SPAIN/VENEZUELA: PRESSING MFA ON NAVAL SHIP SALE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001256 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR FOR A/S FRIED AND PDAS VOLKER EUR/WE FOR ALLEGRONE, CLEMENTS, AND CERVETTI PM FOR A/S STEVE MULL E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR VZ SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/VENEZUELA: PRESSING MFA ON NAVAL SHIP SALE MADRID 00001256 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) USCIS Director Emilio Gonzalez met with MFA Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bernardino Leon June 21 to compare notes the major immigration issues affecting both countries. In the context of Leon's discussion of increased migration to Spain through West Africa, the DCM suggested that Spain should revisit its 2005-2006 decision to sell naval vessels to Venezuela. The DCM said it might be more beneficial to Spain's strategic interests to sell "ocean-going patrol boats" (as Spain has termed the vessels) to a West African country in order to help combat the growing threats posed by illegal migration and drug trafficking. By contrast, it was difficult to see how aiding Venezuela's arms buildup would be helpful to Spain, given the current state of affairs. ¶2. (C) The DCM pointed to Venezuelan President Chavez's comments to the media indicating that Venezuela would "distance itself" from Spain in the wake of criticism of the Venezuelan Government's actions on RCTV by Spanish FM Miguel Angel Moratinos during the June 1 visit to Madrid by the Secretary. Separately, Venezuelan FM Maduro insulted high SIPDIS profile Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon as "a clown" for his defense of RCTV during a recent visit to Venezuela. Under these circumstances, suggested the DCM, Spain should reconsider its decision to sell eight naval craft to Venezuela, perhaps with a view to providing these ships to a country that could bolster, rather than undermine, international stability. He said the USG might be able to provide a list of countries that might be in the market for such ships, including some in West Africa that might be more capable of assisting Spain to counter seaborne threats if they had the equipment to do so. ¶3. (C) Leon said that he had always opposed the sale of Spanish-build aircraft to Venezuela and was pleased when that sale was derailed in 2006. He agreed that, given the direction of events in Venezuela, it was time to review the sale of naval vessels as well. Leon noted, however, that he was not familiar with the contractual obligations imposed by the agreement to sell the ships to Venezuela and would have to investigate this aspect before moving forward with a review of the sale itself. //COMMENT// ¶4. (C) Our sense is that Spain's approach towards Venezuela is in a period of flux, most recently after Chavez's reaction to Moratinos' statements on RCTV, and that this is an opportune moment to try once more to impede the sale of Spanish naval craft to Caracas. With this in mind, the Ambassador had requested that the DCM use any opening in the Gonzalez-Leon meeting to press the issue with Leon. Unlike Cuba, where Spain has opted unequivocally for engagement, the MFA appears dissatisfied with the results of its efforts to establish a good working relationship with Chavez. Spain is unlikely to break with its pro-dialogue diplomatic style by publicly dropping the ship deal, but if it were to let the deal fall apart, this would be a clear signal to Chavez, to Latin America, and to Spain's EU partners. (NOTE: As far as we know, the Spanish Government has never acknowledged the dissolution of the EADS CASA aircraft sale to Venezuela. END NOTE). Apart from the obvious value of blocking a weapons sale to the Chavez government, such a move would encourage increased Spanish readiness to engage more deeply with countries that are actually working to bring stability and development. It is not a coincidence, for example, that Spain is considering establishing a preferential "strategic" relationship with Colombia at the same time that its relationship with Caracas is moving into a period of tension. This is a big shift from the early days of the Zapatero Government, when Spain blocked a minor weapons sale to Colombia at the same time that it arranged a major sale to MADRID 00001256 002.2 OF 002 the Chavez Government. We may be able to work quietly behind the scenes to encourage this trend. AGUIRRE