PORTUGAL'S AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 002882

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL'S AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

Classified By: political/economic counselor Matt Harrington for reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
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1. (C/NF) In a November 9 lunch with DATT and P/E Counselor,
the Foreign Minister's diplomatic advisor, Paulo Lourenco,
made it clear that President Cavaco Silva himself was behind
Portugal's recently announced decision to reduce its
contributions to ISAF beginning in August 2008. Lourenco
said the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of
Defense had all been opposed to the decision, which had been
motivated by concerns about eroding public support. He
regretted the timing of the decision as well, coming as it
did just before the FORCE regeneration conference and
escalating operations against the Taliban. Lourenco said the
United States was the only ally to have expressed concern
about the drawdown and he asked pointedly whether we had been
in touch with the President's senior diplomatic advisor and
the head of his military household. He added that it would
be especially helpful if other NATO allies in addition to the
United States weighed in on this issue. We will report
separately Portugal's views on next steps, based on the
Ambassador's conversations with the Minister of Defense and
others. End Summary.

The Decision
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2. (C/NF) Paulo Lourenco said the decision to reduce
Portugal's contribution to ISAF from a rapid reaction company
to a C-130 and a 15-person OMLT in August 2008 had been made
"a long time ago" in a heated discussion in the Supreme
Defense Council. He said the military service chiefs, the
CHOD, the Prime Minister, and Ministers of Defense and of
Foreign Affairs had all opposed the decision to draw down.
Although Lourenco did not say so directly, it was clear that
President Cavaco Silva himself was the driving FORCE behind
the move, apparently motivated by concern about escalating
violence and the growing possibility of casualties, and the
consequent impact on public opinion.


3. (C) We expressed strong concern that we had read about
the decision initially in an Iranian news service piece about
an appearance by the Minister of Defense before a
parliamentary committee. Lourenco said he wished there had
been prior consultation with Allies before the announcement,
noting that it had been the Ministry of Defense that had been
responsible for the rollout. He said pointedly that he would
not have handled the announcement in the same way.
We underlined that the effort in Afghanistan is a critical
NATO effort that will have security-related consequences for
all Allies. The consequences of failure were unacceptable.
Was this a view widely-held within the Portuguese government?
Lourenco replied that it was by most key government
officials, but carefully omitted the President's office.


4. (C) Lourenco said that political leaders have an
obligation to convince their publics of the importance of the
fight in Afghanistan, and he expressed regret that Portuguese
politicians have not done nearly enough in this regard.
Asked whether the NATO-run program that arranges travel of
journalists in Allied countries to Afghanistan would be
helpful in shaping Portuguese public opinion in a positive
way, Lourenco thought it would, and he undertook to discuss
that option with Portugal's NATO Mission.

Reaction from NATO
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5. (C) Lourenco said there has been no reaction to the
Portuguese decision other than ours, either from the NATO
Secretariat or from other Allies. He stated that Portugal's

SIPDIS
commitment to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan remains
strong, and he noted that his country's specific
contributions to ISAF have been cyclical. They began with a
C-130 and AIR traffic controllers, then deployed a commando
company to the south without caveats, and now are adjusting
their contribution again. He implied the GOP could increase
its contribution in the future. He suggested that having
additional Allies weigh in with Portugal might be helpful in
shaping future Portuguese contributions, although he stopped
short of speculating on whether such approaches would affect
the August drawdown. He asked pointedly whether we had
raised the drawdown with President Cavaco Silva's senior
diplomatic advisor and head of military household.

Comment
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6. (C) Lourenco was careful but frank in his comments,
which are consistent with earlier reports from a variety of
sources that President Cavaco Silva was not a big fan of
Portugal's ISAF deployment. We will reach out to the
President's senior diplomatic and military advisors, but we
think it might be helpful for Allied heads of government and
the NATO Secretary-General to weigh in directly with the
President, asking Portugal to reconsider its drawdown. We
will report separately Portugal's thinking on next steps,
based on the Ambassador's conversations with the Minister of
Defense and others.

Hoffman