FOREIGN MINISTRY DEFENDS MAS' HARDLINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003208

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTRY DEFENDS MAS' HARDLINE

Classified By: A/DCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) MFA Director General (DG) Jean Paul Guevarra
convoked the diplomatic corps representing Western Hemisphere
countries to explain the government's perspective on the
Constituent Assembly process and its overall program for
"change." Guevarra explained that the Movement Toward
Socialism (MAS) will have the 170 votes to pass its
constitution by December 14. (Note: In fact the MAS approved
its constitution over the December 8-9 weekend with only
two-thirds of the those present -- not the 170 needed to
reach two-thirds of the overall Constituent Assembly
membership (septel). End Note). The MAS appears to have
cut-off the any negotiations with the opposition. An
opposition senator told Emboff that his party was reaching
out to the MAS to encourage negotiation, but had been
completely rebuffed by Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera.
In a surprising slip-up, after Guevarra was stymied by one
question regarding negotiations between the MAS and the
opposition, the Cuban Ambassador -- perhaps forgetting which
country he represented -- took the liberty to answer.


2. (C) Responding to a question on Bolivia's foreign
policy, Guevarra argued that Bolivia and other countries are
clamoring for a new "multi-polar system" to replace the
existing "uni-polar" Bretton-Woods construct. The DG's
comments seemed to justify President Morales' December 6
diatribe against the United States in which he, once again,
accused the United States of leading an "international
structure" to topple his and other socialist governments in
the region. Evo further charged the USG orchestrating a
recent popular uprising in Beni Department that forced a
Venezuelan military plane to flee Bolivia, and then asked
that people "adopt the same posture against American
helicopters." End Summary.

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The Media Lies, We Tell the Truth
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3. (C) Vice Foreign Minister (DG) Jean Paul Guevarra
convoked a meeting with the diplomatic corps representing the
Western Hemisphere December 7. In addition to the United
States; Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, Paraguay, Canada,
Chile and Cuba attended. Brazil Colombia, Peru, and
Venezuela were absent. The DG opened by stating that the
meeting was the beginning of what he hoped would be a
"dialogue" that the foreign ministry would hold every four to
six weeks. He mentioned that the MFA had already begun a
similar process with European and Asian/Africa/Middle Eastern
nations. Guevarra argued that the dialogue was particularly
necessary as the media was not telling the Bolivian
government's side of the story, and was against the
government's change agenda.

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The MAS: A Historical Imperative
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4. (C) Rather than a dialogue, the meeting turned into more
of a historical lecture by the DG to justify the MAS' recent
actions in the Constituent Assembly and Congress. The DG
stressed that the international community needs to understand
Bolivia's current "political context" and recent political
history, reaching as far back as the 1952 revolution.
Guevarra argued that Bolivia is in a critical moment similar
to 1952, and that the Bolivian government is answering this
"historical imperative." The DG conceded that the "1985
model" was effective in taming hyperinflation but failed to
provide jobs for the people. He stressed that Morales was
the first democratically elected president to receive a
majority, arguing the people had rejected the "coalition"
model -- where groups of political parties in Congress chose
the president, and parties negotiated so that each had a few
of the government ministries. Guevarra reiterated the
importance of Evo Morales' election as Bolivia's first
indigenous president, arguing that it was a vote for
historical "change," and a repudiation of the past.


5. (C) The DG then made his pitch that the government is
pursuing "change" via a democratic framework, focusing the
rest of his lecture on the Constituent Assembly process.
Guevarra argued that demands for a Constituent Assembly dated
back to the 1990s, but that traditional (read opposition)
parties were always against the idea. He explained that
despite their vote in favor of convening a Constituent
Assembly the opposition's "heart" was never in it. Guevarra
continued his critic of the opposition, by claiming it used a
series of invalid arguments to stymie the process; first
departmental autonomy, then the requirement for a two-thirds
majority, and finally the restoration of Sucre as Bolivia's
full capital (i.e., the returning of the executive and
legislative branches to Sucre). Guevarra justified the
government's hard-line actions in Sucre, November 23-25, as a
response to what he called the opposition's "violent"
approach to end the Assembly without a new constitution. He
argued that the MAS had exhausted all other means, including
the Vice President's direct negotiations with the opposition.

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Q & A Session Leads to More Questions than Answers
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6. (C) After his "history" lesson, The DG finally permitted
the diplomatic corps to ask a few questions. Responding to
an inquiry about recently proposed presidential and prefect
recall referendum, Guevarra explained that the details were
not yet defined and that the government needed the
opposition's support. (Note: The main opposition party
PODEMOS and all the nation's opposition prefects have stated
they would participate in the referendum. End Note).


7. (C) Guevarra then discussed the schedule of
Constitutional referendums, stating there would first be a
referendum on perhaps "four to six" articles where there was
disagreement, 90 days after the constitution is approved
followed, by a second referendum on the full constitutional
text 90 days later. He conceded that he did not know how the
newly proposed recall referendum would fit in time-wise with
the other referendums.


8. (C) A question regarding whether agreements between the
Vice President and the opposition would be incorporated into
the MAS constitution garnered the most surprising answers.
The DG stated he was not sure if the agreements would be
incorporated. However, the Cuban Ambassador interjected as
if he knew more than Guevarra (and perhaps forgetting which
country he represented) that some but not all the agreed upon
points would be incorporated.


9. (C) Argentina asked the DG to explain Bolivia's
international policy. Guevarra responded that similar to the
Bolivian domestic situation, the world had reached a
"historical imperative" where the countries were seeking a
"change" from a uni-polar (i.e. U.S.-dominated) system to a
"multi-polar" system. The DG argued against the post-World
War II Bretton-Woods institutions, stating that the world
needs a new system based on the globe's "diversity."


10. (C) Charge then questioned the DG regarding how the MAS
planned to pass its constitution within the Constituent
Assembly if did not have the necessary 170 votes
(two-thirds). Guevarra responded that the MAS would have the
requisite 170 votes, but provided no further explanation as
to how it would obtain this many delegates.

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Comment
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11. (C) The MAS appears to be closing off any prospects for
negotiation with the opposition. The December 5 announcement
to move the Constituent Assembly to the MAS-stronghold of El
Chapare would ensure that the opposition would not
participate. As Evo is still seeking to be perceived as
following a legitimate democratic process he has reopened the
possibility that the session would reconvene in Oruro or La
Paz -- both of which are MAS-dominated, but not as blatantly
rigged as a meeting in cocalero country. Guevarra's comments
about the events in Sucre November 23-25 -- where three
people died and over 400 were injured -- indicate that the
government still is sticking to its line that it bears no
responsibility for the tragedy (a line President Morales
repeated December 6). His comment that the MAS could
assemble 170 delegates signaled that negotiation with the
opposition was no longer necessary as borne out by the events
of December 8-9 (septel). This coincides with statements
that the opposition has shared with the Emboffs on December

6. According to an opposition senator, the Vice President
completely rebuffed his party's attempts at re-opening
negotiations.


12. (C) Guevarra's explanation of Bolivian foreign policy
appeared to be a "justification" of President Evo Morales
December 6 diatribe against the United States, in which he
all but urged his supporters to attack USG aircraft. Evo
once again accused the United States of orchestrating a
conspiracy against his government stating that the United has
created "an international structure" to attack "revolutionary
democracies." He also attempted to link the USG to the deaths
in Sucre, stating that the USG finances the opposition which
"looks for death." Finally Morales went on to blame the USG
for a recent popular uprising in Beni that forced a
Venezuelan military plane to depart Bolivia and land instead
in Brazil. Evo first apologized to Venezuela and then urged
that people take a similar posture toward U.S. anti-narcotics
helicopters. End Comment.
GOLDBERG