BOLIVIA: EVO'S SUCRE SPIN BEGINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003091

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: EVO'S SUCRE SPIN BEGINS

REF: A. LA PAZ 3078

B. LA PAZ 3077

C. LA PAZ 3075

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Bolivian President Evo Morales waited almost
three days after protests turned violent in the city of Sucre
to address Bolivians. He asked for calm, as have other
government and opposition leaders. Morales also accused
"groups of oligarchs and neoliberals" of manipulating the
violence and asked for citizens to help "identify those
responsible." Morales otherwise stuck to oft-repeated themes
from government officials: the constitution passed by largely
pro-government Constituent Assembly is legitimate, the
opposition is to blame for the violence, the government is a
victim of the opposition violence, and the government is
reasonable and laments the deaths in Sucre. Presidency
Minister Juan Quintana added a threat of "civil war" to his
call for calm, invoking accusations of opposition racism and
classism. End Summary.

Days Late, Evo Calls for Serenity Now
--------------


2. (U) Following almost three days of violent protests
regarding the drafting of a new constitution in the titular
capital of Sucre, President Evo Morales asked "the Bolivian
people for peaceful serenity" in a televised national address
November 25. Three protesters died in demonstrations aimed
to keep the full Constituent Assembly in Sucre (refs).
Morales expressed "concern about delinquent groups en Sucre "
motivated by political interests" and that he "could not
understand how some can foment confrontation among
Bolivians." He accused "groups of oligarchs and neoliberals"
of manipulating the protests and asked the people of Sucre to
help "identify those responsible."

Santa Evo Leaves Coal in Opposition Stockings
--------------


3. (C) Morales' prior November 22 statements on the Assembly
were upbeat and light compared to the heated rhetoric at the
time. He appealed to Assembly members "of all parties" to
pass a Constitution as a Christmas present to the Bolivian
people. Apparently content to leave the execution of the
Assembly's move to Minister of Government Alfredo Rada and
ruling MAS-party Assembly members, Evo did not comment on
Sucre's situation while he participated in photo
opportunities in El Alto and a La Paz school in the ensuing
days. News footage of school children shouting "Evo, Evo" to
the smiling father figure of Morales juxtaposed awkwardly and
sharply with scenes of chaos from Sucre.

MAS Talking Points:
Constitution Inevitable, Resistance Futile
--------------


4. (SBU) Statements from government officials were fairly
consistent and appeared to be from the same prepared speaking
points:

-- The La Glorieta constitution is legitimate, inclusive, and
inevitable. It was approved unanimously (136 for and 3
abstentions). It was approved by not only by the MAS, but
members from the opposition, indigenous and social
organizations, the middle-class, elites, and representatives
of all nine departments. Officials point to the
constitution's guarantee of departmental and indigenous
autonomy, nationalization of hydrocarbons, and guarantee of
basic services as a "human right." They skip over the
contentious inclusion of unlimited presidential terms and
location of the capital. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera
bluntly told Bolivians to accept the La Glorieta
constitution, since "one way or another it will be approved."

-- Blame the opposition. The government argues the
opposition is ultimately responsible for the deaths and
violence in Sucre by instigating the protests and forcing the
MAS to convene the Assembly in a secure location. Minister
of the Presidency (Chief of Staff) Juan Ramon Quintana stated
on November 25 that Duran, the 29 year-old student who was
the first causality of the violence, died from a .22 or .25
caliber bullet which he alleges neither the police nor
military carry, thus implying Duran was shot by protesters.
Government officials stress the aggressiveness of opposition
protesters. In an effort to discredit a principal opposition
leader and Constituent Assembly member Samuel Doria Medina
(UN party),Government media reported the police caught
Medina's security chief trying to smuggle in a machine gun
and ammunition to Sucre. Doria Medina simply explained the
weapon is used by his own security detail. Presidential
Minister Juan Quintana explained "although we took all
reasonable precautions to avoid violence, we could not have
imagined this" hostility of opposition protests.

-- Government as victim. Government officials emphasize that
protesters are responsible for the lynching of a policeman
(later reported to be missing, not dead) and injuries to
other police officers, the burning of at least two police
stations, attempts to take over police headquarters, and a
prison break (Note: The opposition dispute the prison break
charge; claiming guards let the prisoners go in order to
foment chaos. End Note.) The government is playing up
Molotov cocktail attacks on MAS Prefect's residence and
threats on pro-government Radio Aclo, which led the station
to close. Lingering over these more tangible examples is the
opposition's supposed obstruction of Morales' change agenda,
which they consider tantamount to the will of the people.
During a march Morales led November 26 at the Bolivian Senate
(sep),Evo explained that his "change agenda" would not be
derailed by opposition traitors. "Occupying state offices is
not democracy, civil disobedience is not democracy, and we
hope the Bolivian people identify these traitors, the people
who are against the nation and want to damage this process of
change."

-- Government as reasonable. Administration officials allege
that police were instructed to exercise restraint (after the
fact) in dealing with "provocateurs," return to barracks,
and, ultimately, to relocate temporarily to the neighboring
city of Potosi. (Opposition leaders have likewise called for
restraint.) Officials also point to the concessions given to
Sucre in a resolution tacked onto the constitution (ref).

-- Appeals for calm and regret for deaths. Now that the
constitution is nominally passed, La Gloria Assembly
participants are setting aside vitriolic rhetoric and rushing
to plead for calm. In an apt example of circular logic, La
Paz assemblyman Fridolino Duran Pax asked Bolivians to "set
aside these regional fights, which will only lead to regional
fights." Government officials have also been quick to offer
their condolences for "bloodshed" in Sucre and endorse an
"independent, transparent" government investigation.

Quintana's Robin Hood Impression
--------------


5. (U) Presidency Minister Quintana broke out of the standard
boiler plate November 25 and tried to frame the struggle over
the constitution along class warfare lines. He said the rich
are using money they have taken from poor to fight passage of
the constitution because they know "the poor will become rich
through the constitution." He said the rich would always
work to "close avenues to anyone that seeks to improve their
situation." Although Quintana echoed sentiments for calm, he
added a threat. "If we persist along the lines of the wishes
of the (political) right in the country, with an old
political constitution, that does not reflect the nation, the
multiculturalism (of Bolivia) will be condemned to violence,
to racism, and Bolivia would be pressed into a civil war."


6. (C) Comment: After initially laying low and then calling
for calm, Morales has come out swinging at the opposition and
unexpectedly led a November 26 demonstration against the
Senate (septel). Were the potential consequences of his
statements not so serious, Morales' accusations that
opposition protests and civil disobedience are "political,"
and therefore subject to repression, would be rejected
immediately, especially considering his background as a
protest leader.


7. (C) Comment Continued: By initially distancing himself
from the events in Sucre and leaving the dirty work (and
rhetoric) to his subordinates, Evo has tried not to become
the face of the Sucre conflict. Asking citizens to identify
"those responsible" for violence is an attempt to exonerate
himself and his supporters from responsibility in the minds
of his people. But Evo's attempt to stay above it all may
work against him in the end as Bolivians begin to ask "where
was Evo when Sucre was burning?" End Comment.

GOLDBERG