Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07LAPAZ3209
2007-12-10 13:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

EVO PUSHES DEMOCRACY'S EDGES, APPROVES CONSTITUTION

Tags:  ASEC BL PGOV PHUM PREL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003209 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: ASEC BL PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: EVO PUSHES DEMOCRACY'S EDGES, APPROVES CONSTITUTION

REF: A. LA PAZ 3187

B. LA PAZ 3118

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003209 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 TAGS: ASEC BL PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: EVO PUSHES DEMOCRACY'S EDGES, APPROVES CONSTITUTION REF: A. LA PAZ 3187 ¶B. LA PAZ 3118 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) In a process largely devoid of democratic and legal procedure, President Evo Morales' ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) pulled together a quorum of the Constituent Assembly at about 7:00 PM December 8 in the heavily pro-MAS city of Oruro (three hours outside of La Paz). By 11:30 AM December 9 the MAS had approved its own constitution both "in detail and revision" with almost no opposition participation. The MAS once again used highly questionable tactics to keep the opposition to a minimum, this time by announcing the Constituent Assembly's reconvening without the required 24-hour advance notice. With only hours to respond and given that Oruro is far from opposition strongholds, the opposition was effectively locked out of the vote. With the Constitutional Tribunal hobbled and possibly unable to rule on the legal merits of the process, all that remains is a public referendum (possibly two) on the MAS' constitution. ¶2. (C) The December 8-9 Constituent Assembly marks the third time in less than three weeks the MAS has pushed through important legislation while effectively barring the opposition's attendance. The MAS apparently views its battle with the opposition as a zero-sum game where representative democracy and minority participation are obstacles to be worked around. The opposition based mostly in the lowlands is likely to respond with acts of civil disobedience, the take over of central government installations and declarations of "defacto autonomy." More radical elements may attempt to shut-off gas pipelines to the altiplano and perhaps, out of a desire, to "wake-up" the region cut off gas to Brazil. The government has already sent troops to protect gas installations, so it will be difficult for the opposition to undertake this measure. Sporadic violence could occur in opposition controlled departments but not in La Paz. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Constituent Assembly Bait and Switch - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Violating legal procedure, the MAS gave the opposition less than a day's advance notice of the change in venue -- the Oruro session was announced at 12:30 AM December &#
x000A;¶8. Previously (on December 5) the MAS had announced the Assembly would convene December 12, in its stronghold of El Chapare. Prior to reconvening, some in the MAS stated that they would have their constitution completed within hours, boasting that it would be approved before "the roosters crowed (the morning of December 9)." PODEMOS (the largest opposition party) leader and former president Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga, earlier on December 8, argued that given that his party's delegates were dispersed throughout the country, "not even Superman could make it (to Oruro in time)." Quiroga also remarked that calling a plenary session with less than 24-hour notice is illegal. ¶4. (C) Comment: As it has time and again over recent weeks, the MAS chose to ignore the Constituent Assembly's established rules so that the opposition would have little chance to participate and vote in the December 8-9 plenary session. Quiroga was correct; convening a Constituent plenary session within less than 24-hour notice is a violation of at least two rules -- articles 10 and 55 of the Assembly's General Regulations. As the opposition is concentrated in the lowland departments (of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija) far from Oruro, and that Oruro's nearest airport is in the MAS stronghold of El Alto three hours away, many opposition delegates had few (if any) possibilities for getting to Oruro in time. It is worth noting, however, that despite PODEMOS leader Tuto Quiroga's decision that the opposition should attend the Oruro session if at all possible, PODEMOS delegates from Santa Cruz, Sucre and other cities declined to participate, arguing the entire procedure was illegal. End Comment. ¶5. (C) The MAS initially pulled together 153 of the Constituent Assembly's 255 delegates, resulting in the necessary quorum; later ten more delegates joined. Few of the opposition parties attended, with the exception of the National Unity (UN) party. UN delegate Ricardo Pol argued that the UN's seven delegates attended not out of the desire to give the session "validity" but so that the MAS would "listen to (UN's) proposals." The largest opposition party PODEMOS (which controls close to 60 delegates) did not attend. However, approximately 12 PODEMOS delegates (mostly from areas near Oruro) did briefly enter the Technical University of Oruro building where the Assembly was meeting to declare (and shout) that the session was "illegal." ¶6. (C) Comment: To ensure that the opposition thought twice before participating, pro-MAS groups including cooperative miners, campesinos, coca-growers and residents from El Alto surrounded the Technical University of Oruro building. Many members of the pro-MAS groups made it clear that they were in Oruro to prevent "right wing interference" in the process. The MAS apparently worked hard to ensure that their Oruro session would go off without a hitch. Cooperative Miners had earlier in the week vowed to block the MAS constitution, and any sessions in Oruro. The MAS negotiated a deal to include cooperative miners in its new constitution thereby ensuring the Oruro session would not be encumbered by protests from cooperative miners (ref A). The MAS appears to have instructed its base to permit a least a few opposition delegates to enter the plenary session to give it the appearance of legitimacy, knowing that the opposition could not muster the necessary number of delegates to block approval of its constitution. Fidel Surco, of the Oruro Campesinos Federation summarized the strategy best, "We are here to . . . prevent that anything impedes the development of this process, we will not allow anyone from the right to interfere with the plenary. We have respected that delegates from PODEMOS be part of this conclave, likewise we have allowed them to leave the session." End Comment. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Undemocratic Road to Oruro - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) The Oruro session followed two well orchestrated MAS maneuvers over the past three weeks which prevented the opposition from participating in the democratic process. On November 23-24, the MAS convened a session of the Constituent Assembly at La Glorieta, a military facility seven kilometers outside of Sucre. The opposition did not participate as the MAS had bused in several thousands of supporters (some like the Ponchos Rojos known to be violent) to "protect" the military installation. A very large contingent of police and military provided further protection. As soon as the Glorieta session was announced, most objective observers warned that violence would be likely. Sucre residents who for months were pleading with the MAS, to no avail, to include debate over proposals (for returning the legislative and executive branches to their city) in the Constituent Assembly marched on the Glorieta. Ensuing clashes, primarily between Sucre residents and the police, resulted in three deaths and over 400 injured. Despite declarations by Minister of Government Alfredo Rada, who was present at La Glorieta, that the police were carrying only non-lethal arms, video footage shown to emboffs very clearly shows that some possessed lethal firearms. ¶8. (C) Just three days after the tragic events in Sucre, Pro-MAS groups physically prevented opposition members from entering Congress November 27. Without the opposition's presence the ruling MAS convened a session of Congress and passed new legislation regarding the functioning of the Constituent Assembly and "Renta Dignidad" (a MAS-proposed pension program). The new Constituent Assembly legislation gave Assembly President (Silvia Lazarte of the MAS) the green light for the December 8 Assembly session in Oruro. Prior legislation only provided for Sucre as the seat of the Assembly (ref B). - - - - - - - - - - Voting Soviet Style - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) As it did during its November 23-24 session at La Glorieta, the December 8-9 debate over articles of the new constitution was extremely limited. The MAS Constitution consists of over 400 articles grouped into five sections. Following the approval of the MAS constitution in "general terms" the Constituent Assembly was supposed to debate and vote on each of the articles in detail. Instead, to accelerate the approval, each of the five major sections of the MAS constitution were read out loud in its entirety, and then each political party was allowed 20 minutes to raise its concerns prior to voting. Next the title and number of each article was subjected to a simple hand count (raised arm vote). UN party members who attended the session complained that they were never given a copy of the text which was being "debated." Even some in the MAS complained about the process. MAS delegate Loyola Guzman who over the past weeks has become very frustrated with her party remarked, "I am very concerned because I sent suggestions that have not been considered. Delegates do not have any right (to speak),not a single guarantee to have their proposals considered." ¶10. (C) Following the article-by-article vote, the full text of the constitution was approved around 11:30 AM December 9. Given that there was almost no opposition presence, few articles garnered much debate and in the end only one article about large land holdings (latifundio) will go forward for a preliminary referendum within 120 days. After the preliminary referendum, if the schedules hold, a referendum on the full constitution will occur 90-120 days later (August 2008). (Comment: If the referendum periods hold, the MAS will likely push for August 6 for the referendum on the new constitution as it marks Bolivian Independence Day and the day the Constituent Assembly started. End Comment). ¶11. (C) Comment: Ironically, the fiercest debate seemed to be over whether or not the delegates will continue to receive a salary beyond December 14, the deadline for delivering a new constitution. According to the legislation establishing the Constituent Assembly, Assembly members cannot receive another salary while serving as a delegate. However, no budget has been set aside for delegate salaries beyond December 14, and delegates continue maintaining their title until the final referendum. Many in the MAS were arguing that they need to receive a salary until the final referendum as they will "work hard" to deliver the constitution. End Comment. - - - - Comment - - - - -- Evo Plays Statesman -- ¶12. (C) While the MAS' December 8-9 Constituent Assembly session makes a mockery of the democratic process, it was perfectly timed. President Morales left later December 9 for Argentina to attend Cristina Fernandez' inauguration and the signing of the charter establishing Banco Sur. While the MAS has three times in as many weeks locked the opposition out of participating in the framing of Bolivia's new constitution and vital legislation, Evo's fellow Latin American presidents are almost certainly not going to comment on his recent undemocratic machinations, thus lending his actions an air of credibility and legitimacy. -- What Next for the Opposition -- ¶13. (C) The opposition has lost faith in negotiating or working with the MAS. Opposition leaders have declared once again the MAS' new constitution both illegal and illegitimate. Ironically even some high-level government officials agree with the opposition, at least on the second point. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Hugo Fernandez recently told Charge that the constitution would be "legal but not legitimate." But beyond declarations, the opposition is likely to send the Constitutional Tribunal a series of cases against the MAS' actions in the Constituent Assembly. The opposition will try to get the cases in before the Tribunal is co-opted by President Morales' upcoming interim (Congressional recess) appointments. Emboff spoke to one of the three remaining magistrates on December 5, the magistrate explained that court was eagerly awaiting cases. Of course any decision made in December will likely be overturned in some way by Morales' future recess appointments. ¶14. (C) In the opposition-led (media-luna) departments of Beni, Pando, Tarija and especially Santa Cruz we can expect acts of civil disobedience the week of December 10-16 and perhaps beyond. The Santa Cruz Civic Committee has called for an emergency meeting as of 6:00 PM December 9. The cities of Sucre (Chuquisaca department) and Cochabamba city (Cochabamba department) will almost certainly join the media-luna. The Santa Cruz civic committee will likely declare its defacto "autonomy" within days and announce a date for a departmental referendum on its autonomy statutes. Some may call for blocking food shipments to the MAS-dominant altiplano departments of Oruro and La Paz, but this is likely to have little short term impact. Also, we can expect more attempts at takeovers of central government installations in the media luna. If the government responds by sending in police or the military, there is high probability of violence. ¶15. (C) More radical elements in the media-luna may attempt to shut-off gas pipelines which feed the altiplano departments. However, Evo recognizing this vulnerability has reportedly already sent the armed forces to secure key gas installations to prevent such an occurrence. Evo has also "convinced" the highest ranks of the military to support his actions. In a response to the Cochabamba and Pando prefects (governors) calls for the military to defend the current constitution (i.e., not support President Morales) Commander of the Armed Forces Wilfredo Vargas on December 7 pledged the military's allegiance to Morales' process of change. He went further and called the prefects those who attempt to "drive us (armed forces) away from constitutional norms" and went on to call the prefects "bad citizens and cowards." ¶16. (C) The opposition will also likely attempt to disrupt (inconvenience) Brazilian President LuiZ Ignacio "Lula" Da Silva's and Chilean President Michelle Bachelet's December 16 visit to Bolivia. Opposition leaders are likely incensed by a December 9 interview in La Paz newspaper La Razon by Lula' foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia in which he promises greater Brazilian (Petrobras) investment, and states that Brazil sees a "democratic evolution to the current crisis." The opposition will certainly try to get an audience with the two presidents. Fearing that the Brazilian government will give Evo a pass some radical supporters of the opposition may attempt more drastic actions. Ernesto Blanco, President of Transredes (the gasline company) mentioned to emboff December 4 that the most effective (radical) strategy to get the Bolivian and Brazilian governments' attention would be to cut off gas to Brazil. -- What Next? ¶17. (C) Evo has delivered to his base the Christmas present he promised -- a new constitution. The internal debate will begin whether the process was legal or legitimate but short of a loud international outcry, there is no domestic authority (the MAS has decimated the Constitutional Tribunal) to invalidate the new constitution. The opposition may proceed with its plan to declare autonomy in four to six departments but has little leverage over Evo to force him to backtrack. Tempers will run high until the traditional Christmas break starting around December 21 so there is a high probability of violence if opposition and Bolivian authorities face-off, (in the opposition held departments, not in La Paz). The opposition's only remaining hope, absent a functioning and impartial Constitutional Tribunal, will be to defeat the referendum on the constitution, but a this point it is not even clear that it will participate in what it sees as an illegitimate process. End Comment. GOLDBERG

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