GARCIA GOVERNMENT: HONEYMOON OVER, TIME FOR RESULTS

UNCLAS LIMA 001709 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE SUBJECT: GARCIA GOVERNMENT: HONEYMOON OVER, TIME FOR RESULTS REF: A. LIMA 1587 ¶B. LIMA 1413 ¶C. LIMA 1270 ¶D. LIMA 1053 ¶E. LIMA 909 -------------- Summary: -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Garcia governmen's extended honeymoon has ende. In the wake of the Tocache Accords and the Pandolfi Affair (Refs A-E),the GOP finds itself beset by a series of protests from cocalero, labor and other groups. At the same time, the APRA leadership faces increasing patronage pressures from within the party. While President Garcia's popularity remains above 50 percent, and his government is stronger than that of his predecessor, he and his ministers will have to begin delivering on their promises in order to deflate rising social pressures. End Summary. -------------- The Long Honeymoon -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Garcia government enjoyed an extended honeymoon, which has now ended. Its strong start resulted from a combination of factors. These include the government's adept crisis management; the President's skillful packaging of policy proposals (State Austerity, "Water for All," the "Investment Shock," "the Highlands' Export Program," Decentralization); and the occasional pursuit of politically popular proposals (eg., the death penalty for child sex murderers) that have little concrete impact. The opposition's fragmentation, particularly the post-election implosion of Ollanta Humala, and the continued buoyancy of Peru's economy, which delivered 8 percent annual growth for 2006, have also contributed to the government's felicitous beginning. -------------- APRA Off Game/Protests Break Out -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The APRA government's own missteps have taken some of the early bloom off the rose. The ill-considered Tocache Accords, in which government negotiators agreed to a cessation of eradication in the Tocache area, and the brief appointment of former Fujimorista Pandolfi to a high-level government position constitute previously uncharacteristic examples of self-inflicted wounds (Refs A-E). ¶4. (SBU) More important, however, has been surging sectoral impatience in key areas. While organized opposition to the government remains weak, outbursts of localized discontent have increased. In the last several weeks, a series of protests exemplify this trend. They include: --The National Federation of Mining, Metallurgy and Steel Workers called a national strike on April 30. While the effort fizzled, its principal catalyst -- the presence of large numbers of "service workers" (subcontracted employees) in Peru's mining sector -- remains a challenge. Candidate Garcia had pledged to reform rules for outsourcing during the 2006 presidential campaign, and now the unions are calling him to account. In response to the criticism and in an effort to preempt the planned strike, on April 26 the GOP issued a decree regulating subcontracting in the sector. (Details septel.) --Coca growers in Huanuco carried out a 72-hour strike May 2-4. Various labor and civil society groups joined them as schools and businesses in the region were closed. The Regional President, who had originally offered to mediate between the growers and the GOP, publicly supported the strike. After a May 8 meeting with Prime Minister Jorge del Castillo in Lima, cocalero representatives called off the strike. Del Castillo promised to form a permanent negotiating roundtable to promote development in Huanuco. --In Piura on May 3, cotton and rice farmers blocked highways and battled with the police, demanding more money for their crops. Close to fifty protesters were injured. The strike ended when the GOP agreed to a number of concessions, including greater access to loans from the state-run Agrarian Bank, the purchase of 1,000 tons of rice for the National Food Aid Program and the installation of new machinery to improve local cotton production. --The Loreto Regional Government called a 48-hour strike May 3-4 to pressure the central government to hire an additional 1,000 school teachers in the region. Local civil society groups backed the measure and the city of Iquitos closed down. Regional President Ivan Vasquez said that local organizations are considering calling an indefinite strike if the central government does not carry out the requested hirings. --In Lima, the city government has been trying to close down a market of informal produce vendors in Santa Anita since ¶2003. The vendors apparently rented spaces from someone who falsely represented himself as the owner of the area. When the city moved to close the market, the vendors occupied the market and have refused to budge. The protesters have brought their own children into the protest and into a possible confrontation with the police. While the city government is the main actor in this protest, its location in Lima gives it a high profile. -------------- Patronage Pressure From Within APRA -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Miners, cocaleros, farmers, teachers and vendors are not the only special interest groups looking for government attention. Ruling APRA party militants are another, potentially more destabilizing one. At the May 7 celebration of the APRA's 83rd anniversary celebration in Lima, party militants heckled APRA Secretary Mauricio Mulder for not providing enough government jobs to party loyalists. To voice their discontent about the lack of jobs, militants chanted, "APRA is a party of the people, not of the right" and called for a new party leadership and a return to the 1979 constitution. Many observers have noted that President Garcia has so far held the line on pressure for patronage from party loyalists while acknowledging it is likely to rise over time. -------------- Blaming the Humala Phantom -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The initial reaction to this latest series of protests was to attribute them to a broader political conspiracy. Opposition legislator (Unidad Nacional) Javier Bedoya spoke of a "plot" to destabilize the government. His charges were echoed by APRA Congressman Javier Velasquez, who claimed that opposition leader and former Nationalist Party presidential candidate Ollanta Humala was orchestrating these protests. Subsequent news reports highlighted these claims by airing debates about the plausibility of Humala's role in fomenting instability. President Garcia and Prime Minister del Castillo discounted this possibility, emphasizing that Humala does not have the organizational capacity to put together coordinated protests on such a scale. Many analysts noted that imputing these scattered conflicts to Humala risked reviving him from the oblivion into which he has fallen after his failed bid for the presidency. One local political cartoon portrayed an embarrassed Humala as thrilled that he might even be considered capable of launching such a wide range of actions. -------------- Comment: Delivering on Promises -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The recent protests reveal how pent-up social pressures are building. The GOP has promoted a number of program initiatives, but both the central government and the regional governments lack the capacity to execute. As execution lags, frustrated sectoral leaders take matters into their own hands. While Peru is no where near the chronic political fragility that plagued the Toledo Administration -- President Garcia's popularity remains above 50 percent, he dominates the headlines, and the growing economy has blessed the GOP with financial resources -- the onset of multiple protests, following the blunder at Tocache and the Pandolfi Affair, signals the end of Garcia's long honeymoon. The GOP increasingly will have to deliver on its promises of change if it is to stay comfortably ahead of popular discontent. STRUBLE