BOLIVIA UNDERMINING MINING: MORE STATE INVOLVEMENT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002674 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2017 TAGS: ECON EMIN EINV BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA UNDERMINING MINING: MORE STATE INVOLVEMENT? REF: A. LA PAZ 1860 ¶B. LA PAZ 1840 ¶C. LA PAZ 1740 Classified By: Ecopol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) In the "exposition of motives" of the draft mining code that is circulating in the Bolivian mining sector but has not been formally submitted to Congress, mining companies are given one year from the promulgation of the new code to sign joint-venture contracts with the state-owned Bolivian Mining Company (COMIBOL). The ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) government has repeatedly stated that it wants "equal partnership" with mining companies, although it has given few details as to what that will mean. Despite COMIBOL's poor record, the MAS seems intent on increasing its role in the mining industry, including passage of a recent law reverting the Posokoni deposit (and Huanuni mine) back to COMIBOL control. A review of some of the experiences that mining companies have had with COMIBOL suggests that greater involvement of COMIBOL will damage the Bolivian mining sector. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Working (or not) with COMIBOL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Although for public-relations reasons most international companies claim to be happy to work with COMIBOL, in private conversations with Emboff, mining executives expressed negative opinions about the organization. COMIBOL staffers are described as undertrained and inexperienced, and COMIBOL managers are generally perceived to be unprepared and often uncooperative. Although COMIBOL President Hugo Miranda Rindon has experience in the mining industry, he seems to be out of his depth running the state mining company. In a meeting with Emboff for example, Rindon was unaware of the details of the contract between COMIBOL and Coeur d'Alene's San Bartolome mine, despite the fact that the meeting had been arranged specifically to discuss that project. COMIBOL is also seen as badly overstretched at the moment. In addition to troubles with COMIBOL's Huanuni mine, industry experts note that COMIBOL was not prepared to take over the Vinto smelter after its nationalization; some observers even suggest that COMIBOL engineers may have damaged part of the plant through unfamiliarity with its workings (this rumor is not confirmed, however.) ¶3. (C) In meetings with Glencore executives, Emboff heard a list of difficulties the Swiss company has had in working with COMIBOL (Glencore has joint ventures with COMIBOL on several of its projects). Glencore is in a particularly difficult situation, since they are associated with Comsur, Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada's old company, which is a target of the MAS and therefore COMIBOL. Glencore executives described their current joint ventures with COMIBOL as consisting of Glencore management and planning, with the COMIBOL role restricted to oversight and budget approval. They said that COMIBOL wants to increase its role to include planning and daily management, but that thus far Glencore has managed to resist what they consider an untenable situation. However, Mining Minister Echazu reportedly has told them that eventually COMIBOL will "co-manage" all of the joint ventures with Glencore, despite Glencore's certainty that COMIBOL does not have the capacity to do so. (Note: a Glencore executive opined that it was not the Mining Minister pushing for this change but rather isolated MASistas within the Ministry, supported by President Morales' advisors. End note.) ¶4. (C) Canada's Pan American Silver has similar complaints regarding their joint venture with COMIBOL at the San Vicente mine (where COMIBOL controls a minority stake.) In Pan American's case, COMIBOL involves itself more in the details of the design plan (for example, trying to specify a narrower, less-safe ramp because it would be cheaper--Pan American refused.) A Pan American executive mentioned that many of their requests for information or permission go for months without a response from COMIBOL, increasing the cost of the project. Adding insult to injury, Pan American has heard from a contact within COMIBOL that COMIBOL is considering bringing a lawsuit against Pan American, its own "partner" in the project. ¶5. (C) U.S. operations have not been spared the quirks of working with COMIBOL. Although not a joint venture, Coeur D'Alene has contracts to work with COMIBOL at the San Bartolome project in Potosi. In a meeting on August 20, San Bartolome President Jim Duff mentioned that COMIBOL had delayed the removal of old oxide dumps (part of the overall mine plan that gives San Bartolome a net positive environmental effect) due to pressure from a Potosi civic group. Duff added that the mine needs to get started on that phase of the project because they will have to pay a USD 2.5 million fine to COMIBOL if they do not meet their previously-established deadline. When asked if COMIBOL was deliberately delaying the work in order to receive the fine, Duff said he didn't think they were that sophisticated. He admitted, however, that Coeur D'Alene has no way of forcing COMIBOL to allow them to meet the deadline, if in fact COMIBOL is manipulating the situation to collect the sizable fine. - - - - - - - - - - - - - COMIBOL's Internal Issues - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) COMIBOL has also recently had difficulty working with its own state-salaried miners. During the Huanuni strikes in early July (ref A),state-salaried miners, employees of COMIBOL, demanded the removal of certain high-level COMIBOL executives including President Miranda. Eventually COMIBOL agreed to reassign regional manager Guillermo Dalence but did not require the resignation of President Miranda. The state-salaried miners also demanded that the Huanuni mine should be autonomous and have administrative control without COMIBOL restrictions, a demand which was also denied. The fact that even the state-salaried miners did not want to work with COMIBOL gives some insight into the quality of the state mining company's management. Industry contacts have also informed Emboff that the rehiring of cooperativist miners as state-salaried miners has blurred what used to be clear "us versus them" lines, increasing theft within COMIBOL and corruption at all levels of mine operations at Huanuni. ¶7. (C) A COMIBOL supervisor who works with Pan American Silver and other projects told Emboff that COMIBOL is having difficulty attracting qualified staff (a complaint echoed in the Bolivian mining industry in general, as salaries for miners and engineers increase with world-wide demand). He pointed out that Bolivia has not been producing qualified mining engineers in sufficient numbers for decades and opined that there would be significant shortages for the next 20 years, especially for COMIBOL, which cannot pay the high salaries that mining engineers now command. Nonetheless, he said that COMIBOL intended to become more involved in the day-to-day operations of all mines in Bolivia, through joint ventures. "Before, the private companies put up the capital, and we gave them the right to mine," he said, "but now we want to have more say in how the capital is used." - - - - Comment - - - - ¶8. (C) As in other areas of Bolivia's government, COMIBOL's troubles have been exacerbated by wage-caps that encourage qualified managers and engineers to leave for the private sector. Many observers have suggested that the MAS government actively distrusts the mining industry, in part because of its association with former President Goni Sanchez de Lozada. This MAS distrust of the industry adds to COMIBOL's difficulties, as they must work with the mining companies and also with their MAS bosses. Mining companies report that they have difficulty even arranging meetings with COMIBOL representatives (note: Emboff's request for a tour of COMIBOL's Huanuni mine has been ignored since late June, despite follow-up calls.) ¶9. (C) Overstretched, understaffed, and occasionally uncooperative, COMIBOL is not a partner private mining companies want. Industry contacts hope that the draft mining code will be dramatically changed before it gets to Congress, if it is submitted to Congress at all, and that the MAS will decrease its interest in hands-on involvement in the industry. Meanwhile, however, the unofficial draft mining code casts its shadow over almost every mining meeting. Currently it is serving to decrease private interest in the industry, leaving exploration up to the state, which simply is not up to the task. End comment. GOLDBERG