U.S. IN EVO'S CROSSHAIRS: WHAT NEXT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003029 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR DEA/OEL/TOTH E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EAID SNAR BL SUBJECT: U.S. IN EVO'S CROSSHAIRS: WHAT NEXT? Classified By: EcoPol chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) In a closed Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party meeting on November 12 that was taped and leaked to the press, Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana repeated his outrageous conspiracy charges against USAID while upping the ante by threatening USAID's expulsion from Bolivia. This latest threat follows a string of bogus accusations against the USG, most recently that Ambassador Goldberg is conspiring with the opposition and Colombian paramilitaries to overthrow President Evo Morales' government. In addition to his USAID attacks, Quintana parroted Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's accusations against former Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar, claiming that Aznar and the Spanish Partido Popular are supporting Bolivia's opposition-led departments to destabilize the Morales government. Quintana then linked the USG and Aznar to the Bolivian media, stating the government would "investigate" the media's sources of financing. Quintana's statements coincide with a string of reports from other Embassy sources that indicate that the Evo's inner circle is planning further attacks against the United States. Among the anti-US actions Evo may be considering are: making it impossible for USAID to carry out its programs, restricting or even expelling DEA, and possibly PNGing the Ambassador. End Summary - - - - - - - - - - - - USAID a Constant Target - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Bolivian press outlets are reporting that Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana convened a meeting of MAS party stalwarts in Tarija November 12 to reveal the government's strategy for combating a plot to topple President Evo Morales' government. (Note: Apparently unbeknownst to Quintana his remarks in Tarija were recorded and were then leaked to the press. Post is seeking a transcript of Quintana's comments. End Note). Quintana is alleged to have stated USAID will be expelled because it finances the political "resistance." Quintana's attacks on USAID began back on August 29, when he held a press briefing to level spurious charges against USAID's assistance: stating it lacked transparency, rarely reached Bolivians, and supported a conspiracy against the Morales administration. (Comment: During that press conference, Minister Quintana foreshadowed that the government would issue new rules on foreign assistance. The government made good on that promise on October 11 via Supreme decree 29308. Although the decree leaves much room for interpretation, it states that international aid may not/not imply "political or ideological conditions." It is unclear whether Quintana plans to use decree 29308 as the "legal" basis against USAID programs, but clearly (in his mind at least) USG assistance carries "ideological conditions." End Comment). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Another Decree, Yet More Trouble for USAID - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Hot on the heels of last month's decree outlining requirements on foreign assistance, President Morales signed another decree creating four program implementing units in the Ministry of Rural Development. Ministry of Rural Development officials told USAID representatives November 14 that they intend the decree to require these units to receive donor funding and implement projects directly. This is a significant change from current practice, whereby USAID-funded projects are implemented by USAID contracted firms and NGOs in close coordination with Ministry counterparts. In order for USAID to comply with the decree, major and time-consuming adjustments to its Bolivian programs would be required. The decree also seems to present difficulties for some technical counterparts in the Ministry of Rural Development because they depend on USAID projects to achieve their objectives within our shared bilateral agenda. Some Embassy sources have indicated that this is exactly the point: to set USAID projects up to fail so that we will discontinue them. The decree impacts all or parts of USAID's alternative development, environment, economic opportunity, and PL 480 title 2 food security programs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hugo Chavez: The Quintana Whisperer - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) USAID was not the only target of Quintana's baseless charges. As if Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez were whispering into his ear, Quintana also levied charges against former Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar. The Presidency Minister told the MAS supporters that the Bolivian government has evidence that Aznar's Partido Popular is conspiring against Morales by siding with the Bolivian states that are seeking autonomy. Quintana stated, "Partido Popular . . . is financing the department that voted "Yes" on the autonomy referendum, there is proof, this is now clear and we will show it with figures." (Comment: The fact that Quintana's attacks on Aznar follow Hugo Chavez's diatribe against the former Spanish president at the November 8-10 Ibero-American summit is surely no coincidence. The statements point to Chavez' profound influence over Evo. Unfortunately, Spain's King Juan Carlos is not in Bolivia to ask Quintana to "shut-up." End Comment). - - - - - - - - - - - Pressuring the Press - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (U) More troubling for Bolivia's democracy (and freedom of expression) are Quintana's statements directed at the press. The Presidency Minister announced November 14 that the government would "investigate press financing," once again insinuating that the press receives funds from the USG and other sources to write negative stories about the Morales administration. Quintana has previously accused the USG of paying journalists to write articles that foment conflict. President of the Bolivian Press Association Renan Paz Estensorro challenged Quintana to substantiate his allegations, but Quintana has never provided any evidence. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DEA Lowering its Profile Given the Climate - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Our DEA Director has suspended participation of all DEA personnel in operations during which there might be an arrest, seizure, or search, until Bolivian Government rhetoric aimed at U.S. counter-narcotics efforts subsides. He will reassess at the end of November. Meanwhile, National Police Commander General Miguel Vasquez Villamor and Colonel Rene Sanabria, Director of the Bolivian Anti-Narcotics Police have told the DEA Director that they felt DEA could continue participating in operations with a low profile. Separately, a reporter with good connections to the government asked the Ambassador leading questions about when and how we expected the government to expel or prevent DEA from participating in operations, as if it were a foregone conclusion. Later an emboff spoke to the reporter off the record to understand the basis of the questioning. The reporter explained that he had recently spoken with the Vice Minister of Justice Wilfredo Chavez who told him that "ministers were working on a resolution to withdraw DEA from interdiction." (Note: This vice-minister is a member of CONALTID, the policy formulation body for counter-narcotics which is comprised of several government ministers. End Note). DEA is trying to verify the existence of the resolution. ¶7. (SBU) President Morales continues to publicly call for kicking out U.S. "agents" associated with counter-narcotics efforts and/or "armed uniformed foreigners" since he brought it up October 8 during an event honoring Che Guevara. Although Morales had made similar comments shortly after taking office in January 2006, he had been quiet on the issue since then. Morales used an Associated Press story promoting the November release of a new Morales documentary to make the same argument. Morales asserted in the AP interview and the documentary that he was beaten multiple times by U.S.-supported Bolivian Counter-Narcotics police during the 1980s. He also regularly reiterates his refusal to allow U.S. bases in Bolivia and encourages other countries to do the same, most recently in his November 10 statements at the Ibero-American Summit in Santiago, Chile (perplexing as there are no U.S. bases in Bolivia). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Something Brewing Against Us - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) President of the Congressional Foreign Relations Committee Michiaki Nagatani (MNR- Santa Cruz) told Emboff on November 15 that there are strong rumors circulating in congress that the Presidential Palace is considering actions that will come close to breaking relations with the United States. Nagatani stated that hard-liners Quintana and Presidential Spokesperson Alex Contreras are pushing the break. Congressman Nagatani noted that there is a "hardening by the day" inside the Presidential Palace. While Nagatani believes that Evo will not go so far as to cut diplomatic relations, he warns that we should expect further attacks and measures aimed at the USG. ¶9. (C) Warning of future domestic turmoil, opposition alternate senator Rafael Loayza now doubts that a deal can be made to deliver a new constitution at the Constituent Assembly. Only three weeks earlier Loayza had high hopes for a negotiated agreement between the MAS and opposition. In our meeting, he stated Bolivia is reverting to 2003, when the country was ungovernable. As in 2003, Loayza now foresees serious violence between MAS and opposition with the possibility of "many deaths." Loayza repeatedly stated that Evo and his insiders will continue to attack the USG since the United States remains one of the few issues with which he can rally his followers. The senator noted that he would not be surprised if the government declared Ambassador Goldberg persona-non-grata. (Comment: Loayza's conversion from optimist to pessimist is particularly disturbing. He was working with other pragmatic politicians within the opposition and the MAS to craft a solution dubbed "Constitution Lite" which could have averted a crisis. Per Loayza, the Constitution Lite was close to completion when the MAS killed the negotiations by announcing a new pension system that would result in funding cuts to the opposition departments. End Comment). ¶10. (C) Noted political commentator Carlos Valverde contacted the Embassy to express his "grave concern" over the current situation. Valverde mentioned that is hearing that many in the MAS favor an "auto-golpe." Under this scenario Evo's supporters and the possibly members of the military loyal to the president will publicly urge Evo Morales to rule by decree to restore stability. Some argue that members of Morales' inner circle are clandestinely encouraging this scenario. Valverde also mentioned that the "more moderate" vice president has been sidelined, with the president's insiders accusing Garcia Linera of conspiring against Morales. According to Valverde, these "conspiracy" accusations have forced Garcia Linera to try to avoid public appearances and to take a more radical tone when he does appear in public. Valverde's comments regarding the vice president are consistent with Garcia Linera's own statement to the Ambassador in September that he "is loosing influence." - - - - Comment - - - - ¶11. (C) Evo and his inner circle appear to be escalating their attacks on the USG. From the manipulation of innocent events (such as the legal importation of bullets for practice shooting) to the blatant fabrication of alleged plots, Evo's paranoia and domestic grandstanding are heading toward a point of no return. Increasingly, it appears that part of Evo's strategy is to cause difficulties or even a break with the United States to distract from domestic problems, energize his radical base, and possibly set the stage to justify undemocratic action in order to force through a new constitution that would enable his re-election. ¶12. (C) While there is little indication that working-level contacts, particularly in the military and police, are less inclined to work with the Embassy, good working relations are no guarantee that Evo will not take radical action against us. We fear that our contacts are likely to find out about any draconian measures to break or "nearly break" relations only after they are announced, as happened with the decision to require visas for Amcits. This is because the government of Bolivia is now basically a one-man "Evo" show, with a small circle of advisors improvising as domestic problems mount. ¶13. (C) As Evo and his advisors use the USG as a useful distraction from domestic crises in Bolivia (increasing inflation, scarcity of staple commodities, the near-inevitable failure of the Constituent Assembly),we expect more outrageous, inflammatory rhetoric. More worrisome, we also see evidence that Evo is bound to take concrete steps against USG activities in Bolivia, possibly making DEA and USAID cooperation in Bolivia more difficult or even impossible. The government's repeated attacks on USAID, in particular the new rural development decree which may be intended to make USAID's work impossible, seem to be designed to force the USG to break with Bolivia -- something that Evo's team may then spin as the United States abandoning poor, victimized Bolivia. GOLDBERG