SLOVENIA/CROATIA: PRESSURE MOUNTING TO RESOLVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000342 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV HR SI SUBJECT: SLOVENIA/CROATIA: PRESSURE MOUNTING TO RESOLVE BORDER ISSUE Classified By: COM Thomas B. Robertson for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The unseasonably warm spring seems to have been an early trigger for the annual summer border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. Following a winter of relative peace on that front, Slovenian Foreign Minister Rupel stepped back into the fray after the unveiling in Croatia on May 21 of a map of traditional shellfish farms in the Bay of Piran. The map, produced by the Ministry of Agriculture in Croatia, provoked this reaction with the depiction of a line of demarcation running through the middle of Piran Bay, which on this map is identified as Savudrija Bay - another affront. In his same-day reaction Rupel told a news conference that no map drawn after June 25, 1991 had any validity, and that sooner or later Croatia would have to find a way to solve this issue, since it hoped to join the European Union. This latest exchange is a symptom of the chronic discord over the border that has existed between Slovenia and Croatia since independence was declared in 1991. ¶2. (C) The difference 15 years later is that Slovenia is in the European Union, and Croatia would like to join that club. The Government of Slovenia appears sincere in wanting Croatia and the rest of the Western Balkan countries to join the EU. This is key to its policy to create a secure and stable Balkan region. From the Prime Minister to the head of the Parliamentary EU Committee, to the Foreign Minster himself, all say that Slovenia will not hold Croatia's EU accession hostage to bilateral issues unless the EU is interested in having these problems solved prior to Croatia's entry. That said it seems to be difficult for FM Rupel to resist returning fire when he believes Croatia has overstepped with claims about the border. It would also be unrealistic to expect Slovenia to agree to any demands for arbitration prior to the EU Presidency in the first half of ¶2008. End Summary. ¶3. (C) Recently, it seemed that relations might be on an upswing on the Croatia-Slovenia dispute. Foreign Minister Rupel had largely stepped back from public confrontation. This was to the relief of many Slovenes of various political views who find his personalization of the dispute and high handed threats about EU accession for Croatia to be poor form �0A;and detrimental to an important bilateral relationship. However, for calm to rule, it is clear both sides must observe restraint when it comes to public discussion of the border by government officials. Politicians and the Press are much harder to rein in. ¶4. (C) The latest provocation for Rupel came with the unveiling of a map of Croatian shellfish farms in Piran Bay produced by the Croatian Ministry of Agriculture and published in the Croatian Official Gazette. Rupel did not dispute the location of the farms, rather he objected to the depiction of the Slovenia-Croatia border running through the middle of Piran Bay and the assertion that Croatia would have jurisdiction over that area. A further provocation was the renaming of the bay as Savudrija Bay after the nearest Croatian town and which, to the best of our knowledge, is a name that has never been used to describe this area of water. ¶5. (C) To be sure, there has been continuing provocation from Slovenia. It has come, predictably, from loud mouths in minor political parties who have few other issues on which to build their national profiles. The assertion by Zmago Jelincic of the National Party (SNS) that Slovenia's border should extend to the Mirna River - well into Croatian Istria - is dismissed by all as absurd, and his further threat to call for a referendum on Croatia's EU accession is considered reckless and a recipe for certain disaster. Marjan Podobnik (SLS),a minor politician (but from a coalition party) and head of newly formed "Institute 25 June" released a map of his view of the Croatia-Slovenia border on May 14, and he was rebuked by Rupel in the same press conference in which he reacted to the Croatia map. ¶6. (U) In that conference, Rupel stated the Government of Slovenia is serious about respecting the "non-provocation pact" agreed between the GOS and GOC in June 2005 and that "no other maps but those that reflect the situation as it was on 25 June 1991 can be valid." ¶7. (C) This latest cycle of accusations and recriminations LJUBLJANA 00000342 002 OF 002 failed again to produce any substantive change in the situation. Prior to this most recent dust-up, at a lunch hosted by Croatian Ambassador to Slovenia, Mario Nobilo, and attended by Polecon Chief, Nobilo had expressed optimism that the rhetoric had died down and that there was an opportunity to start the process of arbitration prior to the EU Presidency. The looming EU Presidency does seem to be the impetus for the GOS to resolve a few outstanding issues that many believe will reflect poorly on the GOS if left at loose ends during the Presidency. These include managing a real reduction of court case backlogs, resettlement of a well known Roma family, and possibly resolving the status of the "erased." But, any push to start arbitration on the sea border prior to the Presidency is not being seriously considered in Ljubljana as all competent legal minds have been drafted already to support the Presidency, and it would be simply impossible for Slovenia to prepare its case in the few months left in 2007. Given upcoming elections in Croatia, it is probably less likely that the GOC would want to move this forward at this time. Additionally, while a move to arbitration may be inevitable, Slovenia will insist that the entire border with Croatia be included - not just the sea border. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) This long running dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, after 15 years, has sounded more strident in Slovenia recently. While each country's politicians use aggressive and provocative language against the other country to prove patriotic credentials and demonstrate tough-mindedness in the best interests of the nation, for some parties in Slovenia it is the only issue on which they can get attention. Alternating political cycles guarantee that there is never enough breathing space between elections for both sides to develop more pragmatic positions. Slovenia's PM Jansa has publicly chalked up the more recent assertions from Croatia as unfortunate and clearly meant for domestic political consumption. ¶10. (C) The last best chance at a bilateral solution was in 2001 when Slovenia's PM Janez Drnovsek and Croatian PM Ivica Racan signed an agreement covering all the outstanding issues. It was rejected by the Croatian Sabor as an unacceptable failure, though it continues to be held up by Slovenia as a workable compromise. In any future negotiation, it is almost certain Slovenia will want to use it as a touch point (though Croatia would reject this proposition) when making the case for its claims. Recent agreement among the majority of Slovenian political parties, coalition and opposition alike, recognize that arbitration is probably inevitable. ¶11. (C) Finally, despite political bluster, be it from minor politicians or the Foreign Minister himself, the Government of Slovenia will not hold up Croatia's EU membership over unresolved border issues, and there has never been any suggestion that NATO membership would be held up on these grounds either. These same disputes existed three years ago when Slovenia entered the European Union, and in practice, Slovenia is providing every assistance to the GOC in its efforts to join the EU. The GOS knows, however, that it must work to tone down the domestic political rhetoric in order to squash any attempt at calling a referendum on Croatia's EU membership, which would be disastrous. ¶12. (U) Embassy Zagreb has cleared on this cable. COLEMAN