FM AMADO ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 002916

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PO KV SR
SUBJECT: FM AMADO ON KOSOVO


Classified By: Ambassador Alfred Hoffman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary: During a farewell lunch he hosted for
Ambassador Hoffman, Foreign Minister Luis Amado spoke at
length in answer to Ambassador,s questions about the EU,s
progress on Kosovo. While defending the Portuguese
presidency,s role in making Kosovo an "EU issue" that is
firmly stamped as a priority for the Union and member states,
and not just for Brussels and/or the Presidency, Amado
admitted that it would be all but impossible to forge an EU
consensus on Kosovo before the end of the Portuguese
presidency. He also said that, once such a consensus was
reached, there would be an EU statement on Kosovo that would
inevitably call for independence and would represent the
EU,s "last best offer" to Serbia. End Summary


2. (C/NF) During a November 13 farewell lunch he hosted for
the Ambassador, FM Amado spent most of his time discussing
Kosovo. Ambassador Hoffman continually pressed Amado to
describe the current state of play within the EU and to
explain how current internal EU discussions constituted
progress. Amado somewhat defensively claimed that, at the
very least, Portuguese efforts to keep Kosovo on the EU
agenda and to advocate a common EU position had been
successful if only because the Kosovo issue was now rightly
seen as a European and EU priority that member states and the
Union needed to address. Member states were no longer
willing to "leave the issue to Brussels," and, thanks to
Portugal,s efforts, Kosovo could no longer be considered the
hobby horse of any given presidency, but a genuine priority
for the Union as a whole.


3. (C/NF) Ambassador Hoffman asked Amado how the Troika
negotiations represented progress if almost everyone agreed
that independence for Kosovo was inevitable but the EU
couldn,t acknowledge that and agree on the conditions under
which member states would recognize an independent Kosovo.
If Serbia has to agree to everything in order for the EU to
accept Kosovo,s independence, what,s the difference between
that position and giving Serbia (and Russia) a veto over EU
policy? Amado said that an EU consensus was slowly being
established and that only a few member states were not yet on
board in accepting a policy and statement that would outline
EU support for independence. He noted that Cyprus was
proving to be the most problematic member state in achieving
this consensus.


4. (C/NF) Nonetheless, Amado admitted that it was very
unlikely that agreement would be reached before the end of
the Portuguese presidency, and that it would probably be "one
or two months" into the Slovenian presidency before the EU
would be ready to make its official statement. (Asked by the
Ambassador what the Slovenian position was, Amado confessed
that Slovenia was at the forefront in urging that Kosovo be
solved during the Portuguese Presidency.) Amado
characterized this eventual EU statement as a "last best
offer" to Serbia regarding what the EU would commit to do in
order to ensure that the parties agreed on a plan for
Kosovo,s independence. This offer would be a "package" and
likely include guarantees of support for a mechanism for
Serbia,s continued involvement in "areas of particular
interest" in Kosovo, but insist that Serbia,s interests
could not preclude true independence for Kosovo. (Amado
alluded to but did not elaborate on EU membership being part
of the package.) Ambassador asked what the "or else" would
be in this last best offer. Amado,s response was that the
EU would throw its full support behind the Ahtisaari plan.


5. (C/NF) Comment: It is important to underscore that
Amado did not discuss in detail internal EU deliberations on
Kosovo, his reticence likely motivated by the presence of a
journalist and prominent member of civil society at a
luncheon that was supposed to be primarily ceremonial.
Nonetheless, we were disappointed to hear Amado admit
Portugal,s preference, essentially, to kick the Kosovo can
down the road into the Slovenian presidency, and we suspect
he was overly optimistic in describing Cyprus as the
principal problematic member state. In commenting that the
EU would throw its weight behind the Ahtisaari plan if the
Troika negotiations do not produce a negotiated settlement,
the Foreign Minister did not address the fundamental question
of whether an EU consensus would be possible in the absence
of a UN Security Council resolution endorsing that plan.
End comment.
Hoffman