Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MADRID1774
2007-09-13 13:34:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

SPAIN/CT OVERVIEW: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF

Tags:  PTER PREL SP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6744
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #1774/01 2561334
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 131334Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3402
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3034
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001774 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT (AMBASSADOR DAILEY)
NSC FOR ELIZABETH FARR
NCTC FOR MICHAEL LEITER
FBI FOR ART CUMMINGS
JUSTICE FOR JESSIE LIU
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR MARISA LINO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/CT OVERVIEW: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF
S/CT COORDINATOR DAILEY

MADRID 00001774 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001774

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT (AMBASSADOR DAILEY)
NSC FOR ELIZABETH FARR
NCTC FOR MICHAEL LEITER
FBI FOR ART CUMMINGS
JUSTICE FOR JESSIE LIU
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR MARISA LINO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/CT OVERVIEW: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF
S/CT COORDINATOR DAILEY

MADRID 00001774 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Mr. Ambassador, the visit to Madrid of
your interagency delegation comes during a time when the
Spanish government is already in a heightened state of
terrorist alert, both from the Basque terrorist group ETA and
from Islamist extremists threatening to strike at the heart
of the former Muslim-controlled region they still call
"al-Andalus." Spanish government officials have made clear
their desire to coordinate closely with the USG on
counterterrorism, which they broadly view as a shared threat.
They will certainly be interested in your assessment of
Al-Qa'ida's expanding global outreach, especially in Europe
and North Africa. Although the Socialist government of
President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero is not in lockstep
with the US on many issues, Zapatero supports a strong CT
policy, and cooperation with the US contributes to this
objective. However, bureaucratic obstacles (highlighted by
intense inter-service rivalries that preclude almost all
information sharing or joint CT operations and
investigations) remain an impediment to improved cooperation.
You will have the opportunity to meet with a group of
Spain's interagency CT team (including representatives from
the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, National
Intelligence Center, NCTC-equivalent, National Police, and
Civil Guard),and you should emphasize our recent success in
establishing an interagency task force to address the
heightened threat environment. Spain is a valued US partner
and an important geostrategic player that has achieved a
remarkable transformation since the end of the Franco
dictatorship 30 years ago. It is one of the leading
democracies in Europe, and has the eighth-largest economy in
the world. I hope you and your delegation enjoy a productive
interaction with Spanish counterparts during your stay. END
SUMMARY.



//CT OVERVIEW//


2. (S/NF) Spain is a past and current Al-Qa'ida target and a
critical player in US-EU counterterrorism efforts, due to its
close proximity to the Maghreb and a population that includes
more than one million Muslims. Although Spain has been
fighting domestic terrorism since the 1960s, especially from
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist
organization and the radical left-wing First of October
Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO),it was only after the
September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the March
11, 2004 Madrid train bombings that the Spanish government
considered the threat from Islamic terrorism to be one of its
top national security priorities. At the time of the Madrid
bombings, however, Spain was already an active front in the
Global War on Terror as a result of its arrest of significant
Al-Qa'ida figures beginning in 2001 and its identification of
numerous Islamic extremist groups operating within its
borders. Spain continues to be an important staging point
for North African extremists heading to Iraq to join the
insurgency. The Spanish government fears that hardened and
experienced Jihadists will soon make their way back to Spain
in a reverse terrorist pipeline. Spanish media reported in
July that the Iraqi terrorist group Ansar al-Islam had
established a recruiting cell in Catalonia to route would-be
suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq. Spain has aggressively
targeted recruiters and facilitators and has arrested some 35
suspected Al-Qa'ida operatives as of July 2007, according to
the Ministry of Interior. Spanish authorities arrested over
50 suspected Islamist extremists in 2006 and are currently
holding some 100 detainees on Islamist terrorism-related
charges.


3. (S/NF) While the GOS differs with the US on the use of
military force to combat terrorism, bilateral CT cooperation
remains one of the cornerstones of this relationship. Spain
has pursued an aggressive agenda in law enforcement,
judicial, and information-sharing efforts. In March 2005, US

MADRID 00001774 002.2 OF 005


Attorney General Gonzales and the Spanish Minister of Justice
agreed to the creation of a bilateral CT working group.
Spanish participants are from the Spanish AG's office and
from the office of the Prosecutor of the National Court.
Embassy's Legatt, Consular, and Political sections join with
senior officials from the FBI and DOJ to participate on the
US side. The bilateral CT working group has met several
times, both in Madrid and Washington, with the last gathering
in early 2007. The group's goal is to build mutual trust and
enhance cooperation on combating Islamic extremism. The US
Terrorist Screening Center and Spain's NCTC equivalent are
due this month to sign an information-sharing protocol
covering terrorist lookout information as envisioned in
Homeland Security Presidential Directive Six (HSPD-6).


4. (S/NF) Spain participates in the Megaports and Container
Security Initiatives, and works with us to deny terrorists
access to Spanish financial institutions. Spain maintains a
robust law enforcement and intelligence posture against
Islamic terrorist finance and works well with us to combat
this problem. Spanish police in July arrested two Syrian
nationals on money laundering and terrorism finance charges.
Spain and the US co-chair the OECD's Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Spain is
a member of the G8's Counterterrorism Action Group and
provides technical assistance to other countries to help
build their institutions to counter terrorist finance. Spain
and France are collaborating on a project to establish a
Financial Intelligence Unit in Morocco. With respect to
terrorist designations, Spain implements all UN designations.
We are confident that Spain follows up on our requests for
asset checks of suspect individuals and organizations.
However, it is clear the Spanish suffer a sense of fatigue
with the designation regime, in part because there have been
a number of well-publicized cases of mistaken identities.
This may explain why Spain has still not designated convicted
Al-Qa'ida financier Barakat Yarkas and his collaborator Driss
Chebli.


5. (S/NF) Spain remains both a target of international
terrorist groups and an important transit point and
logistical base for terrorist organizations operating in
Western Europe. Spain does not serve as a sanctuary for
terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, the large
population of recent immigrants from North Africa and South
Asia (e.g. there are upwards of 60,000 Pakistani immigrants
living in the Barcelona area alone, most of whom are single
or here without their families),the opportunities that exist
for raising funds through illicit activities, and the ease of
travel to other countries in Europe, make Spain a strategic
location for international terrorist groups. The GOS knows
it faces a challenge in how to integrate its large Muslim
community into Spanish society. Since 2004, the government
has tried to promote moderate Islam and regularize contact
with Muslim communities to minimize their alienation, but
officials tell us they do not yet know if these policy
initiatives have had any effect. One problem we see is that
Spain's Muslim community is far from homogenous and it is not
clear that the individuals with whom the GOS is engaging
truly speak for or have influence among large sections of the
Muslim immigrant community. Our counterparts also tell us
they face daunting challenges in stemming the tide of
radicalization and recruitment occurring in Spanish prisons,
as these locations have become hotbeds of budding Jihadist
activity. One senior Spanish CT official related his
personal experience during an official trip to Morocco where
he was shown pictures of several inmates who had spent 2-3
years in local jails on various "minor" charges. He said
that the inmates, upon their release, left with long beards
reminiscent of the Taliban and head coverings and clothes
indicative of radical Islamic fundamentalists. Spanish
authorities tell us that approximately 15 to 20 percent of
Muslims who were first arrested for petty crimes were later
arrested for Islamic extremist activities.


MADRID 00001774 003.2 OF 005



//CHALLENGES REMAIN//


6. (S/NF) Despite the generally positive bilateral CT
relationship, challenges remain. Spain's main intelligence
and law enforcement services (the National Intelligence
Center, National Police, and Civil Guard) often fail to
communicate with each other and sometimes do not talk with
us. Spain's services rarely share information on CT targets
or participate in joint CT operations, largely because of
deep, long-standing rivalries. This obviously serves to
reduce the overall effectiveness of the Spanish security
apparatus and can hinder our bilateral CT cooperation at the
working level. One senior security official quipped to us
that US intelligence often had a better idea of what was
going on in Spain than Spanish services did because the US
could go separately to the Civil Guard, National Police, and
National Intelligence Center and then combine the information
received to gain the full picture. Senior Spanish officials
are aware of their stovepipe problem, but it is not evident
that the situation has improved since the creation of Spain's
National Anti-terrorism Coordination Center (CNCA - our NCTC
equivalent) in the wake of the Madrid train bombings. Your
delegation will be able to lead by example and show a united
front between elements of the US diplomatic, security, law
enforcement, and intelligence apparatus.


//CREATING A CT/LAW ENFORCEMENT HUB IN BARCELONA//


7. (S/NF) Mission Spain is currently developing a proposal
to transform our Consulate General in Barcelona into a
platform for a multi-agency, jointly-coordinated
counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence center to work
with our Spanish hosts in combating the target rich
environment of terrorist and criminal activities centered in
the Western Mediterranean region. This hub concept would
count on the contributions of key USG agencies such as DEA,
DHS, FBI, ORA, State, and USSS. Although this concept is
still in its infancy and not ready to be shared with the
Spanish, our Mission team would like to discuss this idea
with you and your delegation. This is a field-driven
strategy to counter, disrupt, and eliminate terrorist and
organized crime networks that cross national borders by
breaking down regional stovepipes within USG departments and
agencies. The center would also build host nation
cooperation and capacity to address transnational threats to
US national security.


//SUBSTANTIVE SCHEDULE//


8. (S/NF) Mission Spain's Country Team strategy has been to
develop a two-nation, multi-agency approach to confront the
terrorist threat in all its aspects. Your first meeting will
be with the Embassy's Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG),
chaired by the DCM, where you will hear from each of the
relevant agency and section heads on their role in fostering
the bilateral CT relationship. You will be able to review
with the CTWG the day's schedule with Spanish counterparts
and what we hope to accomplish in each meeting. Your first
meeting with Spanish officials will be with key members of
Spain's upper house of parliament so that you can deliver
your message directly to Spanish politicians of all political
stripes. These are the individuals who can convince the
Spanish public of the necessity to continue to take the fight
to Al-Qa'ida.


9. (S/NF) Even though Spanish politicians often criticize
our CT policies, the Spanish population appears to understand
the threat. The latest Transatlantic Trends survey by the
Marshall Fund found that 71 percent of Spaniards were worried
about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, more than the
European average of 54 percent and the US average of 59
percent. Over 80 percent of Spaniards surveyed expressed

MADRID 00001774 004.2 OF 005


concern about international terrorism, compared with the
European average of 66 percent and the US average of 74
percent.


10. (S/NF) Following the meeting with Congress, you will pay
an office call on Deputy Interior Minister Antonio Camacho, a
good friend of the Embassy who understands the need for
strong bilateral CT cooperation, and later join your
delegation as it delivers its briefing to Spain's interagency
CT team composed of representatives from the Ministry of
Interior, National Intelligence Center, NCTC-equivalent,
National Police, and Civil Guard. This substantive meeting
will provide the opportunity for a roundtable discussion on
CT best practices and an analysis of areas in which to
broaden and deepen CT cooperation. You should also press the
Spanish for their views on terrorist groups from North Africa
operating inside Spain, specifically Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic
Maghreb. We will then meet at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs with their senior officers working terrorism,
nonproliferation, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The final event
of the program is a working lunch hosted by the DCM with a
small group of Spain's top counterterrorism officials.


//THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT//


11. (C) President Zapatero will face Spanish voters again in
March 2008. While anything can change between now and next
March, most local pundits are predicting his re-election, due
mainly to the inability of opposition Partido Popular (PP)
leader Mariano Rajoy to galvanize and energize the Spanish
population beyond his center-right base. Key factors which
could influence the electoral outcome are the potential for a
slowing economy as well as the impact of another massive
terrorist attack on Spanish soil, and Zapatero is well aware
that he came to power precisely because of a terrorist attack
during elections held on March 14, 2004. Before the train
bombings on March 11, 2004, the PP held a four-percentage
point lead in the polls. Just three days later, the
frightened and angry Spanish electorate gave Zapatero's
Socialist party a four-percentage point victory. The PP in
many ways has yet to get over this sudden twist of fate.
Although the Spanish military strongly supports the United
States, Spanish foreign policy is primarily pacifist. For
this reason, the Spanish government and population are often
critical of the military aspects of US CT policy. The
Zapatero government feels much more comfortable committing
troops to peacekeeping operations than to combat, although
senior GOS officials insist that they are committed to a
long-term military presence in Afghanistan.


//THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP//


12. (C) Spain cooperates closely with the US in key areas
besides CT, including counter-narcotics, military and defense
programs, non-proliferation and Latin America. Spain is an
important NATO ally, a key player in the European Union, and
currently holds the rotating presidency of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Though it removed its
troops from Iraq in 2004 shortly after President Zapatero's
unexpected election, Spain has contributed $22 million to the
construction of the children's hospital in Basrah, Iraq.
Spain continues to fulfill a $300 million pledge for
reconstruction in Iraq and recently pledged an additional $28
million to the effort. Spain has made a strong, long-term
commitment to NATO's mission in Afghanistan, where it has 690
soldiers deployed to the Badghis Provincial Reconstruction
Team and Forward Support Base; it has also contributed 150
million euros to Afghan reconstruction. Spain has deployed
1100 soldiers to Lebanon, where they lead a multi-national
brigade of UN peacekeeping forces (UNIFIL) assigned to the
volatile tri-border region between Syria, Lebanon, and
Israel. In June, a terrorist attack killed six members of the
Spanish UNIFIL contingent. Spain further supports US

MADRID 00001774 005.2 OF 005


strategic interests by allowing the US to share two important
Spanish bases, ROTA Naval Station and Moron Air Force Base in
Southern Spain, as well as providing blanket flight and
overflight clearances. The 1500 US military personnel at the
two bases support thousands of US military flights and
hundreds of US ship visits each year, and is a major hub for
US force and logistical deployments into the Iraq,
Afghanistan, Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. Continued
access to and use of these bases is essential to US military
and strategic interests.
AGUIRRE