EUR A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 14-16 MEETINGS IN MADRID -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 002046

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR, ALSO FOR WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL SP CU
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 14-16 MEETINGS IN MADRID -
CORRECTED COPY OF MADRID 2034


Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4B AND D
.


1. (C) Summary: EUR Assistant Secretary Fried visited Madrid
October 14-16. The visit was in preparation for the November
29-30 OSCE ministerial. A/S Fried met with FM Moratinos
(septel),Presidential foreign policy and security advisor
Carles Casajuana, MFA DG for Foreign Policy Rafael Dezcallar,
MFA DG for Foreign Policy for Europe and North America Jose
Pons, and Moratinos Chief of Staff Javier Sancho. His
conversations focused on CFE and missile defense, Kosovo, a
variety of OSCE ministerial issues, Afghanistan, Iran,
Turkey, Cuba, and overall bilateral relations. He also
participated in a roundtable on security challenges in the
OSCE framework at the think-tank INCIPE, had lunch with four
prominent members of the opposition Partido Popular (PP) who
are engaged on foreign policy issues, and gave interviews to
Spanish print and television media. End summary.

CFE and Missile Defense
--------------


2. (C) A/S Fried briefed his GOS interlocutors on the October
12-13 "2-plus-2" talks concerning CFE. He explained that the
U.S. had presented the Russians with a creative proposal that
went beyond the "parallel actions" paper. He said the
proposal included a number of ideas for additional steps on
Georgia and Moldova, but cautioned that there was still much
to be done. He asked that the Spanish keep the information
out of the press. He noted that the Russian demands
regarding elimination of the flanks went too far and in any
case required consultation with the affected countries. The
U.S. counter was its willingness to discuss the issue. He
explained that the idea of early ratification was still alive
(perhaps Hungary and Germany - the process of ratification in
the U.S. Senate would take much longer). A/S Fried said he
was headed from Madrid to Brussels to brief NATO Permanent
Representatives. He noted the U.S. was waiting for the
Russian response and the initial positive Russian reaction
could change. The Spanish were extremely pleased with these
developments and obviously hoped a breakthrough on CFE would
improve prospects for a successful OSCE ministerial. They
acknowledged that the U.S. had been very forthcoming.


3. (C) A/S Fried described to interlocutors from the
Presidency and the MFA the joint regional architecture
proposals on missile defense that had been shared with the
Russians. He emphasized that the U.S. was being flexible and
trying to include the Russians to the extent practicable.
The U.S. had made clear that our negotiation with the Poles
and Czechs would continue. Because our missile defense
program was threat-based, changes to the nature and timing of
the threat, e.g., Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear
weapons programs, would affect the timing of
operationalization of the system, and we had conveyed this to
the Russians. The Russians, surprised by the "forthcoming"
U.S. proposals acknowledged that MD discussions may now be on
a productive track.

Kosovo
--------------


4. (C) A/S Fried raised Kosovo in all of his substantive
exchanges with Spanish counterparts. He had a particularly
in-depth and spirited discussion on Kosovo with Spanish
National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana. Fried emphasized
that the U.S. supported the Troika effort, but in reality it
was unlikely a solution could be reached by December 10. He
stressed that Europe and the U.S. needed to continue to
support Kosovo post-independence although Russia would try to
shut down the international effort. One challenge was to
find a way to let the OSCE continue its work, perhaps by
moving its assets under another umbrella such as UNMIK.


5. (C) Casajuana expressed concern over the legal basis for
our continued presence in Kosovo post-independence. A/S
Fried explained that German, Italian, British, and American
lawyers had looked carefully at UNSCR 1244 and concluded that
it was not inconsistent with independence and would continue
to provide a mandate for the UN and EU even after
independence. He noted Javier Solana had expressed the same
view at the Secretary's Transatlantic dinner for European
foreign ministers in New York during the UNGA. A/S Fried
said that while it was not the right time for a public
discussion, it was time to begin looking ahead.


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6. (C) Casajuana and MFA Foreign Policy Director Dezcallar
separately registered Spanish concern that UNSCR 1244 was not
in fact legally sufficient for a post-independence scenario.
They were concerned about Spanish domestic and especially
congressional reaction and the fallout from independence in
the Balkans. Casajuana noted that Spanish law required them
to justify a military presence in Kosovo with either a
request of the host government, a UNSCR, or agreement of NATO
or the EU. The first was impossible, the second would run
into a Russian veto, and the third might be blocked by
Cyprus. Casajuana noted concerns about inflaming Spanish
regional ambitions of the Basques and Catalans as a
constraining factor on Spain's ability to act in an
independent Kosovo. However, Spanish officials insisted that
a united Europe was indispensable in dealing with Kosovo and
Spain would go all the way in support of a unified position.
Spain did not want to see Europe fail. A/S Fried's GOS
interlocutors suggested further delay, perhaps until after
the Russian elections, would be helpful.


7. (C) A/S Fried said the U.S. was not asking the EU as a
whole to recognize Kosovo -- recognition would remain a
national decision -- but rather to find a way to continue the
international mission and thereby avoid catastrophe. Cyprus
could not be allowed to prevent Europe from doing the right
thing, and the U.S. could not be expected to shoulder the
entire burden. As for delay, A/S Fried reminded his
interlocutors that the U.S. had, at European insistence,
persuaded the Kosovars last summer to accept the delay until
December 10. Europe and Spain had enjoyed ample time to
prepare. The U.S. was not going back to the Kosovars and
champion another postponement of the inevitable. It would
cost the U.S. and Europe all credibility and strengthen
radical elements in Kosovo. He said France, Germany, and the
UK were prepared to do the right thing; Spain would not be
alone. In the end, the question was not simply European
unity, but whether that was unity for action or for
paralysis. Certainly independence would be fraught with
problems, and for that very reason Kosovo needed
international help. It would be difficult but manageable if
the international community stood together. KFOR believed it
could cope with problems such as breakaway Serbs in the
north. Serbia would certainly sulk, but they would recover
and get on with life within Europe. What was needed was for
Spain to remain engaged, not lead a rush to the exit.

Other OSCE Issues
--------------


8. (C) A/S Fried raised a number of OSCE issues in his
meeting with Pons. On South Ossetia, A/S Fried said that we
sought to increase the number of OSCE monitors both inside
and outside the zone of conflict, whereas the Russians only
supported an increase outside the zone of conflict (i.e., in
Georgia). Clearly they needed to be inside the zone as well.
He said the U.S. had other confidence building measures it
wanted to advance such as putting OSCE observers in Georgian
radar stations. He urged that the OSCE resist Russian
obstructionism and noted there was a PC draft decision
document circulating on which we hoped to achieve consensus.
Regarding the Georgia missile incident, A/S Fried said it
could be that the Russian planes (which were certainly
present) were fired on by the South Ossetians and the pilot
simply panicked and dropped the missile (he noted the motor
had fired but the warhead had not detonated). He emphasized
the U.S. interest was not to punish the Russians but to
prevent such incidents in the future. For this reason
observers were needed. He noted this would be difficult for
Spain as OSCE CIO since the Russians were emotional on
Georgian issues, but Europe and the U.S. needed to help
Georgia in the face of Russia's pressure against it. A
confident Georgia would be more likely to help us on issues
such as CFE.


9. (C) A/S Fried predicted that a Russian assault on ODIHR
would be a theme at the OSCE ministerial. He said this was
one of the most worthwhile activities of the OSCE, and Europe
and the U.S. should not give ground on it. He noted OSCE
elections observers looked east because that was where most
of the problems were. He attributed the recent controversy
over observers for the Polish elections to Kaczynski's
annoyance with statements by Vaclav Havel and said the U.S.
had helped calm the Poles. Pons suggested that OSCE SYG
Oliver might usefully adopt a lower profile in his relations
with ODIHR.


MADRID 00002046 003 OF 005



10. (C) Regarding Kazakhstan's bid for the chairmanship, Pons
said Spain as CIO would have to seek consensus. He argued
that having Kazakhstan as CIO would send an important signal
to Central Asia. Pons said Spain's perception was that
Kazakhstan realized their 2009 bid was no longer realistic.
A/S Fried said European supporters seemed to be backing away
after the recent election results. Pons said it might be
possible to get consensus for 2010, but much depended on the
U.S., UK, and others. He urged avoiding written conditions
since a precedent for conditionality would become a trap that
the Russians or others in the OSCE could use (e.g., Cyprus
might use it against Turkey). A/S Fried said that 2011 was
far more credible as a target date. He agreed that explicit
written conditions were problematic but asked what would
happen if Kazakhstan received a commitment for 2010 and then
failed to make progress. What was needed were not explicit
conditions but some language that would provide an escape
clause in case of a failure by Kazakhstan.


11. (C) A/S Fried told Pons EUR DAS Kramer would visit Madrid
October 22 to introduce Philip Remler, the new head of the
OSCE mission to Moldova. He said Remler had the support of
the Moldovans and was very well qualified. He added that
Russian DFM Kislyak had indicated Russia would not
necessarily object to an American; it was not in any event
Russia's place to veto the candidate.


12. (C) On the Convention on Legal Personality and Privileges
and Immunities, A/S Fried noted the experts had nearly
finished their work (Fernando de Galainena, Spain's OSCE Task
Force Ambassador, noted a text would be completed before the
ministerial). He predicted the Russians would try to use
this to leverage their idea of a charter which they would use
to weaken the OSCE democracy mandate. Pons suggested Russia
could be assuaged by offering discussion of the charter issue
at some future date. A/S Fried said the U.S. wanted to avoid
linking the convention and the charter. Galainena said Spain
would be meeting the Russians October 17. He said the
Russian position was no charter, no convention, and he
doubted they could be shifted before the ministerial. A/S
Fried said that more broadly, the U.S. and Europe should
avoid giving way too much to the Russians in this
ministerial. The U.S. would welcome a good declaration but
could certainly live with a CIO statement as it had in the
past. Pons asked what the U.S. would consider a bad
declaration. A/S Fried responded that limitations on ODIHR
would be unacceptable. Pons then provided a draft
declaration (Note: copies have been forwarded to EUR/WE and
USOSCE via e-mail. End note). He said Moratinos was eager
for a ministerial declaration. A/S Fried again cautioned
against letting the Russians warp the debate. There was no
need to seek middle ground if faced with Russian demands to
weaken the OSCE's democracy activities. He said that Spain
should push ahead on things such as the Human Rights
Defenders. Even if the Russians were going to block, they
were worth fighting for. Pons said he hoped the Human Rights
Defenders issue would be resolved before the ministerial.


13. (C) Pons said Moratinos was also eager for a ministerial
declaration on an environmental security strategy. He said a
third draft would be forthcoming and would incorporate many
U.S. suggestions. A/S Fried said he would look at the
language and hoped we could build on agreement with Europe.

Afghanistan
--------------


14. (C) A/S Fried expressed appreciation for the work Spain
is doing in Afghanistan with its PRT and OLMTs and urged it
continue to look for ways to do more on both the civil and
military sides. He suggested Spain consider doing something
to help the Dutch, who were in a tough fight in the south and
who needed a show of support from Western European allies.
Casajuana said that while Spain was committed to Afghanistan,
sending troops to help the Dutch was politically impossible,
especially with Spanish elections only five months away.
Fried urged that Spain consider what more it could do to
support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. With Pons, A/S
Fried mentioned that the OSCE seemed to be usefully focusing
on a northern border mission. Pons agreed this would be a
good start for the OSCE in Afghanistan. He said Spain was
working on a text and promised to share it.

Iran
--------------


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15. (C) A/S Fried underscored the importance of Europe and
the U.S. standing together on the issue of Iran. He praised
the French, German, and UK stance. He said that while a
UNSCR might be the best option, a united front from Europe
and the U.S. was a strong second best and that the two
objectives were compatible. His Spanish interlocutors stated
a preference for another UNSCR, but accepted that Russia and
China would make that impossible. Casajuana (and Moratinos -
see septel) said Spain was following the lead of France,
Germany, and the UK and supported imposing European sanctions
if necessary.

Turkey
--------------


16. (C) A/S Fried briefed his GOS interlocutors on his visit
to Turkey, explaining the Administration's position on HR 106
(the "Armenian genocide resolution"). On the PKK, he said
the U.S. had urged the Turks to consider carefully their
options. A cross border raid might be a satisfying gesture,
but where could it lead? Casajuana said he had told a
Turkish contact that a move into northern Iraq could cripple
Turkey's EU bid, but the Turkish attitude seemed to be that
dealing with the PKK was a higher priority than EU
membership.

Cuba
--------------


17. (C) A/S Fried pointed out to Dezcallar that this was an
unhelpful moment to renew cooperation with Cuba. Spain
should not marginalize its contacts with dissidents, in
effect accepting the regime's classification of banned human
beings. A/S Fried warned that in trying to engage supposed
reform elements in the Cuban Government, Spain might simply
facilitate transition from one dictator to another.
Dezcallar argued the Spanish and U.S. approaches could send
complementary messages. A/S Fried replied that Spanish
engagement might simply mislead the regime into believing it
could ignore the truth in favor of what it wanted to hear.
Spain had unique influence in Cuba, particularly under a
socialist government, and it should use that influence in the
right way. Dezcallar said both Zapatero and Moratinos had
spoken publicly of the need for democratic transition and
Spain maintained contact with the dissidents. He also
mentioned that a human rights dialogue with the regime was
part of Spain's strategy. Dezcallar said Raul Castro was not
Fidel, and repression appeared to have eased somewhat.
Spain's approach would be to combine discrete pressure with
timely calls for change. A/S Fried urged that Spain listen
to countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary on the
issue.

Spain - U.S Relations
--------------


18. (C) Dezcallar made a plea for greater U.S. engagement
with Spain. He said coordination was excellent on
counter-terrorism, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Latin
America, but it would be useful if the U.S. coordinated more
frequently on other issues. He said Spain had tailored a
suit for itself in the 20th century but with the transition
to democracy and the attendant rapid economic growth, the
suit no longer fit. Spain was ready to play a more
appropriate role in the world. He noted shared interests in
the Mediterranean and the Middle East, an area of great
national security interest to Spain. He also mentioned
Spain's engagement in places such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, and
Lebanon. A/S Fried agreed that Spain needed (and the U.S.
would welcome) a larger world role, but said that nations
made themselves relevant by providing leadership on difficult
issues. Spain would have to take tough and sometimes
domestically unpopular decisions in order to be a larger
player. For example, Spanish officials cited domestic
politics as a reason not to do more in Afghanistan. The
Charge noted that the U.S. and Spain maintained a very active
dialogue and substantial cooperation on Latin America,
counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics. Dezcallar agreed
that much had been accomplished. He urged senior U.S.
participation in an Alliance of Civilizations meeting in
Spain in January. A/S Fried said the U.S. was looking at
various projects, although he expressed concern over
high-level group reports blaming the U.S. and Israel for
tensions with Islam.

INCIPE Roundtable and Lunch with PP

MADRID 00002046 005 OF 005


--------------


19. (U) During a very well attended roundtable at the Spanish
think tank INCIPE (including the Russian and Serbian
Ambassadors and Pons),A/S Fried expounded on the
possibilities for European - U.S. action in the world based
on shared values. He highlighted the challenges in Kosovo,
the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He underscored the
importance of resolving remaining issues in the Balkans and
noted settling the issue of Kosovo was a prerequisite. He
said the future role of Ukraine and Georgia in Europe should
be decided by those countries and the Europeans. He
encouraged Russia to find constructive ways to deal with
Georgia. He urged aggressive promotion of solutions to the
frozen conflicts. A/S Fried said the OSCE had a vital role
to play. On missile defense, he emphasized the threat from
Iran, saying the U.S. and Europe needed options should
diplomatic efforts fail. He said missile defense would be
enhanced by NATO and even Russian involvement. On CFE, he
noted the Russian threat of suspension and briefly described
the 2-plus-2 talks in Moscow. Kosovo drew most of the
questions, with the Russian and Serbian Ambassadors
predictably negative on the subject of independence.


20. (C) A lunch hosted by the CDA with four members of the PP
active on foreign policy issues (Jorge Moragas, Gustavo
Aristegui, Baudilio Tome, and Eduardo Gutierrez) rounded out
the visit. A/S Fried offered a tour d'horizon similar to
that given at INCIPE, and the PP guests offered their
critical assessment of Zapatero's handling of issues such as
Cuba and ETA. They expressed optimism about the March
elections, saying the PP could recover a number of seats lost
in 2004. They said the PP would run on economic issues
(especially worries about affordable housing and the mortgage
markets),Zapatero's alleged mishandling of regional
tensions, and immigration.


21. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
AGUIRRE