GLENCORE GETS THE SILENT TREATMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000559

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/AND LPETRONI
COMMERCE FOR JANGLIN
TREASURY FOR SGOOCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: EMIN EINV ECON PREL PGOV BL SZ
SUBJECT: GLENCORE GETS THE SILENT TREATMENT

REF: LA PAZ 410

Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Andrew Erickson for reason 1.4 (c).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The GOB appears to have adopted the silent treatment
after its February 9 nationalization of the Vinto tin smelter
(reftel),ignoring overtures from Swiss-owned Glencore
International and refusing to answer requests for dialogue.
A Glencore representative said February 26 that executives
expect no immediate change; they plan to continue their push
for negotiations while simultaneously preparing a case for
international arbitration. Smelter operations continue, but
at reduced volume. End summary.

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THE SILENT TREATMENT
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2. (C) GOB officials appear to have adopted the silent
treatment after the Morales administration's February 9
nationalization of the Vinto tin smelter (reftel),ignoring
overtures from Swiss-owned Glencore International and
refusing to answer requests for dialogue. The GOB received a
February 16 diplomatic note from the Swiss embassy and a
February 22 letter from Glencore; both urged negotiations,
and both were ignored.


3. (C) Luis Felipe Hartmann, Vice President of Industrial and
Community Relations for Sinchi Wayra, Glencore's wholly owned
Bolivian subsidiary, told Econoff February 26 that company
executives expect no immediate change; they plan to continue
their push for negotiations while simultaneously preparing a
case for international arbitration. Hartmann said he
expected Glencore to be able to build a strong argument, as
the GOB failed even to follow constitutionally sanctioned
procedures for nationalizing privately owned properties;
instead of declaring the move in Bolivia's national interest,
the GOB cited irregularities in the 1999 privatization of the
tin smelter and used resulting "economic damage" to justify
the government's decision to take control.

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DECLINING VOLUME
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4. (C) Smelter operations continue, but at reduced volume.
Hartmann noted that even before the nationalization, Vinto
ran at only 65 percent capacity, largely due to insufficient
raw material; today, two weeks after the takeover, the
complex is running at just 50 percent capacity. Cash flow
problems have inhibited managers' ability to pay suppliers on
delivery, and reluctance to accept delayed payments has led
many suppliers to withhold raw materials. According to
Hartmann, the smelter's monthly tin production will fall from
an estimated 900 metric tons in December to approximately 700
metric tons in February, with output falling still further in
the future. Vinto's 450 employees continue to work, but
top-level management changes have already begun to threaten
operations, as the new general manager is reportedly a
low-level engineer with little technical expertise or
management experience.

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COMMENT
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5. (C) Glencore may wish to make a good-faith effort to
establish dialogue, but it seems unlikely the GOB will
respond favorably, at least in the near term. Hartmann
acknowledged that the Morales administration could authorize
additional confiscations of Glencore properties but said GOB
talk of monopolizing tin sales was more worrying, as the
action would severely inhibit Glencore's ability to operate
its mines. For now, the firm will likely continue to urge
dialogue, and the GOB will likely continue the silent
treatment. End comment.
GOLDBERG