DEPUTY USTR VERONEAU WITH PERU'S PRESIDENT GARCIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001019 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR E, EB, EB/TPP, WHA/AND PASS TO USTR FOR VERONEAU, EISSENSTAT, HARMON COMMERCE FOR MCAMERON TREASURY FOR JEWELL, SHWARZMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017 TAGS: ETRD ELAB EAGR PGOV USTR PE SUBJECT: DEPUTY USTR VERONEAU WITH PERU'S PRESIDENT GARCIA ON TRADE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, MARCH 12-13 Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. CURTIS STRUBLE, REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Peru's President Alan Garcia received Deputy U.S. Trade Representative John Veroneau in Lima, March 12 for a discussion of the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) and regional developments. Garcia told Veroneau that the PTPA was essential for his country's economic development and that the majority of Peruvians supported the agreement and value good relations with the United States. Garcia told Veroneau that the success of the PTPA would mean a victory for market and open investment- oriented countries like Colombia, Chile, Peru and Mexico over Hugo Chavez's model. As he has with other high-level visitors, Garcia spoke of a "Cold War" in South America and of his disappointment over Argentina and Brazil's complicit support of Chavez. He noted Chavez's interest in supporting North Korea and Iran's nuclear ambitions, and urged the U.S. to act with "studied indifference" towards Ecuador. Ambassador Veroneau explained to Garcia the current Congressional dynamics on the PTPA, as he did with business representatives, congressmen, environmental groups and labor leaders that he met with during his visit. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During a March 12-13 visit to Peru, President Alan Garcia received Deputy US Trade Representative John Veroneau for a discussion of the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and regional developments. President Garcia said that it is important for people to recognize that economic borders between countries are falling. The PTPA is essential, he said, to help fight passivity in a Peruvian population that has not discovered its potential. Peru can grow at 10 percent a year, Garcia predicted, if PTPA is in place and Peruvians discover what they can do. To push the process, he added, Peru was engaged in what he termed a "unilateral FTA", i.e. cutting to zero most tariffs on imports of productive machinery. On this visit, Ambassador Veroneau was accompanied by Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Bennett Harman and Press Spokesman Gretchen Hamel. PTPA APPROVAL WILL DEMONSTRATE CHAVEZ FAILURE -------------- ¶3. (C) Garcia said that there is a second, geopolitical dimension to the PTPA, recalling that he had told President Bush in October that the US needs allies with vision. There is a momentary challenge posed by people like Hugo Chavez, Garcia said, but it will pass. Bringing the PTPA with Peru into force would be the best way to demonstrate their failure. PTPA will create solid relations with the U.S. and help steer Latin America in the direction of friendship with Washington. Ambassador Veroneau agreed with the President,s observation and said that countries can adopt policies, he said, that strengthen democracy and broaden the base of the economy or policies that narrow the economic base. Broadening opportunity consists of more than throwing money at problems. ¶4. (C) Garcia said that his administration is trying to broaden investment and employment. The Peruvian people had heard many messianic and demagogic promises in the past 50 years. They therefore understood, Garcia said, the responsible course his administration is taking and have confidence in its direction. The President said that 75 percent of Peruvians are in favor of the PTPA and a similar number think that relations with the U.S. are the most important. For that reason Garcia lamented the contrary message that Chavez was trying to send out with his protest rally in Argentina. "Governments can,t distribute what they don,t produce. For that reason, they need open economies combined with social investment." The President opined that Chavez is trying to escape Venezuela,s social problems: "The more he talks abroad the more problems he is running from." A "COLD WAR" IN SOUTH AMERICA -------------- ¶5. (C) As he has with other recent senior USG visitors, Garcia spoke of a "Cold War" in South America. Venezuela, Bolivia and increasingly Ecuador and Argentina are on one side of the divide with Colombia, Peru, Chile and Mexico sharing a more democratic and open market orientation. Chavez is overacting, Garcia said, because he can,t show results in his own country. His rhetoric puts political leaders against a wall and makes them feel obliged to follow his radical course. Correa in Ecuador, the President said, is an example of this, and is someone who will lose if he follows his own discourse. Garcia said that he was scheduled to visit Correa in Quito in an effort to be a counterweight to Chavez,s influence but lamented that he couldn,t go because Correa had "closed Congress in an anti-democratic fashion." The Peruvian President said he advised Correa to explain publicly to Ecuadorians why the country cannot afford to distance itself from the U.S. CHAVEZ: "I THINK WE'LL BEAT HIM" -------------- ¶6. (C) Returning to the challenge posed by Chavez, Garcia said, "I think we,ll beat him." The Venezuelan leader is trying to reinvent himself as Castro but the latter,s unique image among Latin Americans won,t transfer to Chavez. As he did with Ambassador Tobias, Garcia spoke in frank terms of his disappointment with Brazil, which along with Argentina has become complicit with Chavez. Brazil is only in favor of South American union when it directly serves Brazilian interests; the GOB had been the greatest impediment to the FTAA. I believe in a South American union, Garcia said, but the moment is not right for it and won,t be until we have the right example to follow. In that regard Garcia said that President Bush might have found it more productive to invite South American leaders to Washington rather than travel to the region, as the latter exposed him to the double game of Lula and Kirchner. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Veroneau said that President Bush is a political leader with principles. What is even more troubling for the President than the way some South American countries have distanced themselves from the U.S. is the fact that their policies don,t work for the people; what is frustrating about Chavez,s message is that it goes nowhere. CHAVEZ, IRAN, NORTH KOREA AND ECUADOR -------------- ¶8. (C) Chavez's goal, Garcia continued, is to make himself a big problem. He is a very irresponsible leader. Reiterating a theme he has mentioned in other recent private meetings, Garcia said that he is convinced Chavez is interested in aiding Iran,s and North Korea,s nuclear ambitions and buying the technology. Garcia said Chavez's rhetoric and economic errors are secondary compared to the risk that he will seek to "nuclearize" South America as Castro tried to do in 1961. ¶9. (C) Ambassador Veroneau asked Garcia what advice he would offer the U.S. for dealing with Ecuador. Garcia recommended that the U.S. act with studied indifference -- don,t adopt a hostile policy but say "if you don,t want an FTA, fine and goodbye." If the U.S. adopts a policy of good will it will be perceived as condescending, he argued, while assuming a low profile is the best way to bring Ecuador back. The U.S. should not give Ecuador an ATPDEA extension, Garcia said, because it rewards populism: Correa is tying to keep the benefits of an FTA without assuming the costs of guiding political debate in the country on the importance of foreign markets. The GOE will use an extension, Garcia feared, to buy time while waiting for Venezuelan benefits to come through. CONSIDER "STRATEGIC INTERESTS" -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador Veroneau next brought the conversation around to PTPA dynamics within the U.S. Congress. President Garcia said that he had recently been briefed by his Ambassador to Washington on those who are for PTPA, those who are against, and who in Congress is undecided. "We will do the necessary to secure broad bipartisan support. He added, "I am hopeful that strategic interests will weigh favorably on members of Congress." OTHER MEETINGS -------------- ¶11. (C) LABOR LEADERS. Ambassador Veroneau also met on March 12 with nine union leaders for a 60-minute discussion of the PTPA. As expected, the union leaders staked out positions that were critical of the PTPA and expressed doubt that the agreement would improve working conditions for the majority of Peruvian workers. Labor leaders echoed some of the U.S. Congress's concerns, but had few constructive suggestions or alternatives. COMMENT. A standoff between union and management negotiators in the ILO-brokered talks over the direction of the General Labor Law, currently stuck in Congress, has complicated internal rivalries, and may have led to their cautious comments. END COMMENT. ¶12. (C) CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS. A broad section of Peruvian Congressional leaders expressed a generally positive view of the PTPA. Trade Committee chairman Carlos Bruce warned Ambassador about the negative impact the rejection of the PTPA might have. Labor supporter Aldo Estrada and others commented on how important the PTPA was to Peru's economic development. The Congressional leaders asked how they could most effectively weigh in with their legislative colleagues in Washington. ¶13. (C) TRADE AND LABOR MINISTERS. In meetings with both Trade Minister Mercedes Araoz and Labor Minister Susana Pinilla, Ambassador Veroneau explained how delicate domestic Congressional negotiations were. Pinilla provided Ambassador Veroneau with updated data on Peru's workforce, of which roughly 75 percent is in the informal sector. The government's efforts are geared towards moving those workers into the formal sector and increasing their benefits. On the other hand, Labor Minister Susana Pinilla noted that labor affiliations have increased slihtly in the last year ¶14. (C) ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS. Ambassador Veroneau assured environmental groups that the Administration shared their goal of balancing environmental goals with economic development. Meeting with members of conservation, wildlife protection and advocacy groups, Veroneau listened to their concerns with respect to overfishing, illegal logging, and protection of biodiversity. Overall, all said they believed the PTPA was positive for the environment, but they expressed their interest in seeing continued U.S. assistance programs in compliance and institution strengthening. ¶15. (C) BUSINESS LEADERS. Ambassador Veroneau also met with presidents of Peru's principal business associations, many of whom have spent recent months visiting Congress and staff on behalf of the PTPA. He explained the Administration's strong desire to move ahead with free trade agreements in the region rather than to seek extensions of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Deputy USTR Veroneau's visit was well-timed. His schedule enabled him to explain the facts concerning the Administration's efforts on the Hill, and served to convey to nervous Peruvians a sense of cautious optimism regarding the PTPA. In addition to meeting with Peru's President, Trade Minister, Labor Minister and key Congress people, Ambassador Veroneau also saw a broad cross-section of Peru's civil society, including labor, business, and environmental groups. Most continue to be strongly in favor of the PTPA, not only for commercial reasons or because the agreement will provide opportunities to reduce poverty, but because the agreement will help civil society lock in much-needed reforms in a variety of areas. These include, among others, labor and environmental laws, general transparency, rules and practices governing trade and investment and economic regulations covered by the PTPA. ¶17. (U) USTR has cleared this message. STRUBLE