EL ALTO: YOUNG, POOR, AND A POLITICAL FORCE

UNCLAS LA PAZ 000696 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: EL ALTO: YOUNG, POOR, AND A POLITICAL FORCE -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) El Alto, Bolivia's fastest growing and second largest city, celebrated its 22nd anniversary March 6. The average Alteno, as residents of El Alto are called, is young, poor, indigenous, and a recent migrant to the city. To many observers, El Alto appears to be the most capitalist city in Bolivia; over 40 percent of residents are self-employed. Paradoxically, despite their capitalist exterior, Altenos form a significant part of President Evo Morales' base; he enjoys an 80 percent approval rating in El Alto. However, positive approval ratings do not guarantee that Altenos will remain tranquil. El Alto's strategic location next to Bolivia's capital means that its protests can cripple La Paz. Altenos, encouraged by local radical organizations, forced President Carlos Mesa to resign in June 2005 despite a greater than 50 percent approval rating. President Morales recognizes that he cannot take the city for granted, so he visits El Alto frequently and is quick to offer government handouts, such as the USD $50 million package he unveiled March 3. Morales and El Alto appear to have entered into an unspoken contract; Morales must periodically deliver much needed services and in exchange Altenos promise their support. This cable is the first in a series that will highlight the challenges facing El Alto as well as its importance to Bolivian politics. End Summary. -------------- El Alto Demographics 101 -------------- ¶2. (U) El Alto, Bolivia's fastest growing city (with its population exploding by 30 percent since 2000),celebrated its 22nd anniversary March 6. El Alto has surpassed its neighbor, the capital La Paz, as Bolivia's second largest city with over 860,000 inhabitants. Altenos are primarily indigenous. Over 75 percent consider themselves Aymara; five to seven percent self-identify as Quechua. Over 60 percent of residents are under 25; the average age is 22. Many older Altenos are ex-miners who moved to El Alto after the GOB closed state-run mines in the 1980,s. ¶3. (SBU) Per the 2001 census, over 70 percent of Altenos are poor. More than 50 percent suffer from inadequate access to potable water, sewage, electricity, and health services. The city currently only has three hospitals. A police presence is also seriously lacking. Poloff recently visited the city's only detective squad, which consists of less than 30 investigators and solves only very rarely any crimes. Not surprisingly, Altenos often resort to vigilantism to resolve differences. The city's tremendous growth, tiny tax base, bureaucratic inefficiency, and corruption contribute to the dearth of services. Coupled with the municipal government's inability to cope with the city's runaway growth, previous GOBs traditionally neglected El Alto. Altenos, rightly or wrongly, view racism as the principal cause of this neglect. -------------- El Alto Economics 101 -------------- ¶4. (SBU) To the outsider, El Alto appears to be the most capitalist city in Bolivia. Over 40 percent of Altenos are self-employed. Many work informally as small merchants, and indeed free market competition in El Alto is so severe that it undercuts faith in capitalism. The constant influx of people and foreign products to El Alto results in fierce price competition. Price deflation is a common complaint amongst older vendors, who state they work longer hours for less money because of the ever-increasing supply of sellers. ¶5. (U) Strategically located next to the capital, El Alto is home to La Paz's airport and is the transit point for all but one of the major highway's linking La Paz to the rest of Bolivia. While officially divided into nine districts, the city consists of 550 plus neighborhoods, each with its own neighborhood association. Most neighborhoods have sprung up without municipal government approval, so a neighborhood association's primary role is to pressure the municipality to provide access to services. Association leadership is generally leftist and radical, and leaders function as old-style "ward bosses." Membership in neighborhood associations is obligatory, as is following the leadership's orders. Since the municipal government lacks authority in many areas, the FEJUVE (Federation of Neighborhood Associations) exerts significant control over citizens. -------------- -------------- El Alto in National Politics: A Focal Point for Resistance -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Paradoxically and despite the fiercely capitalist tone of economic life, Altenos form a significant part of Evo Morales' base. He enjoys 80 percent (or higher) approval ratings in El Alto. (Note: Some argue that Morales' 80 percent support is not a coincidence given the city is 80 percent indigenous and that Morales has locked up the indigenous vote. End Note). Many of El Alto's self-employed used to work for state-run companies that were privatized in the 1980s and 1990s; Morales' nationalization policy is popular because workers remember the steady wages and benefits of state-run companies, and contrast this "golden age" with the fierce competition and declining living standards of El Alto's free market system. ¶7. (SBU) El Alto is often the focal point for resistance to the GOB. Positive approval ratings in El Alto do not ensure a president's ability to maintain order there. El Alto's strategic location means that well-organized demonstrations can completely cut off the capital. Leftist organizations like the FEJUVE and the El Alto chapter of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) frequently urge their followers to protest against and encircle the GOB. Altenos were protagonists in the 2003 and 2005 protests that toppled presidents Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and his successor Carlos Mesa. President Mesa resigned in June 2005 despite a higher than 50 percent approval rating. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Having himself led Altenos to protest and oust previous governments, Morales does not take the city for granted. Morales and El Alto appear to have entered into an unspoken contract; Morales must periodically deliver services, like his March 3 plan to invest close to USD $50 million in El Alto. (USD $25 million is slated for home gas hook-ups; USD $10 million for sewage improvements; and an additional USD $5 million for expanded access to potable water). In return, Altenos give Morales their support. ¶9. (SBU) A recent poll identified El Alto as the "least happy city in the southern cone." Given the political pressure El Alto can wield, we can expect to Morales to continue to look after its interests. As El Alto's municipal council president stated March 3, "El Alto has been, and will be the vanguard, the support and the base of all the changes you are leading, and we will respond if necessary to defend these changes . . ." With that in mind, Morales has also proposed reducing the voting age to 16. Given the city's young population, this could translate into tens of thousands of additional Altenos voting for Morales and his MAS party in future elections. End Comment. GOLDBERG