FM AMADO ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 002916 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 TAGS: PREL PO KV SR SUBJECT: FM AMADO ON KOSOVO Classified By: Ambassador Alfred Hoffman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: During a farewell lunch he hosted for Ambassador Hoffman, Foreign Minister Luis Amado spoke at length in answer to Ambassador,s questions about the EU,s progress on Kosovo. While defending the Portuguese presidency,s role in making Kosovo an "EU issue" that is firmly stamped as a priority for the Union and member states, and not just for Brussels and/or the Presidency, Amado admitted that it would be all but impossible to forge an EU consensus on Kosovo before the end of the Portuguese presidency. He also said that, once such a consensus was reached, there would be an EU statement on Kosovo that would inevitably call for independence and would represent the EU,s "last best offer" to Serbia. End Summary ¶2. (C/NF) During a November 13 farewell lunch he hosted for the Ambassador, FM Amado spent most of his time discussing Kosovo. Ambassador Hoffman continually pressed Amado to describe the current state of play within the EU and to explain how current internal EU discussions constituted progress. Amado somewhat defensively claimed that, at the very least, Portuguese efforts to keep Kosovo on the EU agenda and to advocate a common EU position had been successful if only because the Kosovo issue was now rightly seen as a European and EU priority that member states and the Union needed to address. Member states were no longer willing to "leave the issue to Brussels," and, thanks to Portugal,s efforts, Kosovo could no longer be considered the hobby horse of any given presidency, but a genuine priority for the Union as a whole. ¶3. (C/NF) Ambassador Hoffman asked Amado how the Troika negotiations represented progress if almost everyone agreed that independence for Kosovo was inevitable but the EU couldn,t acknowledge that and agree on the conditions under which member states would recognize an independent Kosovo. If Serbia has to agree to everything in order for the EU to accept Kosovo,s independence, what,s the difference between that position and giving Serbia (and Russia) a veto over EU policy? Amado said that an EU consensus was slowly being established and that only a few member states were not yet on board in accepting a policy and statement that would outline EU support for independence. He noted that Cyprus was proving to be the most problematic member state in achieving this consensus. ¶4. (C/NF) Nonetheless, Amado admitted that it was very unlikely that agreement would be reached before the end of the Portuguese presidency, and that it would probably be "one or two months" into the Slovenian presidency before the EU would be ready to make its official statement. (Asked by the Ambassador what the Slovenian position was, Amado confessed that Slovenia was at the forefront in urging that Kosovo be solved during the Portuguese Presidency.) Amado characterized this eventual EU statement as a "last best offer" to Serbia regarding what the EU would commit to do in order to ensure that the parties agreed on a plan for Kosovo,s independence. This offer would be a "package" and likely include guarantees of support for a mechanism for Serbia,s continued involvement in "areas of particular interest" in Kosovo, but insist that Serbia,s interests could not preclude true independence for Kosovo. (Amado alluded to but did not elaborate on EU membership being part of the package.) Ambassador asked what the "or else" would be in this last best offer. Amado,s response was that the EU would throw its full support behind the Ahtisaari plan. ¶5. (C/NF) Comment: It is important to underscore that Amado did not discuss in detail internal EU deliberations on Kosovo, his reticence likely motivated by the presence of a journalist and prominent member of civil society at a luncheon that was supposed to be primarily ceremonial. Nonetheless, we were disappointed to hear Amado admit Portugal,s preference, essentially, to kick the Kosovo can down the road into the Slovenian presidency, and we suspect he was overly optimistic in describing Cyprus as the principal problematic member state. In commenting that the EU would throw its weight behind the Ahtisaari plan if the Troika negotiations do not produce a negotiated settlement, the Foreign Minister did not address the fundamental question of whether an EU consensus would be possible in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution endorsing that plan. End comment. Hoffman