SPAIN/CUBA: ENCOURAGING EU MEMBERS TO HOLD FIRM ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000649

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/CUBA: ENCOURAGING EU MEMBERS TO HOLD FIRM ON
CUBA POLICY

REF: A. MADRID 629


B. HAVANA 332

C. HAVANA 322

D. MADRID 545

E. MADRID 425

F. MADRID 338

Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) As discussed in reftels, Spanish FM Miguel Angel
Moratinos and a top-level MFA team visited Havana April 1-3
and concluded political, economic, and cultural agreements
with the Cuban Government. In effect, FM Moratinos undertook
a major reorientation of Spanish policy, inverting Spanish
priorities dating back to the Felipe Gonzalez presidency by
shifting the emphasis from democracy and human rights to
improving relations with the Castro regime. The form and
substance of the Moratinos visit appeared to violate the
spirit of existing EU policy towards Cuba. Moratinos
justified his visit and his policy shift based on the
assertion that Spain has more at stake in Cuba than any other
EU member. The Zapatero Government has evidently determined
that a succession has already taken place in Cuba, and that
it is in Spain's interest to support this succession. This
is a disappointing, but not surprising development, since the
Zapatero Government had previously discussed its preference
for a gradual transition in Cuba and its preoccupation with
maintaining stability during this period rather than actively
encouraging reform.

//LITTLE TO SHOW FROM MORATINOS VISIT//


2. (C) Although Post was aware of a desire by FM Moratinos to
visit Cuba, the final planning for his April 1-3 trip took
place with minimal notice to the USG (or, it seems, to
Spain's EU allies). It appears that Moratinos dismissed the
advice of his key Latin America experts and opted to proceed
quickly and with an agenda that was advantageous to the Cuban
Government. As discussed in refs A, B, and C, key outcomes
of the Moratinos visit included agreements on political,
economic, and cultural issues:

-- Political: Spain and Cuba agreed to hold bilateral
discussions on human rights issues, with the first session to
take place in May at the MFA Director General level.
Parameters for discussion are not clear, but Cuban FM Perez
Roque said there would be no discussion of "internal" Cuban
issues and denied that there were political prisoners in Cuba.

-- Economic: Cuba agreed to discuss repayment of official
Cuban debt to Spain and a possible negotiation of a bilateral
investment treaty. Cuba also agreed to the resumption of
Spanish development assistance programs.

-- Cultural: Cuba agreed to start discussions on reopening
Spanish Cultural Center in Havana

As noted in ref B, the results of the visit were obviously
favorable to the Cuban Government; it is less clear how the
results advanced Spanish interests in Cuba. The form and the
substance of the Moratinos visit indicates that the Zapatero
Government has determined that a succession has effectively
already taken place in Cuba and that it is in Spain's
interest to promote very positive relations with the existing
Cuban Government.

//WHAT WILL SPAIN DO NEXT?//


3. (C) NOW that the Zapatero Government has embarked on this
course, we logically expect Spain to actively seek a similar
level of engagement in Cuba by other EU governments and to
pursue:

-- The elimination of the EU's 2003 Restrictive Measures on
Cuba.

-- Termination of the EU's nascent "Strategic Plan" on Cuba.

-- A reduced emphasis on EU Common Position in favor of
bilateral efforts by individual EU Members (a "coalition of

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the willing" instead of a united approach).

The timing of the Moratinos visit is important, as it
provides Spain time to work these issues before the June
review of the EU Common Position on Cuba. As Moratinos has
asserted that Spain has a greater stake in Cuba than any
other EU country, we also expect Madrid to work to sideline
countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland,
that have previously objected to easing EU policy towards
Cuba.

//COMMENT - MOVING THE BALL OUT OF SPAIN'S COURT//


4. (C) Since there is little likelihood of walking Moratinos
back on this issue, we believe the USG should move swiftly
with other EU governments to prevent any erosion of support
for the EU Common Position on Cuba or for the EU's 2003
Restrictive Measures on Cuba and to discourage EU members
from accepting continued Spanish leadership within the EU on
the Cuba issue. While former Communist states agree with
overall USG views on Cuba, they carry little relative weight
with Spain and only the engagement of larger EU member states
is likely to prevent Madrid from dramatically easing EU
policy towards Cuba. Spain could attempt to use the May/June
review of the EU Common Position on Cuba as a vehicle to
obtain explicit EU backing for Spain's policy shift. We are
confident in our analysis of the Moratinos visit as discussed
below, but leave open the possibility that Moratinos may
share additional context when he briefs the Ambassador;
Moratinos is in Central Asia the week of April and we are
seeking a meeting with him when he returns.
Aguirre