BOLIVIA: WHAT NEXT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003261

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: ASEC BL PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: WHAT NEXT?

REF: A. LA PAZ 3220


B. LA PAZ 3244

Classified By: EcoPol Counselor Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4b, d

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Summary
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1. (C) Tensions are running high in the wake of the ruling
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party's extra-legal
maneuverings to achieve a draft constitution and with the
opposition departments poised to declare their autonomy this
weekend. While President Evo Morales has spoken of a
Christmas truce, some officials in his government are
threatening reprisals and force if the opposition follows
through with planned declarations of autonomy this weekend.
Santa Cruz and other opposition department leaders have
assured us that they do not intend violence, focusing instead
on drafting and publishing department autonomy statutes and
on continuing peaceful civil disobedience to protest the
"illegal" MAS constitution. However, it is clear that the
radical elements of both sides could be difficult to control
and a small incident could spark larger scale violence.
Rumors abound that the government will take some action
against the opposition departments, from declaring a state of
siege to arresting key leaders. However, Vice President
Alvaro Garcia Linera told the Ambassador December 14 that the
government would not/not declare a state of siege or deploy
the military unless it is to defend government buildings or
to protect people.


2. (C) Logic would dictate that Evo, who has forcefully
outmaneuvered the opposition in getting a new constitution
text without much international outcry, would now seek to
maintain calm, particularly as Presidents Lula and Bachelet
arrive in La Paz December 16-17. Then in January, Evo will
be able to appoint a new director of the National Electoral
Court and justices to the Constitutional Tribunal and focus
on securing victories in the two referenda on the
constitution and a possible recall referendum. A second,
uglier scenario us also possible, although we believe it to
be less likely. The triggers for the second scenario would
be the government arresting opposition leaders or initiating
police/military actions in the opposition departments,
possibly including declaring a state of emergency. End
summary.

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Forecast: Mostly Peaceful, with Possible Scattered Violence
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3. (C) After pushing through the MAS draft constitution by
purposefully (and forcefully) excluding the opposition, Evo
is now calling for dialogue and calm. In response, Santa
Cruz Civic Committee President Branko Marinkovic commented:
"Isn't it nice, having done everything he could to win,
breaking laws, killing people, afterwards (Evo) says 'Let us
have a truce for Christmas.'" Evo's conciliatory tone rings
hollow since his ministers are busy making threats. Minister
of Government Alfredo Rada announced potential use of force
should democratic initiatives fail and Viceminister of the
Interior Ruben Gamarra warned: "What's at stake is the
nation, and we're not going to let any prefect, city or civil
leader to act against the national unity...it's a
constitutional duty to combat against such acts of sedition
and separatism in our country." But, in a hour-plus long
meeting December 14, the Vice President assured the
Ambassador that the government would not impose a state of
siege or take military action unless there is a need to
defend government buildings or protect people. The Ambassador
made clear that the United States is concerned about the
situation and that we are urging restraint from both sides,
the government and opposition. Garcia Linera said that
expressions of autonomy are democratic and "acceptable" but
warned that opposition department moves to establish local
police forces, collect taxes, or control national resources
would be illegal. "The President and I must guarantee the
country's integrity and stability," he added. The Ambassador
noted that the United States supports a united and democratic
Bolivia, but what was needed now is restraint.


4. (C) We foresee relative peace in the near term with
potential for isolated violence and possible, though
unlikely, military or police reprisals. Both sides have
winked at increasingly violent actions by their more radical
elements. During the recent Sucre violence, MAS-aligned "Red
Ponchos" or indigenous militia tortured and decapitated two
stray dogs, saying that this is what easterners should
expect. On December 10, members of a Santa Cruz youth group
attacked a supposed Masista who was taking pictures of the
hunger strike (caught on tape, the attack is violent and
could be used to rally western ire against the opposition.)
With fringe elements of both sides willing to use violence,
the potential for isolated confrontations is high. For
example, a minor skirmish escalated into violence on December
13 when middle-class protestors brawled with MAS supporters
in La Paz. Furthermore, any confrontation between a civilian
mob and the military or police, could well result in deaths
-- as occurred in Sucre. However, the government does not
want a repeat of Sucre and seems to be preparing its radical
social groups as the ones who would confront opposition
civilian groups. The calculus is that confrontations between
middle-class and indigenous would make the opposition look
bad or, as the government labels them, "fascist, racist,
oligarchs." If the police or military engage, it is the
government which will likely be blamed.


5. (C) We also expect that Evo and the MAS will continue
their attacks on the United States to distract attention from
domestic issues. On December 13, Evo was interviewed on CNN
International and once again accused USAID of financing the
opposition and the Ambassador of engaging in politics not
diplomacy. Beyond these rhetorical attacks, we have not seen
any incidents of violence targeting USG interests or U.S.
citizens. (Note: Post EAC met on December 14. Reported
septel. End note)

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Looking Ahead
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6. (C) In the longer term, the opposition departments are
likely to assert their autonomy in ways that gradually erode
national power. The opposition departments' most probable
method of asserting autonomy will be withholding of taxes or
revenues, particularly hydrocarbon revenues, from the central
government. (Note: this could lead to difficult situations
for private companies, if autonomous departments demand that
taxes go to the department while the central government
demands the same tax revenues. A similar situation with the
departmental aviation agency in Santa Cruz led to a shut down
of the international airport when airlines, including
American Airlines, refused to pay double fees. End note.)


7. (C) Departments could also attempt to bolster their
autonomy by taking central government buildings and declaring
them under departmental control. Likely targets would be tax
and land offices (opposition forces in the city of Tarija are
currently occupying both the tax and the land-reform
government offices.) Departments might also choose to form
departmental police squads, both to bolster their appearance
of autonomy and to give them a force which could face off
against the central government. (Note: currently the only
police in Bolivia are the national police, although a number
of large cities have begun hiring "municipal guards". End
note.)


8. (C) The opposition departments of Pando, Beni, Tarija and
Santa Cruz are planning to present their autonomy statutes
this weekend. Opposition leaders have assured us that they
will go no/no further, so as not to provoke a government
response. Their hope is that the government will enter into
a "true" dialogue, but they feel that this can only occur if
there is an outside mediator. The opposition has asked the
OAS, Brazil, the EU and the Catholic church if they would
mediate. So far, the government has rejected all of these
options.

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Opposition Fears Evo will Takeover Electoral System
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9. (C) There are three national referenda expected in 2008:
a referendum on whether to recall the president and Bolivia's
nine prefects; a preliminary referendum on an article of the
new constitution; and a subsequent referendum on the entire
constitution. The National Electoral Court decides the rules
of the game for each election and is normally comprised of
five justices, four appointed by Congress, one by the
President. To ensure that all interests are represented, the
electoral code stipulates Congressional appointments require
a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress. Currently
the court has only three justices, and the president of the
court must step down in January, leaving the court without
the necessary three-person quorum and forcing the appointment
of new justices. With Congress soon to enter recess, Evo
will be able to fill the Electoral Court's three vacancies,
giving him control over the court.


10. (C) Comment: Without impartial international observers,
the opposition fears that the MAS-dominated Electoral Court
will organize the 2008 referenda in such a way that favors
the MAS. La Paz Prefect Pepe Lucho told us that he feels Evo
will use the recall referendum as a "test run" of the
Electoral Court once it is under his control. For Evo a
successful recall referendum would eliminate one or two
opposition prefects (whom Evo would replace) and give Evo a
chance to fine-tune the referendum process in preparation for
the constitutional referenda. The constitutional referenda
are the oppositions' best chance at defeating Evo, but the
opposition is still divided on whether to participate. A
corruption of the electoral system could further alienate the
MAS and opposition. If the MAS skews the electoral system so
much that the opposition-led departments see the 2008
referenda as fraudulent, some radicals in the opposition may
view violent protest as the only solution. End Comment.

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Distrust, Hard to Overcome
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11. (C) If opposition departments reject the MAS constitution
in the national referendum (for example, if a majority of
Santa Cruz voters votes "no" on the constitution),
departments could individually decide not to accept the new
constitution, leading gradually to a de-facto divided
country. Opposition departments would continue to operate
under the current constitution and their own autonomy
statutes, while the "loyalist" departments (La Paz, Potosi,
Oruro, with question-marks over the divided departments of
Cochabamba and Chuquisaca) could become even more centralized
under the MAS constitution.


12. (C) To avoid this slow devolution to division within
Bolivia, dialogue between the two sides would be necessary,
but the level of distrust is so high this would require the
intervention of an international mediator. Both sides
currently see the situation as a zero-sum game with nothing
to be gained by working with the other side.

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Comment
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13. (C) Evo is currently in a strong position on the
constitution, having prevailed in Oruro and is now able to
sit back and let the opposition look bad in the case of any
violence. Despite his history of thriving on confrontation,
Evo will probably continue to call for tranquility and
"dialogue", now that it is too late for the opposition to
have any real input in the draft Constitution. The
government's reaction to Santa Cruz's steps toward declaring
autonomy have thus far been restrained, although as usual
Evo's rhetoric is more forceful--declaring autonomy statutes
"illegal". The lack of official government action against
the opposition thus far is a good sign, suggesting that Evo
intends to follow the logical approach and maintain calm.
The Vice President's assurances to us, while important, do
not exclude the possibility that the government will use
force if it sees an opportunity to deliver a significant blow
to the opposition. Should the opposition move from civil to
violent protest, Evo could use that as an excuse to take
action against it. Alternatively, Morales could simply point
to any opposition violence as illegal acts against a
peaceful, restrained central government. Absent a
spontaneous confrontation, we expect both sides to try to
avoid violence in the short term, particularly since Evo
will not want to disrupt the upcoming visits Presidents Lula
and Bachelet or bring further international attention to his
undemocratic machinations. End comment.

GOLDBERG