SPAIN: DCM COMPARES NOTES WITH MOD SEC-GEN LUIS

S E C R E T MADRID 002297

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ELAINE SAMSON, EUR/WE; DAVID QUINN, PM/RSAT;
LOURDES CUE, WHA/AND; JACK HILLMEYER, EUR/RPM
USNATO FOR AMBASSADOR NULAND, DCM OLSON, AND JOHN COCKRELL
KABUL FOR DON SHEEHAN AND BRENT HARTLEY
OSD FOR RACHEL ELLEHUUS, NICHOLAS HILLMAN
JOINT STAFF FOR VINCE FREEMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: DCM COMPARES NOTES WITH MOD SEC-GEN LUIS
CUESTA

REF: A. MADRID 1910

B. KABUL 3437

Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Deputy Chief of Mission and Spanish
Ministry of Defense Secretary General for Policy Luis Cuesta
reviewed the past year in U.S.-Spanish cooperation and
addressed ongoing issues at their December 19 meeting.
Saying it helped to have helpful counterparts, Cuesta agreed
2007 had been characterized by hard work, mutual respect, and
flexibility. The two discussed shared interests in
Afghanistan, concerns about Venezuelan support for
narco-trafficking, continuing commitment to Kosovo, and the
status of Spanish requests for Tomahawk weapons and aircraft
security systems. The DCM also used the opportunity to
follow up on issues such as equitable compensation for
U.S.-indirect-hire MOD employees at NAVSTA Rota, which Cuesta
had raised during his November 30 meeting with DASD Dan Fata.
The meeting has already yielded subsequent conversations and
some progress on the Spanish offer to train and Afghan Army
company (reftels). This message also contains a
LAIRCM-related action request at para 7. End summary.

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Afghanistan: Fill a Need, or Miss an Opportunity?
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The DCM thanked Cuesta for Spain's contributions in
Afghanistan and emphasized the continuing need, as presented
by SecDef Gates in congressional testimony and conveyed by
U.S. delegates to the November 29-30 OSCE Ministerial in
Madrid, for partners to step up and meet the great challenges
in Afghanistan. Noting FM Moratinos had attempted to deflect
discussion with Under Secretary Burns of increased
participation in Afghanistan, citing the Spanish electoral
cycle, the DCM assured Cuesta the U.S. would not delay in
revisiting Afghanistan with the GOS after Spain's March 9,
2008, general elections. The DCM likewise assured Cuesta the
Spanish offer to train an Afghan company (reftels) was
valued.


3. (C) Regarding the training proposal, Cuesta stated the MOD
was still awaiting a response from CSTC-A to the draft MOU
sent to MG Cone o/a December 5. Cuesta posited Spanish
insistence on two "essential elements," a permanent presence
in Badghis province and an initial commitment of two years,
were likely to be sticking points. Cuesta stressed the
initial period was renewable, and spoke almost exclusively in
terms of an eventual ANA battalion. When the DCM spoke of
the importance of harmonizing our shared mission in
Afghanistan and the need for flexibility in case of
emergencies outside the Spanish area of responsibility,
Cuesta conceded Spain was working the MOU language
strategically but would certainly make troops available in
case of an extraordinary need. He suggested that as long as
a minimum company contingent were resident in the proposed
Badghis base, the rest of the battalion could be deployed
elsewhere. The Spanish hope was to provide security in the
province. Cuesta called it an opportunity to create a 600-man
battalion where currently there was none. Cuesta said it
would be a "shame" if we could not reach and implement and
agreement.


4. (S/NF) COMMENT: Working-level DAO contacts in the
ministry confirmed December 20 that Spanish BG Castresana had
e-mailed the so-called counter-offer December 5 to CSTC-A's
MG Cone, and that Castresana's team had received feedback on
the proposal via NATO channels. The MOD appeared to be
mulling that feedback even as they awaited direct
communication from MG Cone. In fact, Cuesta called the DCM
late the morning of December 21 to tell him that he and his
military staff had reviewed the NATO-brokered proposal. He
said the compromise text on the permanent placement of the
company/battalion was acceptable to the Spanish. He also

said that Spain accepted that operational commanders could
make the tactical deployment decision to move the
company/battalion outside the AOR. Cuesta did say that Spain
would insist that any instruction to move the Spanish
advisors attached to the company/battalion OMLT be subject to
final command authority approval in Madrid. Cuesta expressed
the view that Madrid would insist on having final say on the
issue of the specific deployment of Spanish advisors, but he
was confident that once the request was made, approval would
likely be granted. End comment.

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Venezuela
--------------


5. (C) The DCM raised media reports of increased FARC
activity in Venezuela, citing also drug tracks from
JIATF-South that he had shared November 23 with Secretary of
State for Latin AMERICA Trinidad Jimenez. He suggested Spain
might be in a position to discuss counter-narcotics concerns
with Venezuela, and he asserted the importance of close
U.S.-Spanish consultation on Venezuelan counter-narcotics
cooperation to avoid surprises. Cuesta acknowledged the
seriousness of the issue and the importance of drug seizures,
but was careful to note the MOD's involvement was limited to
support for the Spanish Civil Guard, except in the case of
Venezuelan Armed Forces activity, if any. Regardless, once
the drugs arrived in Spain they fell under the purview of the
Ministry of Interior. The DCM suggested the time for
inter-agency cooperation and coordination was therefore
earlier in the track.

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Spanish Acquisition of TLAM and LAIRCM
--------------


6. (S) Reassuring Cuesta the Embassy had done its part to
brief the importance to Spain and U.S. national interest of
Tomahawk for this major NATO ally, the DCM advised the State
Department's legislative affairs bureau was carefully
weighing the tactical question of congressional notification
in the context of other pending cases. Cuesta seemed
satisfied that the notification might come this week or after
Congress returns in January. Regarding the Government of
Spain's request for Large Aircraft Infrafred Countermeasures
(LAIRCM),submitted November 13 to SAF/IA, the DCM conceded
the Pentagon was still considering the wide-ranging Spanish
proposal. He suggested that bureaucratically, the request
for protection of additional aircraft (i.e. Head of State and
Head of Government) did not fit easily and required
additional review. The DCM assured Cuesta the U.S. Mission
was tracking the request.


7. (S/NF) NOTE: Post has subsequently learned the Spanish
Air Attache in Washington may have learned from DOD contacts
the LAIRCM request is likely to be denied. Ambassador
Aguirre will seek high-level meetings to discuss the status
of the Spanish Letter of Request during his January
consultations in Washington. In the meantime, Post seeks
guidance and cooperation in speaking with one voice to
interested Spanish partners in Madrid and in Washington. End
note.

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Pay Equity for Rota Workers
--------------


8. (SBU) Picking up a thread from Cuesta's November 30
conversation with DASD Fata, the DCM affirmed the USG is
paying competitive wages to indirect-hire local employees at
Naval Station Rota. He noted USG salaries can be anywhere
from five to fifty per cent higher than those paid by the
Spanish MOD to personnel in similar positions. The rate of
increase offered this year to USG employees was not
commensurate with what the Spanish MOD offered, primarily

because the GOS implemented retroactive changes to make up
for past wages shortfalls. Cuesta did not dispute the
competitiveness of U.S. salaries, but he noted the method for
determining the pay scale had changed this year. He asked to
know why the U.S. had used a "different" system for
evaluating compensation, and he asked how wages would be
calculated moving forward. In addition to seeking
clarification, Cuesta preferred to use the most favorable
method for determining compensation levels in the future.
NOTE: ODC notes the methodology used was the same this year
as in past years. Post surmises Cuesta's query stems from
the fact that the U.S., in calculating this year's increases,
had to average the unusually wide range of Spanish salary
percentage increases. End note.

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No Change on Kosovo
--------------


9. (C) Cuesta raised the issue of Kosovo, stating Spain would
keep doing what it had been doing. He saw KFOR's mission as
protecting minorities and assuring freedom of movement, and
noted the GOS would consider discussing additional missions
at the appropriate time (once Kosovo's final status was
determined). Spain did not see the urgency to include
provisions for future Kosovo security forces before the final
status determination. The DCM suggested they keep in touch
to ensure the process was well handled. He added the United
States would be asking Spain to do more on Kosovo and in
other difficult areas and noted the price of leadership is
the willingness to make tough decisions.
AGUIRRE