Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07LAPAZ3242
2007-12-12 23:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

EVO'S "HARD HAND" PUSHES CHUQUISACA AWAY

Tags:  PHUM PGOV PREL BL 
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INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7414
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RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0378
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003242 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: EVO'S "HARD HAND" PUSHES CHUQUISACA AWAY

REF: LA PAZ 3209

Classified By: EcoPol Counselor Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

- - - -
Summary
- - - -

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003242

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: EVO'S "HARD HAND" PUSHES CHUQUISACA AWAY

REF: LA PAZ 3209

Classified By: EcoPol Counselor Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

- - - -
Summary
- - - -


1. (C) Chuquisaca, Bolivia's third smallest department was
firmly in the ruling Movement Toward Socialism's (MAS) camp
in recent (2005 and 2006) elections. However, the MAS'
hard-line toward Sucre's proposal to be restored as the
nation's full capital and the tragic events of November
23-25, in which three young Sucre residents were killed and
over 400 people injured, has tilted public opinion against
the MAS. Sucre city leaders argue that the MAS could no
longer win in their city and Chuquisaca department (state) as
a whole. Nonetheless, unseating the MAS in Chuquisaca is not
a forgone conclusion. While many in Sucre will likely
abandon the party and President Morales should there be
elections in 2008, Chuquisaca's size prevents it from being a
deciding factor in a presidential election. Newly
disillusioned MAS voters would have to transfer their vote
en-masse to another party (such as PODEMOS) to prevent the
MAS from still picking up the bulk of the departments'
congressional seats. The prefecture is perhaps the only job
where the MAS is truly vulnerable. End Note.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Chuquisaca 2005/2006: MAS Wins Easily
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2. (U) Chuquisaca is Bolivia's third smallest department in
terms of population (representing five percent of the
electorate). In 2005 and 2006, Chuquisaca was solidly behind
Evo Morales and his MAS party. Sucre city represents nearly
60 percent of Chuquisaca's electorate, with the remaining 40
percent of the department is largely rural.


3. (U) In the December 2005 presidential and prefecture
(governor's) election, Evo Morales' MAS party easily beat all
other political parties. Morales won 54 percent of the vote
in Chuquisaca, and just over 52 percent in Sucre. Of the 28
different Chuquisaca presidential voting districts, the MAS
had an absolute majority (50 percent or more) in 19. MAS
candidate David Sanchez won the prefecture with 42 percent of
the vote, his next closest competitor (from the PODEMOS

party) received 36 percent of the vote. The MAS also won
seven of Chuquisaca departments eleven lower house seats and
two of department's three senate seats.


4. (U) In the July 2006 Constituent Assembly election the
MAS actually performed better than in December 2005. The MAS
won 14 of Chuquisaca's 23 assembly seats. Of the 28
different Chuquisaca voting districts, the MAS had an
absolute majority (50 percent or more) in 21. More
importantly the MAS improved its percentage vote of the vote
in 25 of the 28 districts. Sucre city was one of three
districts where the MAS performed worse, losing about 4
percentage points, but its closest rival, the PODEMOS party
fell even further losing 17 percentage points.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sucre City Leaders -- MAS Friendly No Longer
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5. (C) Emboff and a contingent of diplomatic officials from
France and Italy met with Sucre mayor Aydee Nava and City
Council President Fidel Herrera on December 5. Both Navaa
and Herrera focused most of their discussion on the central
government's "brutal repression" of their city's residents
"who peacefully protested against the MAS' convening of the
Constituent Assembly" at a military installation outside of
Sucre November 23-25. They confirmed that the conflicts
resulted in three deaths and argued that there was no doubt,
despite government pronouncements to the contrary, that the
deaths were the result of police actions. Navaa and Herrera
presented video evidence that some elite police forces were
carrying lethal firearms contrary to Government Minister
Alfredo Rada's numerous announcements that police only
possessed crowd control (non-lethal) weapons.


6. (C) Both Nava and Herrera shared that public opinion in
Sucre has turned resolutely against the government and the
ruling MAS party. They explained that the MAS via its
"illegal actions" in the Constituent Assembly and its
forbidding of discussion on the returning of the executive
and legislative branch to Sucre had alienated all but the
most ardent MAS supporters in Sucre. Time and again, Herrera
and Nava stated that Sucre had always been a peaceful city
that avoided Bolivia's heated "street" politics until the
Constituent Assembly. They explained that Sucre's citizens
would never have gone to the streets had it not been for the
MAS' very heavy-handed tactics. Nava explained that she
herself had voted for President Evo Morales in December 2005,
but would never do so again.


7. (C) Both Nava and Herrera expressed little sympathy for
Chuquisaca Prefect David Sanchez who fled Sucre on November
24 after people destroyed and looted his home. Nava argued
that Sanchez, because he was from the MAS, did nothing to
defend Sucre's interests within the Constituent Assembly and
failed to get the government to back down from its hard-line
in Sucre November 23-25. Sanchez who left Sucre is seeking
asylum in the United States or elsewhere, argues that he did
try to advocate for his department and Sucre, but that
President Morales and other government officials did not work
with him in good faith.

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Still Distrust Amongst Police and Civil Society
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8. (SBU) Emboff also visited four important police
installations ) the transit police complex, the Chuquisaca
department police headquarters, Sucre local police
headquarters, and the San Roque prison ) that were destroyed
(or heavily damaged) following the November 23-25 violence.
The police after suffering from attacks by angry Sucre
residents and fearing for their safety departed the city
midday November 25. They only returned late November 28,
leaving the city without police protection for three entire
days. Most of the severe looting occurred on November 25.


10. (SBU) The transit police complex was the most damaged,
with 65 cars completely burned (and unsalvageable) down to
their metal exoskeleton. Only 25 of the cars were official
police vehicles, the remainder were the officers' private
vehicles and impounded cars. All offices had been looted,
traffic records had been burned and police equipment
(including computers) stolen. The Chuquisaca department
police headquarters was badly burned, and according to police
officers police records were completely ransacked, leaving
almost no case files (past and present). During the visit
officers mentioned that approximately 30 prisoners still
remained at large from the November 25 San Roque jail break.
Police officials acknowledged that only the "worst criminals"
with the longest sentences had not returned to prison.
Prisoners with short sentences returned within hours of the
November 25 jail break.


11. (SBU) The police argue that angry Sucre residents forced
them to leave the city, that it was not a government
decision. City officials told emboffs the destruction was a
response to police's "brutal repression" of "peaceful
protesters." The police, including newly appointed Sucre
commander Colonel Casceres argue that Sucre civic leaders
incited the destruction. Police officials have privately and
publicly denied aiding in the San Roque jail break, stating
they had to let people leave the facility because residents
had set fire to the building. The mayor and city council
president argue that any fires within the prison were minor
and the police released the prisoners as means of revenge on
the city.


12. (C) Comment: There remains serious distrust between the
police and city residents. The police are working out of
makeshift facilities and have no vehicles in which to conduct
their normal activities. The city leadership views the
police as allied with the national government. Mayor Nava
explained that the city would "not pay one cent of the
reconstruction and refurbishing of police facilities,"
arguing it was the central government's responsibility since
it was the central government that provoked the city's
residents. End Comment.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Human Rights Ombudsman Viewed as MAS-Loyalist
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13. (SBU) Emboff also met with the local representative of
the Human Rights Ombudsman Sonia Soto. Soto explained that
her office had not received any formal complaints regarding
the November 23-25 violence, but expected that her office
might receive some in the near future. Soto acknowledged
that people in Sucre view her office as allied with the
government; she explained that few understand it is an
independent agency. She stated that on occasion her office
has received threats by anti-MAS groups. (Note: The Santa
Cruz Human Rights Ombudsman's office was attacked November

25. End Note).


14. (C) Comment: Soto does not appear to be helping her
case that her office is independent. As the local
representative of the Human Rights Ombudsman, she has the
authority to investigate cases of human rights abuses
regardless of whether her office has received a direct
complaint. Furthermore the Human Rights Ombudsman office
(both nationally and locally) was silent (did not issue a
statement) up until late on November 24. Her explanation for
the silence is that the national Human Rights Ombudsman,
Waldo Albarracin, was outside the country and she was not in
Sucre on the day the violence started in earnest.
Nonetheless, in the past the Human Rights Ombudsman's office
has issued statements almost immediately upon the emergence
of violence between civil society and government authorities.
Critics of Waldo Albarracin state he is too close to
government officials, arguing his close friendship with Vice
Minister Sacha Llorenti impacts his ability to be
independent. Llorenti was one of the first Morales
administration officials to defend the government's actions
in Sucre. End Comment.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Recent Events Further Split MAS from Chuquisaca
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15. (SBU) On December 10, after the MAS passed its
constitution (in detail and revision at yet another location
(ref) pictures of MAS Constituent Assembly delegates from
Chuquisaca were posted around the town square with the word
"traitors" scrawled on them. On December 11, Mayor Nava
called on the opposition departments, who are planning to
announce their autonomy around December 15, to include Sucre
as the "nation's full capital" (seat of not only the judicial
but also the executive and legislative branches) in its
autonomy statutes. Also on December 11, the Bolivian Senate
censured Government Minister Alfredo Rada for his involvement
in the November 23-25 violence (septel). President Morales
immediately overturned the censure, further alienating people
in Sucre and Chuquisaca.

- - - -
Comment
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16. (C) Chuquisaca, with only five percent of the
electorate, will have little impact on any nationwide
presidential elections (or recall referendums) in 2008, if
there are indeed such elections. In congressional elections
Morales' "hard-hand" might have slightly more of an impact,
but the odds are still in the MAS' favor. In 2005, the MAS
won two of its directly elected lower house seats by less
than a 900 votes, and a third by 1300. These three seats may
be in jeopardy, assuming the MAS does not gerrymander voting
districts, which it might be able to do once it controls the
National Electoral Court after the current director's term
end January 7. If the opposition could unite under one
banner it also could win two senate seats, rather than its
current one. But, the opposition is divided and PODEMOS, the
party that could most effectively use the MAS voters to
eclipse the MAS, is perhaps the least likely party to pickup
the disaffected voters. Also, if the MAS' new constitution
passes a public referendum, the MAS is all but guaranteed the
newly created indigenous upper house seat.


17. (C) The prefecture is perhaps where the MAS' policies
will be most felt in Chuquisaca. Prefect David Sanchez won
with only 42 percent of the vote, his PODEMOS runner-up 36
percent. With Sanchez politically burned and likely in exile
out of the country at the time of the 2008 elections, the MAS
will have to put forth another candidate. Currently there
are few (if any) MASistas at the departmental level which can
garner much support. Meanwhile, the charismatic Sucre city
council president Fidel Herrera, one of the faces of Sucre's
resistance to the government November 23-25, told emboff in
August he would likely make a bid for the prefecture when new
elections are called. End Comment.
GOLDBERG