COCHABAMABA UPDATE: QUIETER BUT TENSIONS REMAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM BL
SUBJECT: COCHABAMABA UPDATE: QUIETER BUT TENSIONS REMAIN

REF: A. LA PAZ 84


B. LA PAZ 83

C. LA PAZ 75

D. LA PAZ 54

Classified By: Amb. Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Cochabamba remained mostly calm throughout the night
and during the day of January 12, following the violence of
January 11. According to Police Inspector General Fernando
Pelaez, there were two deaths and approximately 150 injured
on January 11. Early January 12, President Morales called on
pro-GOB groups not to be vengeful. By midday, an estimated
25,000 people attended a "cabildo" (town hall meeting)
organized by pro-MAS social sector groups in Cochabamba's
main square. The organizers continued to clamor for Prefect
Reyes' resignation, argued for increased vigilance, and
suggested the seizing of Reyes' personal properties. The
Ambassador called Vice President Garcia Linera three times;
first to express his concern and to suggest that the
government urge cocaleros and campesinos to leave the city
and to apprise the vice president of a request by the
Bolivian military to move troops to the city. He also
reached out to other diplomatic missions and urged them to
call senior GOB officials with the same message; most agreed.
The city remains tense, but there are signs that the
situation is quieting down. Pro-government leaders were
calling on their supporters to lift the blockade around the
city. In addition, there are rumors that Prefect Reyes may
back down on his call for a new autonomy referendum, which
many consider a step towards a possible solution to the
conflict, although others believe it will not be enough. End
Summary.

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The Situation Overnight
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2. (U) Cochabamba remained mostly calm throughout the night
and during the day of January 12, following the violence of
January 11. The army received reinforcements overnight, and
both police and military patrolled the streets maintaining a
tense calm. Despite their presence, pro- and anti-GOB groups
remain armed.

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January 11 Toll: Two Deaths, 150 Injured
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3. (U) According to Police Inspector General Fernando
Pelaez, there were two deaths and approximately 150 injured
during the January 11 violence. The first death was a
pro-MAS 40-year old cocalero named Nicomedes Gutierrez; the
second death was 16-year old ant-MAS protester Cristian
Urresti. Cochabamba,s Viedma hospital reported handling 110
injured. Two other clinics reported an additional 39
injured. There were new reports of attacks on the press; an
ATB network cameraman, Wilson Menchaca, was brutally beaten,
and the Unitel network building was attacked by campesinos.
(Note: The Unitel building was attacked again January 12, but
was protected by GOB forces who used rubber bullets. Three
protesters were hurt. End Note).

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January 12 Events
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4. (U) Early January 12, President Morales called on pro-GOB
social groups to act in a democratic fashion, to refrain from
vengeance, and to seek dialogue as a means of resolving
conflict. By midday, an estimated 25,000 people attended a
"cabildo" town hall meeting) organized by pro-MAS social
sector groups in Cochabamba's main square, site of the
January 8 attacks. The cabildo's organizers stated three
main objectives: the ratification of their demand for the
resignation of Prefect Manfred Reyes; an increase in pressure
against Reyes; and finally the physical confiscation of
Reyes' personal property. Prior to the cabildo, thousands of
campesinos (non-cocaleros) from the poor outskirts of
Cochabamba marched to the city center. Later, many of the
protesters began marching north towards the areas where the
January 11 confrontations took place. Rumors circulated that
they planned to seize Prefect Reyes' home outside the city
and take his apartment in the city.


5. (U) At 3:00 PM, Prefect Reyes reportedly flew to Santa
Cruz to meet with Catholic Church Cardinal Julio Terrazas in
hopes that the church could help mediate a solution.
Separately, Human Rights Ombudsman Waldo Albarracin announced
he would go to Cochabamba and work with the church to mediate
the conflict. By 4:00 PM, there were reports that some
cocaleros were leaving Cochabamba and removing blockades.

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Ambassador Calls the Vice President
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6. (C) The Ambassador called Vice President Garcia Linera
the evening of January 11 and expressed his regret regarding
the day's events and his concern for the 3,000 U.S. citizens
living in Cochabamba. He also urged to the vice president to
take action to deconflict the two sides by urging the
cocaleros and campesinos to return home. The vice president
explained that he was saddened and sorry for what had
happened and said he ordered additional police and military
to help secure the city. At 1:00 PM, January 12, the
Ambassador called the vice president again and proposed and
reiterated his approach to improve the situation. First, the
Ambassador suggested that the GOB should publicly discourage
additional protesters from entering the city, encourage those
protesters in the city to leave, and that the GOB should
deploy adequate troops to police and stabilize the situation.
The vice president said that the GOB was discreetly asking
social organization leaders to withdraw protesters from the
city, but could not do so publicly. The Ambassador
emphasized that the pro-GOB groups needed to have an "exit"
from the city. At 4:00 PM on January 12, the Ambassador
spoke with the vice president yet again to inform him of a
request from the Bolivian military for assistance in
transporting troops to Cochabamba. Garcia Linera responded
that General Vargas had told him that the military did not
need additional troops. The vice president asked the
Ambassador not to transport any troops until he heard via the
vice president that USG assistance was needed. At 7:00 PM
local time the military informed the Embassy that it did not
plan to send additional troops.


7. (C) Despite the Ambassador's January 11 call to Garcia
Linera the vice president took a hard line against Reyes in a
televised speech to the nation that evening. He lamented
that Reyes had gone to La Paz to politick with his
counterparts during the conflicts in Cochabamba. He added
that in the past three days, the GOB had worked to try to
pacify the situation while Reyes only demonstrated
intransigence. In response, Prefect Reyes, argued that the
GOB was responsible for the "spilling of blood" in
Cochabamba.

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Calling on the International Community
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8. (C) The Ambassador and DCM reached out to other diplomatic
missions (Brazil, Peru, Spain, Germany, the European Union,
and the United Kingdom) to forge a united voice in calling on
the GOB to pacify the situation, using the Ambassador's
approach. All the missions agreed with the exception of the
Brazilians. Garcia Linera mentioned to the Ambassador that
he had heard from several European Ambassadors.

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Comment
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9. (C) Cochabamba remains tense. However, the arrival of
additional security forces and perhaps the natural tendency
for residents to return to their homes on the weekend appears
to have calmed the situation. In addition, pro-government
leaders were calling on their supporters to lift the blockade
around the city. Reports are also circulating that Prefect
Reyes has written a letter dropping his demand for a new
autonomy referendum, which the GOB has argued would help
solve the current impasse. According to the reports, Reyes
will wait until after he meets with Cardinal Terrazas to make
the letter public. End Comment.
GOLDBERG