PORTUGUESE POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 003149

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO

REF: STATE 165486

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Classified By: Pol/econ counselor Matt Harrington for reasons 1.4(B) an
d (D).

Summary
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1. (C) MFA political director Vasco Bramao Ramos told the
DCM on December 12 there is a consensus among EU member
states that the period for negotiations on Kosovo is over and
that independence is the only alternative. He was less
certain how events would unfold over the next weeks and
months, however, and believed only 8-10 member states would
recognize a declaration of independence immediately. Ban
ki-Moon's refusal to offer a supportive statement had
complicated the EU's efforts to generate an ESDP mission, but
the EU was proceeding nonetheless and would be ready to
deploy a mission no earlier than March 2008. End Summary.


2. (C) DCM delivered reftel talking points on December 12
to MFA political director Vasco Bramao Ramos. He was
accompanied by pol/econcounselor and poloff.


European Council
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3. (C) Bramao Ramos said there was unlikely to be much new
emerging from the December 14 gathering in Brussels of EU
heads of state and government. EU conclusions on Kosovo had
been issued earlier in the week by Foreign Ministers
attending the General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) and the European Council's conclusions would be very
similar, although there may be additional emphasis on the
fact that Serbia's future lies in Europe.

State of Play within the EU
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4. (C) The political director said Portugal had hoped to
make more progress on Kosovo final status during its
presidency. There had been some important movement, however.
One, the EU had agreed Kosovo is a European responsibility
and most member states now accepted the necessity of moving
forward without a new UN Security Council Resolution. There
is consensus that the period for negotiations is over and
that, despite the problematic consequences, independence is
the only alternative. "Let's just hope the process is
manageable," Bramao Ramos added. Many member states continue
to have concerns about next steps, he said, and no one is
completely comfortable with any of the options on the table.
Upcoming Serbian elections,unfortunately, will amplify the
rhetoric, probably on both sides.

Messages to parties
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5. (C) The political director agreed with the need to send
firm messages to both sides. He said he had spoken recently
to "the Serbs" and pressed them to be flexible and
imaginative. He warned them not to resist the "winds of
history," a phrase he repeated to us several times. At the
same time, "we have encouraged the Kosovars to be patient and
they have been." The EU understands there is a limit to their
patience, however.

Recognition
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6. (C) Bramao Ramos expressed his view that, following a
Kosovar eclaration of independence, only eight to ten member
states would grant recognition immediately. A second group
of similar size would drag its feet but would grant
recognition at some later date. A third group, he believed,
would never recognize Kosovo. He believed that, a year after
independence, only about half of member states will have
granted recognition, and that a "vast majority" of the
international community will not have recognized Kosovo. The
political director stuck to that prediction even when
challenged.


7. (C) Bramao Ramos insisted that using 1244 to confer
legitimacy on a Kosovo declaration of independence would be a
political approach rather than a legal one. Most legal
scholars, he said, would reject 1244 as not providing an
adequate legal basis, but that EU consensus had come around

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to accepting this option -- a big change from the summer.


8. (C) Bramao Ramos was deeply concerned about the viability
of an independent Kosovo, particularly in the face of
aggressive resistance by Serbia. Serbia will certainly not
help economically, and Kosovo will be blocked from joining
international organizations, not just by Russia but many
others. He also expressed concern about the growing
potential for religious extremism in the region, noting that
mosques and veiled women are "blooming like flowers," and
that madrassas are sprouting up everywhere.

ESDP mission
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9. (C) The main challenge for deployment of an ESDP
mission, according to Bramao Ramos, is finding an appropriate
legal basis. In the absence of a new UNSC resolution, the EU
had been counting on three things: an invitation from
Pristina and supportive statements from Washington and UN
Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon. Ban has now made it clear he

SIPDIS
will issue no such statement, which has complicated EU
efforts, although the EU would ultimately find a way to
proceed with deployment. The ESDP mission would be fully
staffed within the next one-two months and adequate funding
has been allocated. The earliest the mission would be able
to deploy would be March 2008, Bramao Ramos said. EU High
Representative Solana wants it on the ground earlier but
logistical hurdles make that
impossible.

Comment
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10. (C) Although acknowledging progress, Bramao Ramos spent
more time wringing his hands about the consequences of Kosovo
independence than explaining how events are likely to unfold
within the EU over the next weeks and months. His
prediction of the number of member states likely to recognize
Kosovo was significantly more pessismistic than we have seen
in reporting from other posts or in press reporting,
suggesting to us that, if he has been at the center of the
Union's efforts to manage the way forward, he has come away
with different conclusions. His comment that Ban ki-Moon
was not being helpful on Kosovo was news to us.
Stephenson