SLOVENIA'S PRESIDENT TO CONVEY IRAN MESSAGE TO UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000163

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE (SADLE)
NSC FOR A. STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP PINR IR SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA'S PRESIDENT TO CONVEY IRAN MESSAGE TO UN
SECRETARY GENERAL


SIPDIS

REF: A. LJUBLJANA 155

B. 2006 LJUBLJANA 380

Classified By: DCM Maryruth Coleman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Slovenia's president Drnovsek recently
initiated an exchange with President Ahmadinejad over Iran's
nuclear activities and hoped to discuss this with President
Bush in Washington this week. With that hope dashed,
Drnovsek will meet with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon on
March 21 to discuss the contents of a letter FM Mottaki
brought from Ahmadinejad when he visited Slovenia March 14
and to relate his own views on possible ways forward with
Iran and its nuclear ambitions. In a meeting with Charge on
March 19, Drnovsek's International Affairs advisor made it
clear that, though Ahmadinejad had extended an invitation,
Drnovsek had no plans to visit Iran, unless it could be
helpful to the negotiations in some way. As in some other
diplomatic efforts by the President, such as with Kosovo and
Darfur, Drnovsek has used his office and past Non-Alligned
Movement (NAM) stature to seek a role as facilitator in
resolving this complex issue. Drnovsek did not vet his
intentions to engage on this issue with Prime Minister Jansa
or Foreign Minister Rupel. While they have not publicly
criticized his moves, the MFA has made it clear to Post that
Drnovsek does not have the support of the Government on this
initiative. End Summary.


2. (C) Over the last several days, Charge has met with MFA
and Presidential staff to discuss the recent visit of Iranian
Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki to Ljubljana and the
planned travel of President Drnovsek to New York, including a
request to meet with POTUS. In meetings with the MFA, it was
clear that no one in the government had had prior knowledge
of Drnovsek's plans to engage on Iran. Drnovsek instigated
the contact with Iran through two letters, one to Ahmadinejad
and the other to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei about two weeks prior
to the March 14 visit. According to Ivo Vajgl, Drnovsek's
International Affairs advisor, FM Mottaki delivered the
response from Ahmadinejad. No response has been received
from Khamenei.


3. (C) On March 16, Vajgl called in Charge to relay
Drnovsek's request for a meeting with President Bush the week
of March 19 to coincide with his visit to New York to see
UNSYG Ban. When it became clear that a meeting with
President Bush would be impossible to arrange, Vajgl called
Charge in again on March 19 to share with her the contents of
Ahmadinejad's letter and asked that this information be
shared with the President. Vajgl did not share a copy of
either letter but said that Drnovsek had suggested Iran
should submit a declaration to the UNSC that it is ready to
completely implement the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and would only use nuclear power for
peaceful means. Drnovsek further suggested that Iran also
offer a declaration stating it would not back out of its
commitments under the treaty (as has North Korea). According
to Vajgl, Mottaki said this would be acceptable and the one
condition Iran would insist upon is the lifting (rather than
suspension) of all sanctions against Iran. Vajgl added that
Mottaki indicated that Iran was prepared to work with the
United States to bring security and stability to Iraq.


4. (C) Vajgl said Drnovsek would travel to New York for a
March 21 meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon where
he would share the contents of this exchange and offer his
own recommendations (on which Vajgl did not elaborate).
Vajgl was also at pains to mention that while Ahmadinejad had
invited Drnovsek to visit Tehran, Drnvosek had no plans to do
so unless there was any added value to be gained from such a
visit.


5. (C) Comment: This is the third time in two years that
President Drnovsek has struck out on his own believing he
could add value to some of the more intractable problems in
the international arena. His prior forays on Kosovo and
Darfur faltered because of Drnovsek's belief that he could
provide solutions outside of established multilateral
efforts. Unfortunately, rather than capitalize in a
constructive way on past NAM associations, he only served to
create more tension with his own government and with its
allies in the EU and US as well as Kosovo, Serbia and Sudan.
Given political dynamics in this country of two million and

LJUBLJANA 00000163 002 OF 002


Drnovsek's strong popularity with the general public, PM
Jansa will not likely move precipitously to reign in
Drnovsek. However, we can expect the GOS to step in if
Drnovsek decides to pursue this issue without the full
support of the international community.
COLEMAN