SPANISH POLDIR ON CFE, CUBA, ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001144 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM KCFE KOSCE CU SP SUBJECT: SPANISH POLDIR ON CFE, CUBA, ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS REF: A. STATE 75239 ¶B. STATE 77371 ¶C. MADRID 1099 ¶D. HAVANA 539 MADRID 00001144 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The DCM met with Spanish MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar June 7 to discuss the need for unity at next week's extraordinary CFE Treaty conference in Vienna. Dezcallar reiterated Spain's strong commitment to NATO and expressed concern at the tone of Putin's recent rhetoric. Dezcallar also took the opportunity to provide a readout of his recent trip to Cuba to participate in the Spain-Cuba bilateral dialogue on human rights, which took place May 29-30 in Havana. He said the trip was generally positive, and he expected the results to bear out the correctness of Spain's policy of engagement. The DCM told Dezcallar that the U.S. strongly disagreed with Spain's approach and was skeptical that Spain's engagement would produce tangible results - an appreciable increase in democracy in Cuba - and not merely a legitimation of Castro II. Dezcallar asked whether the U.S. would be able to provide a contribution to the Alliance of Civilizations as had previously been discussed by the Secretary and FM Moratinos. Finally, he expressed interest in a trip to Washington, perhaps in July, following the success of the Secretary's visit. END SUMMARY. SIPDIS ¶2. (C) The DCM met with Spanish MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar on June 7 to emphasize the need for Alliance unity at next week's CFE Treaty conference (refs A-C). DCM told Dezcallar that the U.S. would seek to assist the Russian Federation in fulfilling the Istanbul Commitments but would not waver in conditioning A/CFE ratification on fulfillment of those commitments. The U.S. was taking Russian President Putin and FM Lavrov's comments seriously and was alarmed by the tone of Russia's preparatory work for the conference. Dezcallar responded that Spain also was alarmed by Putin's recent comments, and he reiterated Spain's commitment to NATO and to unity at the CFE treaty, thanking DCM for the non-paper on a possible response to the Russian draft Final Document. ¶3. (C) The DCM said that the Secretary had expressed great satisfaction with her trip and the substantive agenda, of which the Cuban aspect was only one part of the overall successful visit. Dezcallar agreed and noted that it was no surprise to him that some Spanish media outlets had chosen to highlight the differences on Cuba rather than the overall success of the visit. In this respect, the Secretary's public critique on Cuba had opened the government to criticism on a visit that was intended to show the normalization of the bilateral relationship. The DCM responded that the Secretary felt very strongly about the Cuba issue and wanted to make sure that Spain's leaders understood the U.S. position. //HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH CUBA// ¶4. (C) Dezcallar then gave a more detailed readout of his late May trip to Cuba for the first bilateral human rights dialogue with the Cuban government. He stressed that this was the first time the Cuban government had ever agreed to a dialogue on Cuban internal human rights policy, saying "this was no small accomplishment." He sought to draw a distinction between this effort and previous engagement between former Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez and Fidel by saying that Gonzalez' effort had been a one-off, whereas the Spaniards were conducting this process via a systematic, consistent and protracted dialogue according to international standards. //DISSIDENTS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS// ¶5. (C) He said that the Spanish had stressed to the Cubans the need for freedom of movement and association for MADRID 00001144 002.2 OF 003 dissidents and the need for dissidents to be able to travel internationally. The Spanish delegation told the Cubans that they needed to stop regarding dissidents as delinquents and recognize them as legitimate opinion-holders. They also told the Cubans that positive human rights developments would have positive consequences for Cuba's relationship with the EU. ¶6. (C) On political prisoners, Dezcallar said that the Spanish delegation read off a list of political prisoners, some from Amnesty and Human Rights Watch and other sources, and called for their release. He said that a sign of Cuba's interest was the fact that they took down all of the names in question rather than simply ignoring the exercise. The Spanish also said that the ICRC should get unlimited access to Cuban prisons immediately. ¶7. (C) To the Spaniards' surprise, the Cubans took them to visit three different prison facilities, as reported in ref ¶D. Dezcallar told the DCM that he was not really qualified to judge the conditions at the prison facilities, but he acknowledged that the conditions were not good. He emphasized with the Cubans that it was not the Spanish who should be seeing these facilities but international experts. The DCM added that international experts would have wanted to see some of the notorious maximum security facilities on the island, not three low security facilities in Havana. Dezcallar said that he made that point as well. The Cubans told Dezcallar that if the EU COLAT and discussions on the Common Position went well, then Cuba might be amenable to receiving visits from UN special rapporteurs and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Chanet. //LEGAL REFORM// ¶8. (C) Dezcallar said that the Spanish told the Cubans that their legal framework, particularly "Law 88", the law of penal processing, and certain other elements of their penal code, were not in line with international norms and should be changed. The Spanish offered to organize a conference between Spanish legal experts and Cuban judiciary officials to discuss possible reforms. //BLAME U.S. ON INTERNET ACCESS// ¶9. (C) Dezcallar also said that the Spanish pressed the Cubans on internet access. The Cubans replied that Havana does have internet cafes, but the Spanish stressed that they were very few and prohibitively expensive for the average Cuban. At this point the Cubans suggested that they would love to provide cheap and fast internet access, but the U.S. was blocking their access to bandwidth. The DCM told Dezcallar that we understood this to be false and would follow up with Washington immediately for a clarification. //TIMELINE FOR RESULTS?// ¶10. (C) The DCM conveyed his doubt about whether this process would succeed and asked whether the Spanish had a time horizon at which point they would be able to evaluate whether their efforts were achieving any tangible improvement of freedom in Cuba. Dezcallar bristled, responding that Spain's strategy at least had the advantage that all other tactics had failed to produce any tangible improvement of freedom in Cuba. According to Dezcallar, if external isolation and pressure would ever have produced a change within Cuba, it would have happened last summer when Fidel first surrendered power. He said that the GOS would keep their process completely transparent and would continue to engage with the USG on its efforts, but they were absolutely convinced of the correctness of their policy. He said that the Raul Castro regime recognizes that it will not be able to sustain the status quo and that the historical moment has changed from Fidel's era. ¶11. (C) The DCM noted Spain's effort to change the EU Common Position and lift restrictive measures on Cuba, and he said that this would represent the abandonment of European MADRID 00001144 003.2 OF 003 commitment to democracy in Cuba. The DCM emphasized that the USG would continue to press not just Spain but all EU members to maintain pressure on Cuba. Dezcallar replied that the measures were already suspended, and he thought that they would be eliminated. Dezcallar said Spain recognizes that Cuba is a national security issue for the U.S., but he said the U.S. should consider what kind of change in Cuba would be best for U.S. security. He noted the Secretary's admonition that the Raul Castro regime must not be legitimated, and he countered that the only people who could legitimate the Raul regime were the Cubans themselves. Nobody is under any illusions about who Raul Castro is and what his regime has represented, he said. The Spanish presence in the island was not to give legitimacy to Raul but to try to help the Cuban people. The DCM pointed out that Spain's engagement with a dictatorship would not reflect well on the human rights policies of Spain and the entire EU. Dezcallar again responded that nothing else had worked so far in Cuba. The DCM noted that clearly the U.S. and Spain had serious differences on the issue, but he thanked Dezcallar for the readout and said he hoped that the Spanish would continue to keep the U.S. in the loop. //ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS, TRIP TO DC// ¶12. (C) Dezcallar then briefly touched on the Alliance of Civilizations and asked whether the USG had made any decisions about a contribution to fund a program, as per the "gentleman's agreement" between the two governments after Spain's one million dollar contribution to the Foundation for the Future. Dezcallar said that the Alliance would be organizing a forum shortly to unveil the work plan and set in motion some projects, and he suggested that this would be a good opportunity for the U.S. to announce its contribution. (NOTE: The USG has said it would look to support a project once specific project proposals are identified by the work plan. END NOTE.) ¶13. (C) Lastly, Dezcallar said that he hoped to make a visit to Washington in July, "in the wake of the Secretary's visit" in order to share the GOS' evolving perspectives on Afghanistan, Iran, Kosovo, Darfur and other issues. The DCM said this was an excellent idea and asked Dezcallar for dates as soon as possible so that EUR could set up a excellent high-level program for him. -------------- Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/ -------------- AGUIRRE