Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MADRID2207
2007-12-07 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

OSCE MINISTERIAL: U/S BURNS'S MEETING WITH KOREAN

Tags:  ETRD OSCE PARM PHUM PREL ABLD ROK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #2207/01 3411202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071202Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3911
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0731
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0390
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0154
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002207 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USTR
DEPARTMENT FOR P STAFF GEORGE KENT, EAP/K ANDREW OU, EAP/EX
PATRICIA MCCARTHY, IO/PSC DOUGLAS WAKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: ETRD OSCE PARM PHUM PREL ABLD ROK
SUBJECT: OSCE MINISTERIAL: U/S BURNS'S MEETING WITH KOREAN
DFM SHIM

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USTR
DEPARTMENT FOR P STAFF GEORGE KENT, EAP/K ANDREW OU, EAP/EX
PATRICIA MCCARTHY, IO/PSC DOUGLAS WAKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: ETRD OSCE PARM PHUM PREL ABLD ROK
SUBJECT: OSCE MINISTERIAL: U/S BURNS'S MEETING WITH KOREAN
DFM SHIM

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (U) November 28; 6:20 p.m.; Madrid, Spain.


2. (U) Participants:

United States
Under Secretary Burns
Special Assistant Sumona Guha

E. Strother Murray (Embassy Notetaker)

Republic of Korea
Deputy Foreign Minister Shim Yoon-joe
Kang Kym-gu, Director, European Regional Cooperation
Division, MFA
Jeepio Hong, Deputy Director, North America Division I, MFA


3. (C) Summary. In a November 28 bilateral meeting on the eve
of the OSCE Ministerial in Madrid, U/S Burns and Korean
Deputy FM Shim exchanged views on critical issues including
Middle East peace and North Korea denuclearization as well as
mutual concerns regarding Iran, Darfur, Afghanistan, and
Burma. In a far-reaching conversation that began with
baseball and ended with buildings, Shim tested U.S.
receptivity to a four-party ministerial framework to deal
with Korean peninsula matters, and made it clear the ROKG
could not accept a separate trilateral forum that excluded
both Koreas. On matters involving the deployment of ROKG
resources to Sudan and Afghanistan, Shim deferred discussions
and decision-making until after Korean elections December 19.
The same was true of market access for U.S. beef. Shim
stressed the importance of Chinese engagement to bring down
the Burmese junta, and pledged his government's support for
implementation of Annapolis next steps. End summary.

--------------
Shared Goals in the Middle East
--------------


4. (C) Deputy FM Shim congratulated U/S Burns on the
successful November 27-28 Middle East peace conference in
Annapolis, saying it seemed to be a good start. Shim
nonetheless asserted the ROKG should have been invited to
participate not just in Annapolis but in the October
conference of Iraq's neighbors. He asked the Under Secretary

who would represent the USG at the December 17 conference in
Paris. If Secretary Rice attended, Shim believed Korea's
Foreign Minister would also. U/S Burns promised to advise
him and, regarding Annapolis, thanked Shim for his phone call
and said there was no reason Korea could not be part of the
effort going forward. Shim expressed interest in Hamas and
assured U/S Burns the ROKG would cooperate on Iran. Shim
understood the importance of the region to President Bush and
to Secretary Rice, citing the Secretary's eight trips there.

--------------
DPRK Denuclearization
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the North Korean nuclear issue, Shim
mentioned EAP Assistant Secretary Hill's travel to consult
with counterparts in Tokyo, Seoul, Pyongyang, and Beijing
beginning November 28, including a visit to the disablement
site. When asked whether the USG planned to lift the DPRK
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, U/S Burns
affirmed it was a good idea for A/S Hill to go to Pyongyang,
but cautioned that engagement would have to be step by step.
Responding to Shim's query about D.C. views on the Six Party
Talks, U/S Burns conceded there were some critics in Congress
but that the overall atmosphere was good and that the
Six-Party format was right, provided the DPRK met its
commitments. In Seoul, Shim stated, the atmosphere was
upbeat, as long as the DPRK was serious. It might be
desirable to encourage the DPRK with an added thrust sometime
in January. If by the end of 2007, North Korea had fulfilled
its complete declaration of nuclear programs, Shim posited
that Foreign Minister talks among four of the six countries
could be appropriate.


6. (C) When U/S Burns asked what purpose additional
four-party negotiations might serve, Shim hastened to clarify
such a summit right after the six gathered was purely
theoretical. Yet he hoped such a meeting would provide a
chance to explore the Korean peace regime and armistice

agreement. The Under Secretary noted that the U.S. has not
agreed to a four-party format. The first priorities were to
resolve the nuclear issue and to normalize U.S.-DPRK
relations. Only after those steps could the U.S. revisit the
peace agreement. Launching of such an agreement
simultaneously and in parallel, Burns thought might be a
problem for the United States. U/S Burns said he would let
the Secretary know, but reiterated the DPRK must do what they
said and noted it was not possible to move forward on all
fronts. The USG remained committed to a Six-Party
ministerial, and A/S Hill's trip would help determine a
course of action.

--------------
Iran: ROK Reducing Economic Relations
--------------


7. (C) Under Secretary Burns noted Russia and China were
continuing to block progress on a third UNSC sanctions
resolution. The EU was considering a separate sanctions
effort against Iran. Shim said Treasury U/S Levy's visit to
Seoul had been productive, and the ROK would cooperate in the
international effort against Iran. The South Korean
government has met to discuss actions against Iranian banks,
and the private sector was already taking its own measures to
diminish economic interactions. After strong ROKG warnings
to Korean banks about the risks involved -- with specific
reference to the October designation of the Revolutionary
Guards (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization by the
Unites States -- many banks and other companies had reduced
their interactions with Iranian interests. Bank Mellat had a
branch in Seoul and its business was going down. The volume
of construction contracts with Iran had gone down 25 per
cent. Shim acknowledged it was important for Korea to secure
its oil supplies, given eight per cent reliance on Iranian
oil. He said the ROKG was reviewing contracts on a
case-by-case basis to ensure they had nothing to do with
Iran. He offered to keep U/S Burns apprised of additional
Korean actions and progress. U/S Burns said these actions
were very helpful and asked if the ROK could make its actions
public.

--------------
No Decision Yet on Support for UNAMID
--------------


8. (C) Asked whether the ROKG could provide helicopters and
transport in support of the UN mission in Darfur, Shim
summarized the Korean Ministry of Defense's initial negative
response but surmised there was a possibility for
cooperation, especially in the event ROKG troops currently in
Kuwait withdraw in the next few years. Urged to review the
possibility of transferring those assets to Darfur, Shim said
the decision might best be made by a new, stronger
government, considering the current Korean political season.
The ROKG would reconsider providing assets to UNAMID after
the December 19 elections.

-------------- --------------
Afghanistan: With More Info, Could Support Electricity
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Shim referenced the ROKG's decision to withdraw its
military medics and engineers from Afghanistan and replace
them with civilian medical personnel. U/S Burns hoped Korea
would be able to act on past proposals to lead a Provincial
Reconstruction Team and provide funding for the Northern
Electricity Power System (NEPS) project. Shim asked for more
information on the so-called Uzbekistan project and said no
one had specifically asked the ROKG to participate. Though
he would need more information, Shim felt sure the Korean
Ex-Im Bank would be willing to provide the $25 million
needed. Shim called the situation of South Korean hostages
in Afghanistan "exceptional."

--------------
China Key to Change in Burma
--------------


10. (C) "Burma cannot be changed overnight," the Deputy
Foreign Minister said, but the junta must change. Shim
shared USG concerns about the unmet expectations of UN envoy
Ibrahim Gambari, who U/S Burns noted might need an
international "energy boost" in order to be more active in
Burma itself. Shim agreed Gambari's exclusion from ASEAN in

mid-November had been a great loss of face. He promised to
keep in touch with Under Secretary Burns on Burma. It would
take time, but there had been fruitful three-party meetings
with China in October, and it would be important to embrace
China and to present a united front. U/S Burns added he
would discuss Burma with the Chinese in Paris.

--------------
FTA: "Beef"ing Up Unlikely Before February
--------------


11. (C) U/S Burns raised the U.S.-ROK FTA, urging DFM Shim to
fully implement the guidelines on imports of U.S. beef.
Deputy FM Shim responded by asking U/S Burns what he thought
of the ROKG proposal to do so in two steps, the first 80 per
cent with the remainder to be discussed. He confessed it was
a political decision that might have to wait until February,
following approval Shim hoped the National Assembly would
grant in early 2008. He asked whether the USG would
re-submit the FTA after February. The Under Secretary
insisted he thought a one-step, 100 per cent agreement was
best in order to establish the right climate and build
momentum for passage on the Hill.

--------------
U.S.-China-Japan Trialogue?
--------------


12. (C) Shim raised the matter of a trilateral dialogue among
the United States, China, and Japan. Calling the idea
"unacceptable" to the ROKG, he admitted it was too close for
comfort to the Korean peninsula. Though he appreciated the
Under Secretary's offer to inquire with the Japanese as to
why the concept had resurfaced, Shim noted the USG should
keep a low profile and be careful in asking Japan -- lest the
GOJ think there was room for re-visitation.

--------------
And about that NOB . . .
--------------


13. (C) Finally, Shim asked Under Secretary Burns to look
into what he believed was a misunderstanding over the
transfer to a new site of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. The
best way to resolve the issue, he said, was for the USG to
keep the "original" site. Shim believed the dispute was to
blame for the apparent reluctance the Koreans had encountered
when opening a new consulate in Alaska. He accepted the
Under Secretary's suggestion the ROKG raise the matter with
U.S. Ambassador Vershbow.


AGUIRRE