US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND US-EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LISBON 002750 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UN XG XF AR IR SUBJECT: US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND US-EU MIDDLE EAST TROIKA MEETINGS IN LISBON, OCTOBER 18-19 Classified By: DCM DAVID BALLARD, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On Iran, all parties agreed on the need for concerted action in response to its nuclear program and pretensions for regional hegemony, as well as its deteriorating human rights situation. On the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP),the EU emphasized its support for the planned international meeting and sought U.S. guidance on ways it could be helpful. Although the EU emphasized the need for a "consensus" president in Lebanon, it nonetheless agreed with the U.S. on the challenges posed by Syria's meddling in Lebanese internal affairs and is studying the viability of an EU border monitoring mission to restrict the flow of weapons from Syria to Lebanon. The EU expressed frustration with its efforts to provide assistance for reconstruction and national reconciliation in Iraq and looked to the U.S. to provide greater coordination of such efforts. Both the U.S. and EU welcomed bilateral talks between the government of Morocco and Polisario on Western Sahara, although there were differences regarding how best to move forward. END SUMMARY. IRAN--DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS -------------- ¶2. (C) Portugal's Ambassador in Tehran, Jose Moreira da Cunha, opened the discussion by observing that the Iranian government was not in a weak, end-of-regime position. High oil prices had produced 5 percent annual economic growth in recent years and he projected 4 percent annual growth in coming years. Although unemployment and inflation remained high (17 percent and 13.2 percent, respectively) in an outdated economy "dominated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)," this was compensated for by the regime's ability to use oil revenues for social services. Moreira saw no serious, organized opposition to the regime in Iran, emphasizing that all real opposition was either "in the cemetery" or abroad. Moreira and other speakers emphasized the regime's use of fear, propaganda (mainly anti-U.S. and anti-Israel),and the apparatus of repression to maintain stability. He saw the 2008 Majlis (legislative) elections as a bellwether for whether the regime would move in a pragmatic direction or remain in the hands of hardliners. One problem for the regime was its inability to employ the thousands of university students graduating every year, a source of frustration among the younger generation and a possible source of future discontent. ¶3. (C) Both the Portuguese and the Commission highlighted the deteriorating human rights situation and reiterated their commitment to raising human rights issues with the regime and continuing efforts to work with Iranian civil society on people-to-people contacts. The Canadian delegation viewed the recent crackdown on dissent as suggestive of regime unease; the crackdown had also made contact work difficult for the Canadian embassy in Tehran. They noted the Canadian mission to the UN was circulating a draft resolution on the human rights situation; the U.S. and EU delegations agreed to lobby other governments for wider for support of this effort. The Canadians emphasized the apparent Iranian power struggles should be viewed as little more than a reflection of Supreme Leader Khameini's maneuvers to maintain his hold on power. Opposition to President Ahmadinejad does not necessarily mean opposition to the regime; serious opposition would have to target Khameini and the IRGC. The Canadians indicated that the economic impact of sanctions and economic mismanagement were difficult to measure because widespread black market activity has softened the resultant hardships for the population. ¶4. (C) The U.S. delegation noted previous U.S.-EU-Canada meetings on Iran had raised the possibility of a multilateral conference to coordinate current and future programs for engagement with Iranian civil society, and proposed that such a conference be held by the end of 2007. The delegation welcomed EU and Canadian suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of democracy programs in Iran. The delegation also raised the case of American citizen Robert Levinson, missing since a spring 2007 trip to Iran's Kish Island, and asked the EU to press Iran to allow the Swiss Embassy in Tehran to carry out consular functions (on behalf of the U.S.) in the case. IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM -------------- LISBON 00002750 002 OF 005 ¶5. (C) The U.S. delegation reiterated the USG commitment to the P5 1,s dual-track approach to Iran's nuclear program. It is essential to pursue negotiations with Iran, but should the November reports of EU High Representative Solana and IAEA Director General ElBaradei not be positive, a third UNSC resolution would be necessary . The US delegation welcomed the EU Foreign Minister's statement of 15 October and urged the EU to act on French FM Kouchner's suggestion of autonomous EU sanctions to maximize the pressure on Iran to negotiate. Such EU action was essential to make diplomacy work. The US strategic objective is to get Iran back to the negotiating table and the passage of time only redounded to the benefit of Iran,s nuclear program. ¶6. (C) Portugal's MFA Director for Security and Defense Issues, Joao Corte-Real, said the EU also supported the dual-track strategy, and was considering autonomous sanctions, but strongly preferred additional action in the UNSC in order to avoid the appearance that the issue was an ideological confrontation between Iran and the West. Other EU participants expressed concern about Russian and Chinese cooperation; they feared those countries would fill any any trade or financial void the EU might create, thereby minimizing the impact of unilateral EU steps. Even if continuing to work through the UNSC proved difficult, the value of keeping Russia and China with the West and further isolating Iran made it worth the effort. The Commission reiterated that a consensus of all 27 Member States would be necessary to implement autonomous EU sanctions, implying that such a consensus might be difficult to reach ) or considerably watered down. The EU side expressed concern about pending sanctions legislation before the U.S. Congress that would have extraterritorial application. Such legislation risked alienating allies rather than affecting Iran. The EU also expressed doubts about listing the entire IRGC as a terrorist organization, preferring to list individual leaders in order to avoid cutting off an entire channel of communication with the regime. ¶7. (C) The Portuguese noted the Iranians seemed to prefer talking to the IAEA (where they felt they had more support) than to HR Solana, who would have his first meeting since the September 28 P5 1 agreement with Chief Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Larijani on October 23. The EU anticipated that the Iranians would ensure ElBaradei's report would stave off a third UNSCR. In response, the Canadians stressed that they would support a third UNSCR if the reports showed anything less than full Iranian compliance with all IAEA obligations and UNSC requirements. The Canadians also stated UN sanctions were the ideal, but if additional UN sanctions were not possible, they were studying options. Like the U.S., however, Canada has already done almost everything it can in terms of unilateral action. IRAN-INTERVENTIONS IN THE REGION -------------- ¶8. (C) The Canadian delegation suggested Iran's interference in the internal affairs of other countries in the region was worsening; Canada was most concerned with its activities in Afghanistan because of the presence of Canadian troops. Canada was working with the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan on border security in hopes of halting the flow of weapons and fighters to the Taliban, but Tehran had rejected any cooperation. Ottawa saw Iran's motives as both ideological and tactical; Tehran sought both regional hegemony and to develop proxies such as Hamas and Hizballah to deter and distract the U.S. and Israel. The Canadians viewed these as relationships of convenience (a point on which the EU agreed) and questioned how far such proxies would actually go for Iran in the event of a U.S. or Israeli military conflict with Iran, noting the proxies would likely do whatever they judged in their own interest. The Canadians wondered to what degree the various institutions of the Iranian state were aware of all the activities of the IRGC in neighboring countries. The EU highlighted Iran's diplomatic efforts to break its isolation, noting its quest for allies in Africa and Latin America. ¶9. (C) The U.S. delegation sought EU support for Argentina's efforts to bring to justice the six Iranians suspected of involvement in the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA). Ambassador Moreira noted Tehran,s "unusually moderate" reaction to Argentine efforts LISBON 00002750 003 OF 005 which he attributed to Iranian desire to avoid strains in their charm campaign in Latin America. In response to questions from the EU and the Canadians, the U.S. noted the two ambassadorial-level U.S.-Iran meetings in Iraq had not resulted in a diminution of Iranian lethal support for Iraqi militants. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶10. (C) Portugal's deputy envoy for the Middle East Peace Process, Bernard Futscher Pereira, noted the EU welcomed the planned international meeting, and was now unified in its desire to make the meeting a success. At its most recent foreign ministers meeting the EU had sought to strike a positive tone, while recognizing that many obstacles remained. Underscoring the EU,s desire for involvement with the MEPP, Futscher Pereira (and other EU representatives) stressed the need for the U.S. to outline " in as much detail as possible " what role it envisioned the EU playing. The European Commission representative noted the EU,s distinction as the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority, adding that this assistance could only have lasting effects if accompanied by political progress. If political progress were made, the EU could increase its programs to assist the Palestinian government and people. The EU,s relationship with Israel has improved; indeed, the EU is seeking to increase cooperation, including through Israel,s possible integration into the EU internal market. The EU welcomed the invitation of the Arab League Follow-Up Committee to the international meeting, but it also questioned whether the sequencing set out in the original Road Map remained necessary. ¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation explained the three U.S. priorities for the meeting were progress in the bilateral discussions between PM Olmert and President Abbas, progress in the capacity-building efforts of Quartet Representative Blair, and progress on the ground. The ultimate goal was two states living side by side in peace and security, but both sides needed to demonstrate political will. ¶12. (C) The EU explained that the "action plan" discussed in its most recent foreign ministers meeting (and alluded to by German FM Steinmeier in a recent newspaper article) would seek to combine in one coherent document the many different strands of EU and Member State activities, as well as develop guidelines for future assistance. However, any viable EU action plan depended on the achievement of real political progress between the two parties. All EU speakers stressed the peace process could best be advanced through U.S.-EU collaboration. LEBANON/SYRIA -------------- ¶13. (C) The U.S. delegation stressed the need for Lebanon's presidential election to be free, fair, and free of foreign influence, with the goal of electing a strong president able to secure the country's borders, disarm illegal entities, and enable the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon to function. The arms embargo in UNSC 1701 needed to be reinforced and an EU monitoring mission on the Syria/Lebanon border would be a step in the right direction if coordinated with the Siniora government and if ensured of serious intentions on Syria's part. The delegation also urged the EU to provide financial support to the Lebanon tribunal. The EU speakers described Lebanon as the crossroads of all the conflicts in the region, making it a venue for foreign rivalries and conflicts to play out. The EU agreed with the general U.S. positions on the election, but asserted that a "consensus" president would best be able to settle internal political differences and retain legitimacy. ¶14. (C) The EU committed to take all possible steps to ensure the success of the Special Tribunal and is examining the UN Secretary General's request for financial contributions. The EU was exploring the possibility of a border monitoring mission, but questioned Syrian willingness to cooperate, and thus would not make a decision until after an exploratory mission to Damascus and Beirut. The EU believed Syria was key to the resolution of all regional issues; they noted Damascus often says it can take positive steps, but fails to follow through. As an example, Portuguese MFA Middle East and Maghreb Director, Isabel Pedrosa, noted Syrian officials have privately (and orally) LISBON 00002750 004 OF 005 acknowledged that the Shebaa Farms area is part of Lebanon. IRAQ AND THE REGION -------------- ¶15. (C) The EU emphasized its commitment to assisting reconstruction and national reconciliation in Iraq, but had become frustrated by the difficulty of implementing program activities due to the security situation. The EU was also concerned by the flow of Iraqi refugees, both in the region and in Europe, and asked for details on U.S. views and actions on this issue. The EU noted it sought "new means of engagement" in Iraq and was considering inviting Iraqi FM Zebari to address the next meeting of its General Affairs and External Relations (GAERC) foreign ministers meeting. The EU also questioned "repeatedly" whether the planned Iraq Neighbors Meeting in Istanbul would go forward, given the internal difficulties of the Iraqi government. ¶16. (C) The U.S. delegation said Washington intended the Istanbul meeting to go forward, with the goals of securing additional international support for the Iraqi government, agreeing on a neighbors support mechanism, and setting dates for a follow-up meeting at the working level. The delegation urged the EU to support SRSG De Mistura in his plans to expand UN efforts in Iraq in areas such as health, refugees, national reconciliation, and humanitarian assistance. The U.S. also encouraged the EU to assist with donor coordination, and to consider a greater presence on the ground. The EU countered that the US, as the largest donor with the greatest capacity on the ground, was better suited to coordinating donor assistance. In response to a question from the EU on the Turkish parliament,s recent vote authorizing cross-border operations into Iraq against Kurdish guerrillas, the U.S. delegation noted the USG was in contact with the Turkish government and Kurdish leaders in Iraq in an effort to prevent additional conflict. WESTERN SAHARA -------------- ¶17. (C) Pedrosa stated the EU welcomed the UN General Assembly statement on Western Sahara reached via consensus between Morocco and Algeria. It had been surprised by a quick agreement on the text and the contrast between Algeria's low-key approach and Morocco's forceful lobbying. Unfortunately, the two rounds of direct talks between Morocco and Polisario thus far had shown the process would take a long time to produce results. A third round of talks would soon be held in Switzerland. The U.S. delegation voiced uncertainty about how much progress the talks may have achieved and expressed support for the Moroccan proposal for autonomy for Western Sahara. The delegation urged the EU to support the inclusion of detailed language in the UN mandate that would focus future talks on the Moroccan proposal; vague language risked stagnation and reliance on the UN (rather than progress in negotiations) to maintain stability. The U.S. also urged the EU to join it in funding confidence building measures between the two parties. The EU questioned whether Algeria would support such an approach and whether the international community could focus so much on the Moroccan proposal when the Polisario had rejected many of its key points. NEXT MEETINGS -------------- ¶18. (U) The Slovenian delegation proposed that the next U.S.-EU-Canada trilateral meetings on Iran and the U.S.-EU Middle East troika meetings take place in Washington on April 9-10, 2008. ¶19. (U) Participants: Portugal: Moreira da Cunha, Ambassador to Iran Joao Corte-Real, MFA Director for Security and Defense Issues Isabel Brilhante Pedrosa, Director for Middle East and Maghreb Issues Ivo Fernandes Inacio, Desk Officer for Middle East and Maghreb Issues Matilde Salvacao Barreto, Desk Officer for Middle East and Maghreb Issues Mariana Hancock, Desk Officer for Iran LISBON 00002750 005 OF 005 Bernardo Futscher Pereira, Deputy Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process United States: David Ballard, DCM Embassy Lisbon Henry Wooster, Deputy Director, Office of Iranian Affairs Alyce Tidball, Deputy Political Counselor at the U.S. Mission to the European Union Matthew Harrington, Political-Economic Counselor, Embassy Lisbon Molly Treiber, Political-Economic Officer, Embassy Lisbon Jeffrey Giauque, USEU Desk Officer, EUR/ERA Canada: Dennis Horack, Director, Gulf and Maghreb Division Jeffrey McLaren, Deputy Director, Iran/Iraq, Gulf and Maghreb Division Catherine Boucher, First Secretary, Canadian Mission to the European Union EU Council Secretariat: Wolfgang Barwinkel, Middle East/Mediterranean Task Force EU Commission: Patricia Llombart-Cussac, Head of Unit for the GCC, Iran, Iraq Slovenia: Miljen Majlem, Chair of Middle East and Gulf Section Tomaz Mencin, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Department for Asia, Africa, and Pacific Hoffman