BOLIVIA'S MIXED MESSAGE ON IAEA-IRANIAN ACTION PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002510

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON KNNP MNUC IR IAEA AORC BO
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S MIXED MESSAGE ON IAEA-IRANIAN ACTION PLAN

REF: A. STATE 123352

B. LA PAZ 2456

C. LA PAZ 2500

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche to Acting
Foreign Minister Hugo Fernandez on September 7, 2007.
Fernandez told the Ambassador that the French, German and
British Ambassadors had covered the same topic with him
several days earlier. Fernandez claimed that the European
Ambassadors had urged Bolivia to help pressure Iran to keep
its program within IAEA bounds, otherwise, they reportedly
argued, the U.S. may lose patience and feel the need to take
unilateral action. Fernandez told the Ambassador that it
would not be right for the U.S. to lose patience or take
unilateral action; the Ambassador responded that the issue at
hand was multilateral action. The Ambassador cited recent
progress in rolling back North Korea's nuclear program as
proof that concerted international pressure could work.
Fernandez said the GOB would support multilateral actions to
pressure Iran to bring its nuclear program within bounds,
provided these were respectful and responsible. Fernandez
concluded by saying "Bolivia is not indifferent to Iran's
nuclear program. We have good relations with Iran (Note: the
GOB announced on September 11 that effective immediately it
had opened diplomatic relations with Iran. End Note.)
Fernandez said, "Foreign Minister Choquehuanca defended
Iran's right to have a peaceful nuclear program during a
recent visit to Tehran. But no one should play with the
IAEA."


2. (C) Poloff also delivered reftel demarche and non-paper to
the Ruben Vidaurre, Director of Multilateral Affairs,
September 11. Vidaurre said the Bolivian government shared
the "valid" concerns raised in the non-paper, which he
promised to forward to the Bolivian delegation at the IAEA.
Vidaurre added the action plan was "insufficient" to ensure
Iranian compliance with UN Security Resolutions 1737 and
1747, which he claimed would be a requirement for any
agreement endorsed by the Bolivian government. Vidaurre said
the Bolivian government's primary considerations with respect
to the action plan are "supporting UN principles and
resolutions" and "commitment to international peace."
(Comment: Vidaurre did not elaborate on what "commitment to
international peace" meant or why it needed to be considered
separately from "UN principles and resolutions," perhaps
providing a future justification to back a plan that falls
short of enforcing resolutions. End Comment.)


3. (C) Comment: Although Bolivian government signals are
mixed, post suspects the GOB will ultimately abstain from
supporting a stronger IAEA-Iran action plan. We place little
credence on official assurances that Bolivia shares
international concerns about Iran's military use of nuclear
technology and supports existing UN SR 1737 and 1747.
Bolivian government officials, including the Vice President,
had assured post the Bolivian government would not open
diplomatic relations with Iran, only to do just that
September 11 following a week of public love-festing with
Iranian officials (refs b and c). It is becoming increasing
clear that decisions on international relations are being
made in a very small circle, which more than likely includes
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. End Comment.
GOLDBERG