BOLIVIA: EVO'S SUCRE SPIN BEGINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003091 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: EVO'S SUCRE SPIN BEGINS REF: A. LA PAZ 3078 ¶B. LA PAZ 3077 ¶C. LA PAZ 3075 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Bolivian President Evo Morales waited almost three days after protests turned violent in the city of Sucre to address Bolivians. He asked for calm, as have other government and opposition leaders. Morales also accused "groups of oligarchs and neoliberals" of manipulating the violence and asked for citizens to help "identify those responsible." Morales otherwise stuck to oft-repeated themes from government officials: the constitution passed by largely pro-government Constituent Assembly is legitimate, the opposition is to blame for the violence, the government is a victim of the opposition violence, and the government is reasonable and laments the deaths in Sucre. Presidency Minister Juan Quintana added a threat of "civil war" to his call for calm, invoking accusations of opposition racism and classism. End Summary. Days Late, Evo Calls for Serenity Now -------------- ¶2. (U) Following almost three days of violent protests regarding the drafting of a new constitution in the titular capital of Sucre, President Evo Morales asked "the Bolivian people for peaceful serenity" in a televised national address November 25. Three protesters died in demonstrations aimed to keep the full Constituent Assembly in Sucre (refs). Morales expressed "concern about delinquent groups en Sucre " motivated by political interests" and that he "could not understand how some can foment confrontation among Bolivians." He accused "groups of oligarchs and neoliberals" of manipulating the protests and asked the people of Sucre to help "identify those responsible." Santa Evo Leaves Coal in Opposition Stockings -------------- ¶3. (C) Morales' prior November 22 statements on the Assembly were upbeat and light compared to the heated rhetoric at the time. He appealed to Assembly members "of all parties" to pass a Constitution as a Christmas present to the Bolivian people. Apparently content to leave the execution of the Assembly's move to Minister of Government Alfredo Rada and ruling MAS-party Assembly members, Evo did not comment on Sucre's situation while he participated in photo opportunities in El Alto and a La Paz school in the ensuing days. News footage of school children shouting "Evo, Evo" to the smiling father figure of Morales juxtaposed awkwardly and sharply with scenes of chaos from Sucre. MAS Talking Points: Constitution Inevitable, Resistance Futile -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Statements from government officials were fairly consistent and appeared to be from the same prepared speaking points: -- The La Glorieta constitution is legitimate, inclusive, and inevitable. It was approved unanimously (136 for and 3 abstentions). It was approved by not only by the MAS, but members from the opposition, indigenous and social organizations, the middle-class, elites, and representatives of all nine departments. Officials point to the constitution's guarantee of departmental and indigenous autonomy, nationalization of hydrocarbons, and guarantee of basic services as a "human right." They skip over the contentious inclusion of unlimited presidential terms and location of the capital. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera bluntly told Bolivians to accept the La Glorieta constitution, since "one way or another it will be approved." -- Blame the opposition. The government argues the opposition is ultimately responsible for the deaths and violence in Sucre by instigating the protests and forcing the MAS to convene the Assembly in a secure location. Minister of the Presidency (Chief of Staff) Juan Ramon Quintana stated on November 25 that Duran, the 29 year-old student who was the first causality of the violence, died from a .22 or .25 caliber bullet which he alleges neither the police nor military carry, thus implying Duran was shot by protesters. Government officials stress the aggressiveness of opposition protesters. In an effort to discredit a principal opposition leader and Constituent Assembly member Samuel Doria Medina (UN party),Government media reported the police caught Medina's security chief trying to smuggle in a machine gun and ammunition to Sucre. Doria Medina simply explained the weapon is used by his own security detail. Presidential Minister Juan Quintana explained "although we took all reasonable precautions to avoid violence, we could not have imagined this" hostility of opposition protests. -- Government as victim. Government officials emphasize that protesters are responsible for the lynching of a policeman (later reported to be missing, not dead) and injuries to other police officers, the burning of at least two police stations, attempts to take over police headquarters, and a prison break (Note: The opposition dispute the prison break charge; claiming guards let the prisoners go in order to foment chaos. End Note.) The government is playing up Molotov cocktail attacks on MAS Prefect's residence and threats on pro-government Radio Aclo, which led the station to close. Lingering over these more tangible examples is the opposition's supposed obstruction of Morales' change agenda, which they consider tantamount to the will of the people. During a march Morales led November 26 at the Bolivian Senate (sep),Evo explained that his "change agenda" would not be derailed by opposition traitors. "Occupying state offices is not democracy, civil disobedience is not democracy, and we hope the Bolivian people identify these traitors, the people who are against the nation and want to damage this process of change." -- Government as reasonable. Administration officials allege that police were instructed to exercise restraint (after the fact) in dealing with "provocateurs," return to barracks, and, ultimately, to relocate temporarily to the neighboring city of Potosi. (Opposition leaders have likewise called for restraint.) Officials also point to the concessions given to Sucre in a resolution tacked onto the constitution (ref). -- Appeals for calm and regret for deaths. Now that the constitution is nominally passed, La Gloria Assembly participants are setting aside vitriolic rhetoric and rushing to plead for calm. In an apt example of circular logic, La Paz assemblyman Fridolino Duran Pax asked Bolivians to "set aside these regional fights, which will only lead to regional fights." Government officials have also been quick to offer their condolences for "bloodshed" in Sucre and endorse an "independent, transparent" government investigation. Quintana's Robin Hood Impression -------------- ¶5. (U) Presidency Minister Quintana broke out of the standard boiler plate November 25 and tried to frame the struggle over the constitution along class warfare lines. He said the rich are using money they have taken from poor to fight passage of the constitution because they know "the poor will become rich through the constitution." He said the rich would always work to "close avenues to anyone that seeks to improve their situation." Although Quintana echoed sentiments for calm, he added a threat. "If we persist along the lines of the wishes of the (political) right in the country, with an old political constitution, that does not reflect the nation, the multiculturalism (of Bolivia) will be condemned to violence, to racism, and Bolivia would be pressed into a civil war." ¶6. (C) Comment: After initially laying low and then calling for calm, Morales has come out swinging at the opposition and unexpectedly led a November 26 demonstration against the Senate (septel). Were the potential consequences of his statements not so serious, Morales' accusations that opposition protests and civil disobedience are "political," and therefore subject to repression, would be rejected immediately, especially considering his background as a protest leader. ¶7. (C) Comment Continued: By initially distancing himself from the events in Sucre and leaving the dirty work (and rhetoric) to his subordinates, Evo has tried not to become the face of the Sucre conflict. Asking citizens to identify "those responsible" for violence is an attempt to exonerate himself and his supporters from responsibility in the minds of his people. But Evo's attempt to stay above it all may work against him in the end as Bolivians begin to ask "where was Evo when Sucre was burning?" End Comment. GOLDBERG