibility of such a trip, we were completely surprised by the timing, which we learned through the media. He noted that GOS officials had said that they would consider such a visit only if CUBA met certain conditions, and questioned whether any of those conditions had been fulfilled in such a way as to warrant a visit by the Spanish Foreign Minister. ¶8. (C) DCM said the USG saw no/no positive outcomes from the visit, which seemed only to benefit the Cuban regime. DCM emphasized his surprise at the seeming reversal of roles in which Spain, a strong modern democracy, one of the world's largest economies, and an important member of the EU and NATO, would be seen making a trip to prop up a politically and economically bankrupt dictatorship without achieving anything in return. The DCM said that while the USG did not encourage visits by lower level officials such as Jimenez or Deputy FM Bernadino Leon, these would have been far less symbolic than a visit by the Foreign Minister of a democracy as important as Spain, particularly since no one in Washington could see what Spain had gained from the visit, while it legitimized the transition from Fidel to Raul in the eyes of the world. ¶9. (C) Putting aside the impact on US-Spain relations, DCM expressed Washington's surprise that Moratinos would make a trip to CUBA without meeting dissidents. To make matters worse, Moratinos did nothing to rebut Perez Roque's public mislabeling of the jailed dissidents as "mercenaries" in the pay of the US. Jimenez replied that the USG's analysis of the situation in CUBA was flawed. She said Spain's assessment was that CUBA would not make a transition to democracy based on external pressure or any action on the part of the Cuban people, and that the only route was to engage the regime itself. She said that Spain does not believe change is possible this year, and is taking a "medium-term" approach aiming at promoting substantive change in three to five years. ¶10. (C) DCM told Jimenez that while Moratinos' trip to CUBA is a blow to the US-Spain relationship, we will keep moving forward in other areas. He said that the US would be making a strong case to other EU members about the critical need to maintain support for a transition to democracy in Cuba. Jimenez said that Spain similarly is conveying its own views to the EU. Sandomingo insisted that Spain's new approach does support a transition to democracy and that it in no way contradicts the EU Common Position. DCM suggested that the best way to demonstrate Spain's continued commitment to democracy in CUBA would be a clear statement from President Zapatero or Moratinos himself that the express purpose of Spain's engagement with Raul is to support democracy in Cuba. Jimenez said she would discuss the possibility with Moratinos. ¶11. (C) Jimenez encouraged a visit to Madrid by WHA A/S Tom Shannon to attend the May 18 Inter-American Dialogue and urged him to engage Spanish interlocutors on the USG's views on events in Cuba. She said she planned her own visit to MADRID 00000687 003.3 OF 003 Washington May 23-24 and hoped to see Shannon and his team there as well. Jimenez said that while in Washington she would press Spain's case on CUBA with members of Congress and think tanks as well as with the USG. DCM welcomed her visit and said we would be helpful in organizing meetings with WHA, EUR, and NSC policymakers. -- COMMENT -- ¶12. (C) While Jimenez and Sandomingo appeared less than enthusiastic regarding this sudden shift in Spanish policy displayed by Moratinos' visit to Havana, they have clearly reconciled themselves to the new policy and were comfortable defending it in this discussion with the DCM. We see little chance that any element of the Spanish Government, or the political opposition, is in a position to roll back the results of the visit. On the contrary, Spanish officials are clearly convinced that Raul is firmly in charge and that Spain will gain nothing by challenging the legitimacy of the Castro regime. While we cannot undo the damage caused by Moratinos' trip to Havana, our sense is that we must put Spain on the defensive on this policy shift, both in Madrid and at the international level. Aguirre