SPAIN/CUBA: ENCOURAGING EU MEMBERS TO HOLD FIRM ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000649 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM CU SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/CUBA: ENCOURAGING EU MEMBERS TO HOLD FIRM ON CUBA POLICY REF: A. MADRID 629 ¶B. HAVANA 332 ¶C. HAVANA 322 ¶D. MADRID 545 ¶E. MADRID 425 ¶F. MADRID 338 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) As discussed in reftels, Spanish FM Miguel Angel Moratinos and a top-level MFA team visited Havana April 1-3 and concluded political, economic, and cultural agreements with the Cuban Government. In effect, FM Moratinos undertook a major reorientation of Spanish policy, inverting Spanish priorities dating back to the Felipe Gonzalez presidency by shifting the emphasis from democracy and human rights to improving relations with the Castro regime. The form and substance of the Moratinos visit appeared to violate the spirit of existing EU policy towards Cuba. Moratinos justified his visit and his policy shift based on the assertion that Spain has more at stake in Cuba than any other EU member. The Zapatero Government has evidently determined that a succession has already taken place in Cuba, and that it is in Spain's interest to support this succession. This is a disappointing, but not surprising development, since the Zapatero Government had previously discussed its preference for a gradual transition in Cuba and its preoccupation with maintaining stability during this period rather than actively encouraging reform. //LITTLE TO SHOW FROM MORATINOS VISIT// ¶2. (C) Although Post was aware of a desire by FM Moratinos to visit Cuba, the final planning for his April 1-3 trip took place with minimal notice to the USG (or, it seems, to Spain's EU allies). It appears that Moratinos dismissed the advice of his key Latin America experts and opted to proceed quickly and with an agenda that was advantageous to the Cuban Government. As discussed in refs A, B, and C, key outcomes of the Moratinos visit included agreements on political, economic, and cultural issues: -- Political: Spain and Cuba agreed to hold bilateral discussions on human rights issues, with the first session to take place in May at the MFA Director General level. Parameters for discussion are not clear, but Cuban FM Perez Roque said there would be no discussion of "internal" Cuban issues and denied that there were political prisoners in Cuba. -- Economic: Cuba agreed to discuss repayment of official Cuban debt to Spain and a possible negotiation of a bilateral investment treaty. Cuba also agreed to the resumption of Spanish development assistance programs. -- Cultural: Cuba agreed to start discussions on reopening Spanish Cultural Center in Havana As noted in ref B, the results of the visit were obviously favorable to the Cuban Government; it is less clear how the results advanced Spanish interests in Cuba. The form and the substance of the Moratinos visit indicates that the Zapatero Government has determined that a succession has effectively already taken place in Cuba and that it is in Spain's interest to promote very positive relations with the existing Cuban Government. //WHAT WILL SPAIN DO NEXT?// ¶3. (C) Now that the Zapatero Government has embarked on this course, we logically expect Spain to actively seek a similar level of engagement in Cuba by other EU governments and to pursue: -- The elimination of the EU's 2003 Restrictive Measures on Cuba. -- Termination of the EU's nascent "Strategic Plan" on Cuba. -- A reduced emphasis on EU Common Position in favor of bilateral efforts by individual EU Members (a "coalition of MADRID 00000649 002 OF 002 the willing" instead of a united approach). The timing of the Moratinos visit is important, as it provides Spain time to work these issues before the June review of the EU Common Position on Cuba. As Moratinos has asserted that Spain has a greater stake in Cuba than any other EU country, we also expect Madrid to work to sideline countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, that have previously objected to easing EU policy towards Cuba. //COMMENT - MOVING THE BALL OUT OF SPAIN'S COURT// ¶4. (C) Since there is little likelihood of walking Moratinos back on this issue, we believe the USG should move swiftly with other EU governments to prevent any erosion of support for the EU Common Position on Cuba or for the EU's 2003 Restrictive Measures on Cuba and to discourage EU members from accepting continued Spanish leadership within the EU on the Cuba issue. While former Communist states agree with overall USG views on Cuba, they carry little relative weight with Spain and only the engagement of larger EU member states is likely to prevent Madrid from dramatically easing EU policy towards Cuba. Spain could attempt to use the May/June review of the EU Common Position on Cuba as a vehicle to obtain explicit EU backing for Spain's policy shift. We are confident in our analysis of the Moratinos visit as discussed below, but leave open the possibility that Moratinos may share additional context when he briefs the Ambassador; Moratinos is in Central Asia the week of April and we are seeking a meeting with him when he returns. Aguirre