FOREIGN MINISTRY DEFENDS MAS' HARDLINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003208 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTRY DEFENDS MAS' HARDLINE Classified By: A/DCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) MFA Director General (DG) Jean Paul Guevarra convoked the diplomatic corps representing Western Hemisphere countries to explain the government's perspective on the Constituent Assembly process and its overall program for "change." Guevarra explained that the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) will have the 170 votes to pass its constitution by December 14. (Note: In fact the MAS approved its constitution over the December 8-9 weekend with only two-thirds of the those present -- not the 170 needed to reach two-thirds of the overall Constituent Assembly membership (septel). End Note). The MAS appears to have cut-off the any negotiations with the opposition. An opposition senator told Emboff that his party was reaching out to the MAS to encourage negotiation, but had been completely rebuffed by Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera. In a surprising slip-up, after Guevarra was stymied by one question regarding negotiations between the MAS and the opposition, the Cuban Ambassador -- perhaps forgetting which country he represented -- took the liberty to answer. ¶2. (C) Responding to a question on Bolivia's foreign policy, Guevarra argued that Bolivia and other countries are clamoring for a new "multi-polar system" to replace the existing "uni-polar" Bretton-Woods construct. The DG's comments seemed to justify President Morales' December 6 diatribe against the United States in which he, once again, accused the United States of leading an "international structure" to topple his and other socialist governments in the region. Evo further charged the USG orchestrating a recent popular uprising in Beni Department that forced a Venezuelan military plane to flee Bolivia, and then asked that people "adopt the same posture against American helicopters." End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Media Lies, We Tell the Truth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Vice Foreign Minister (DG) Jean Paul Guevarra convoked a meeting with the diplomatic corps representing the Western Hemisphere December 7. In addition to the United States; Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, Paraguay, Canada, Chile and CUBA attended. Brazil Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela were absent. The DG opened by stating that the meeting was the beginning of what he hoped would be a "dialogue" that the foreign ministry would hold every four to six weeks. He mentioned that the MFA had already begun a similar process with European and Asian/Africa/Middle Eastern nations. Guevarra argued that the dialogue was particularly necessary as the media was not telling the Bolivian government's side of the story, and was against the government's change agenda. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The MAS: A Historical Imperative - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Rather than a dialogue, the meeting turned into more of a historical lecture by the DG to justify the MAS' recent actions in the Constituent Assembly and Congress. The DG stressed that the international community needs to understand Bolivia's current "political context" and recent political history, reaching as far back as the 1952 revolution. Guevarra argued that Bolivia is in a critical moment similar to 1952, and that the Bolivian government is answering this "historical imperative." The DG conceded that the "1985 model" was effective in taming hyperinflation but failed to provide jobs for the people. He stressed that Morales was the first democratically elected president to receive a majority, arguing the people had rejected the "coalition" model -- where groups of political parties in Congress chose the president, and parties negotiated so that each had a few of the government ministries. Guevarra reiterated the importance of Evo Morales' election as Bolivia's first indigenous president, arguing that it was a vote for historical "change," and a repudiation of the past. ¶5. (C) The DG then made his pitch that the government is pursuing "change" via a democratic framework, focusing the rest of his lecture on the Constituent Assembly process. Guevarra argued that demands for a Constituent Assembly dated back to the 1990s, but that traditional (read opposition) parties were always against the idea. He explained that despite their vote in favor of convening a Constituent Assembly the opposition's "heart" was never in it. Guevarra continued his critic of the opposition, by claiming it used a series of invalid arguments to stymie the process; first departmental autonomy, then the requirement for a two-thirds majority, and finally the restoration of Sucre as Bolivia's full capital (i.e., the returning of the executive and legislative branches to Sucre). Guevarra justified the government's hard-line actions in Sucre, November 23-25, as a response to what he called the opposition's "violent" approach to end the Assembly without a new constitution. He argued that the MAS had exhausted all other means, including the Vice President's direct negotiations with the opposition. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Q & A Session Leads to More Questions than Answers - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) After his "history" lesson, The DG finally permitted the diplomatic corps to ask a few questions. Responding to an inquiry about recently proposed presidential and prefect recall referendum, Guevarra explained that the details were not yet defined and that the government needed the opposition's support. (Note: The main opposition party PODEMOS and all the nation's opposition prefects have stated they would participate in the referendum. End Note). ¶7. (C) Guevarra then discussed the schedule of Constitutional referendums, stating there would first be a referendum on perhaps "four to six" articles where there was disagreement, 90 days after the constitution is approved followed, by a second referendum on the full constitutional text 90 days later. He conceded that he did not know how the newly proposed recall referendum would fit in time-wise with the other referendums. ¶8. (C) A question regarding whether agreements between the Vice President and the opposition would be incorporated into the MAS constitution garnered the most surprising answers. The DG stated he was not sure if the agreements would be incorporated. However, the Cuban Ambassador interjected as if he knew more than Guevarra (and perhaps forgetting which country he represented) that some but not all the agreed upon points would be incorporated. ¶9. (C) Argentina asked the DG to explain Bolivia's international policy. Guevarra responded that similar to the Bolivian domestic situation, the world had reached a "historical imperative" where the countries were seeking a "change" from a uni-polar (i.e. U.S.-dominated) system to a "multi-polar" system. The DG argued against the post-World War II Bretton-Woods institutions, stating that the world needs a new system based on the globe's "diversity." ¶10. (C) Charge then questioned the DG regarding how the MAS planned to pass its constitution within the Constituent Assembly if did not have the necessary 170 votes (two-thirds). Guevarra responded that the MAS would have the requisite 170 votes, but provided no further explanation as to how it would obtain this many delegates. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶11. (C) The MAS appears to be closing off any prospects for negotiation with the opposition. The December 5 announcement to move the Constituent Assembly to the MAS-stronghold of El Chapare would ensure that the opposition would not participate. As Evo is still seeking to be perceived as following a legitimate democratic process he has reopened the possibility that the session would reconvene in Oruro or La Paz -- both of which are MAS-dominated, but not as blatantly rigged as a meeting in cocalero country. Guevarra's comments about the events in Sucre November 23-25 -- where three people died and over 400 were injured -- indicate that the government still is sticking to its line that it bears no responsibility for the tragedy (a line President Morales repeated December 6). His comment that the MAS could assemble 170 delegates signaled that negotiation with the opposition was no longer necessary as borne out by the events of December 8-9 (septel). This coincides with statements that the opposition has shared with the Emboffs on December ¶6. According to an opposition senator, the Vice President completely rebuffed his party's attempts at re-opening negotiations. ¶12. (C) Guevarra's explanation of Bolivian foreign policy appeared to be a "justification" of President Evo Morales December 6 diatribe against the United States, in which he all but urged his supporters to attack USG aircraft. Evo once again accused the United States of orchestrating a conspiracy against his government stating that the United has created "an international structure" to attack "revolutionary democracies." He also attempted to link the USG to the deaths in Sucre, stating that the USG finances the opposition which "looks for death." Finally Morales went on to blame the USG for a recent popular uprising in Beni that forced a Venezuelan military plane to depart Bolivia and land instead in Brazil. Evo first apologized to Venezuela and then urged that people take a similar posture toward U.S. anti-narcotics helicopters. End Comment. GOLDBERG