AMIDST VIOLENCE EVO'S MAS APPROVES CONSTITUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003078 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2017 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: AMIDST VIOLENCE EVO'S MAS APPROVES CONSTITUTION REF: A. LA PAZ 3077 ¶B. LA PAZ 1981 ¶C. HAMMER AND MATTHEWMAN EMAIL NOV 24 2007 Classified By: EcoPol chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) Following a tumultuous session on November 23 (ref A),that excluded all but a handful of opposition members, the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) reconvened the Constituent Assembly on November 24 at a military school outside of Sucre amidst thousands of protesters calling for its suspension. Violating numerous Constituent Assembly procedural and voting rules and without even reading the contents of their constitutional document the delegates approved the MAS' draft constitution "en grande" (in general terms). They then fled the military school under police and military protection without defining when and where the Assembly would meet again. There have been at least two confirmed deaths and reports of hundreds of protesters injured. At least one other protester is in very critical condition based on news reports and embassy contacts. The situation in Sucre remains precarious with rumors of a military crack-down imminent. Meanwhile, the opposition stronghold of Santa Cruz is ready to jump into the mix; there are reports that Santa Cruz militants are arming themselves. From now forward, all actions by the MAS regarding their constitution are likely to be viewed by the opposition as illegal, illegitimate and undemocratic. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Situation in Sucre: As of 4:00 PM, November 25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) November 25 morning reports from Sucre indicated the city had returned to a tense calm; but, by mid-afternoon radio stations were reporting that the police had been ordered to evacuate Sucre and that military forces were called in to pacify the city. Separating fact from rumor remains difficult. What appears to be true is that well over a hundred pro-Sucre (anti-MAS) protesters were injured on November 23 and 24. Two protesters are confirmed dead. The first, a 29-year-old lawyer, Gonzalo Duran Carranzanga was confirmed dead at 7:00 PM November 24, reportedly killed by a bullet. The second (name unknown) was confirmed dead the afternoon of November 25. A PODEMOS Constituent Assembly member who is in Sucre told emboff that many young protesters had "disappeared." When pressed, she explained the young protesters had neither returned to their homes, nor made contact with their friends and family. There are many rumors as to the whereabouts of the young protesters. The Assembly member told emboff that approximately 20 (perhaps more) university students are being held in the basement of the military school at La Glorieta. (Note: Most of the protesters who got the closest to the La Glorieta military school are said to university students. End Note). By 1:00 PM November 25, the government news agency ABI reported police officer, Jhimmy Quispe, died after being lynched by pro-Sucre protesters, and mentioned three officers had been injured. The same report indicated that National Police Commandant Miguel Vasquez ordered police officers back to their quarters because of attempts on their lives. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Attempts to Avoid Violence Rebuffed - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Embassy contacts explained that the Emundo Andrade Military School in La Glorieta (approximately 5 kilometers outside of Sucre) was heavily protected; first by thousands of pro-MAS groups (mostly peasant-farmers and indigenous people from El Alto),then a heavily armed police force; and finally the military. There were also press reports of unarmed Venezuelans, but no confirmed sightings. Providing further cover was the fact that security forces were perched atop hills above La Glorieta allowing them to rain down tear gas amongst more lethal items on the protesters. Given that La Glorieta appeared highly fortified, Sucre city and Chuquisaca department civic leaders argue that they attempted to negotiate with central government authorities to avoid the violence that marred November 23. The civic leaders claim their attempts at negotiation were completely rebuffed. Jaime Barron, the President of the Chuquisaca Inter-Institutional Committee (the civic group spearheading Sucre's bid to restore legislative and executive branches to the city) called on supporters to pull-back from La Glorieta in the morning of November 24, in order to prevent any further violence. Reports are that as many as four hundred pro-Sucre protesters had been injured on November 23 during clashes with the police, following a "cabildo" (town hall meeting) where the Inter-Institutional Committee and protesters vowed not to accept the actions of the MAS-only Constituent Assembly. ¶4. (C) According to news reports, Barron, around 1:30 PM on November 24, tried to meet with Minister of Government Alfredo Rada (who is the civilian authority in charge of the national police) at La Glorieta to negotiate a suspension of the Constituent Assembly to avoid any additional confrontations between security forces and pro-Sucre protesters. Rada apparently told Barron he would meet with him once the Chuquisaca Prefect (governor) David Sanchez arrived. Unfortunately, Sanchez (a member of the MAS) only arrived at La Glorieta after Gonzalo Duran was killed. A PODEMOS Constituent Assembly delegate from Sucre told emboff that he had tried contacting his friend and former colleague Minister of Defense Walker San Miguel the morning of November 24 to convince him to use his influence within the government to suspend the MAS-only Constituent Assembly. According to the delegate, San Miguel never took his phone call. - - - - - - - - - - - - MAS Adopts Speed Voting - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) During the November 23 session the MAS delegates adopted a series of new procedural and voting rules which clearly violate the norms agreed upon by Congress when establishing the Assembly, as well as the Assembly's internal rules which the various political parties had painstakingly negotiated over nearly seven months. The new norms, meant to "speed-up" the work of the Assembly, were clearly aimed at allowing the MAS to vote on its constitution without the opposition's presence. Following the November 23 session, MAS delegate and Assembly Vice President Roberto Aguilar told the press that he predicted the Assembly would take 10 days to approve the constitution. ¶6. (C) Perhaps recognizing the situation outside the military school was getting too "hot" -- reports are that protesters were within a few hundred meters ) Constituent Assembly President Silvia Lazarte rushed a vote on the MAS' constitution at approximately 8:00 PM November 24. The MAS delegates approved their draft constitution "en grande" (in general terms) after a cursory review of the reports of only 15 of the Assembly's 21 commissions. The full text of the new constitution was never read. The delegates simply voted on a high-level summary (or table of contents) of the new constitution. Of the 139 delegates present, 136 voted in favor of the constitution, 3 abstained. Despite the rushed nature of the vote and there was essentially no debate, the MAS is highlighting that the vote was unanimous, overlooking the fact that 115 of the Assembly's delegates were not in attendance. - - - - - - - - - - - The MAS Constitution - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Since the text of the MAS constitution was never read aloud, Post can only speculate on its actual contents based on earlier leaked drafts and commission reports. However, assuming the MAS constitution is composed of the items in the MAS' majority reports, the new constitution includes re-election of the president, a unicameral legislature (i.e., the elimination of the Senate),various levels of autonomy (departmental, municipal and indigenous) as well as many other fundamental changes outlined in ref B. The MAS-only Constituent Assembly did attempt to address the polemical Sucre-question, but without actually reviewing any of the six commission reports that reference the restoration of the legislative and executive branches to Sucre. The MAS constituent members did agree to continue recognizing Sucre as Bolivia's "constitutional capital" and judicial seat. They also approved the moving of the National Electoral Court (CNE) to Sucre and that certain sessions of Congress should be held in Sucre. Finally they voted in favor of the government financing of a new airport and roads for the "constitutional capital." (Note: The Constituent Assembly is only tasked with writing a new constitution. Any infrastructure projects the assembly endorses are likely not binding. End Note). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Take the Constitution and Run - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Following the vote on the MAS constitution and a brief interlude to sing the national anthem the MAS delegates began looking for the exits. According to news reports and Embassy contacts in Sucre, the delegates were shepherded out of the rear entrance of the military school around midnight with a large contingent of police and military security. Delegates were evacuated by road to Potosi and presumably Cochabamba overland as protesters had taken Sucre's airport on rumors that a military Hercules airplane was preparing to fly them out of town. (Note: By 9:00 PM many rumors were circulating in Sucre that two to three military vehicles (troops carriers) were converging on the city so that the government could declare military law in the city and arrest protesters and residents without cause. It appears the troop carriers were simply reinforcements to allow the delegates safe passage from La Glorieta. November 25 rumors of a military crackdown may prove equally inaccurate. End Note). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rumored Attacks on the Media - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) There have been several (unconfirmed) reports of attacks on journalists during the November 23-24 violence. A PODEMOS Constituent Assembly member from Sucre told emboff, that on November 23, two journalists from Channel 2 were detained and beaten by police forces after filming some of the violence. According to this source, the police took the journalists' video tape. The night of November 24, Channel 13, which is broadcast by the San Francisco Xavier University, announced on various national media outlets that it was under threat from the police. The university channel was apparently exhorting Sucre residents to support students who were descending on La Glorieta. (Note: Jaime Barron, the President of the Sucre Inter-Institutional Committee and leading voice of the Sucre opposition is the Rector of San Xavier University. End Note). La Paz newspaper La Razon reported that a group of 17 reporters who were in the La Glorieta military school found themselves in harms way in the early hours of November 25 after they tried to come to the rescue of a colleague who was being beaten by MAS sympathizers. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Opposition Reaction, Protests Continue - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) Leading voices of the opposition have resolutely condemned the MAS-only Constituent Assembly as illegal and undemocratic; they blame the MAS and the Morales government for the violence. PODEMOS leader and former President Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga, has essentially pronounced democracy dead in Bolivia stating, "We are mourning democracy." Referring to the use of the La Glorieta military facility and the security forces surrounding it, Quiroga stated that not since the period of military dictatorships had Bolivia's constitutions been written "under arms (guns)." Sucre city Council President Fidel Herrera called Duran's death a "cowardly assassination," reaffirmed that Sucre would not abide by the MAS constitution and would continue protesting the MAS' actions at La Glorieta. Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas and Santa Cruz Civic Committee President Branco Marinkovic affirmed their department's unyielding support for Sucre. They both issued statements declaring that Santa Cruz will refuse to accept the MAS constitution and that there will be massive demonstrations in Santa Cruz starting Monday. There are indications that the demonstrations have already started. Both also squarely placed the blame for the violence on President Evo Morales. In addition to Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca, the civic committees of Beni, Pando and Tarija have also announced that they will not accept the MAS constitution. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Calls for International Help - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Quiroga, Costas, Marinkovic and many other opposition figures made statements the night of November 24 calling on the international community, including the United Nations and Organization of American States, to get involved, to condemn and investigate the violence and anti-democratic actions they argue were perpetrated by the Morales government. Jaime Barron's Chuquisaca Inter-Institutional Committee sent a letter to diplomatic missions calling for the international community to "intervene in stopping the government's brutal aggression against the people of Sucre," (ref C). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Government Blames Opposition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Minister of Government Rada, who was present at La Glorieta during the entire period of the violence and was responsible for orchestrating the government's response to the protesters, claims that police forces were not carrying lethal arms and were never ordered to fire on civilians protesters. In a speech at 3:00 PM November 25, President Morales defended his administration's actions stated his government would "never order the police and military to end human life." Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana has essentially claimed the opposition orchestrated the violence, arguing that an November 24 afternoon announcement by Tuto Quiroga's warning of bloodshed was simply too prescient to be a coincidence. ¶13. (C) Comment: Quintana's statement against Quiroga indicates the government's initial strategy for placing the blame for the violence squarely in the opposition camp. To deflect attention from their own mistakes handling the Constituent Assembly and La Glorieta, the administration will likely press sedition (and other) charges against opposition leaders like Quiroga and Chuquisaca civic leaders. End Comment. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - What Should Happen Next with the Constituent Assembly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (SBU) Before evacuating La Glorieta, the delegates failed to decide on the date, time and location of the Assembly's next plenary session. However, in theory, the Assembly's work is not over. According to the Assembly's rules, (if followed),the full complement of Assembly delegates must meet to vote on each of the 350 plus articles included in the draft constitution. According the Congressional agreement to extend the Constituent Assembly beyond August 6, 2007 (to December 14, 2007) any article that does not receive a two-thirds majority of the vote, should be sent to the public for a referendum. The public referendum would include a version of the majority and minority articles in question. Following the article-by-article vote and/or public referendum on contentious articles, the full Assembly must vote on the full constitutional document. Assuming two-thirds of the Assembly's delegates approve the new constitutional document, the document is supposed to go to a second national referendum. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶15. (C) The convening of the session at the La Glorieta military installation was orchestrated by Evo and his closest advisors in an attempt to achieve a new, MAS constitution through means they could argue were legitimate and legally defensible. During the actual session Minister of Government Rada, MAS Senator and close Evo confidant Santos Ramirez, and Vice-Minister Hector Arce were calling the shots. Once a death occurred, the MAS was forced to immediately push through its constitution without having time to follow pre-established procedures. ¶16. (C) From now forward, all actions by the MAS regarding their constitution are likely to be viewed as illegal, illegitimate and undemocratic by the opposition. As mentioned earlier, the Assembly still has work to do, but it is finished in Sucre. Legally, however, the Assembly cannot meet at another site without Congressional approval, which the MAS cannot obtain as it is a minority in the Senate. The MAS can try convening yet another plenary session "illegally" at an alternate location, (perhaps in MAS-friendly site such as Oruro which has been proposed in the past),but the opposition will certainly not participate unless their safety is guaranteed and they are certain that the MAS will adhere to the Assembly's original voting rules. The MAS is likely to meet neither condition. A public referendum on the MAS constitution without following the steps outline in paragraph 13 would also be viewed illegal, but might go forward if Morales manages to stack the courts during Congress' December recess. However, the MAS now risks having alienated enough people that their constitution may not pass a public referendum. The opposition fears that Evo's charismatic campaigning, Venezuelan financing, and fraud would ensure as MAS victory, and there is a strong possibility that the opposition will refuse participate in protest. ¶17. (C) The government and ruling MAS is shaken by the November 23-24 Sucre violence. President Morales and his cabinet like to contrast themselves with former governments and portray themselves as people dedicated to a "culture of peace." Given that Evo remains determined to appear democratic and open to dialogue; he is perhaps most susceptible now to international pressure. The inability to control the demonstrations at La Glorieta and the security forces' seemingly heavy-handed response has backfired on the government and emboldened the opposition. The opposition now has a couple of martyrs and unfortunately may have one or two more if those critically injured die. Reports are that militants in Santa Cruz are arming themselves, so Sucre's violence is likely to spill over into other departments. Containing the violence and avoiding larger conflict like the one that toppled Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozadas's government in October 2003 must be paramount in Evo's mind. End Comment. GOLDBERG