BOLIVIAN GAS: THE PRESSURE IS BUILDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 002467 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EPET BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN GAS: THE PRESSURE IS BUILDING Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The first signs of an emerging crisis in the Bolivian gas sector are becoming apparent. Gas supply can no longer meet current contractual obligations. Production has fallen to 38.3MMm3/d and contractual obligations are up to 39.4MMm3/d. Moreover, investment in the sector is tentative and insufficient to increase supply significantly. Given the reality of growing domestic demand, industry and/or consumers will soon face shortages. End Summary. -------------- Supply Stagnation -------------- ¶2. (C) Gas production in Bolivia reached its peak in 2006 at 40.7 million cubic meters of gas per day (MMm3/d). As of August, production had fallen to 38.3 MMm3/d. Current contractual agreements total close to 40MMm3/d and no new large-scale production increases are on the horizon. (Note: Contracts generally specify a range of possible delivery amounts and allow the buyer to request deliveries of gas within the specified range. The 40MMm3/d figure reflects the maximum that buyers could contractually demand. End note.) Part of the fall in supply (more than 1MMm3/d) was caused by the discovery of water in a well in the major field of Margarita. This problem may or may not be fixed quickly, but according to Ed Miller, President and General Manager of Gas TransBoliviano, a pipeline operator, it is symptomatic of wells being pushed beyond their secure operating capacity. ¶3. (SBU) Stagnant production is the result of a dramatic fall in levels of investment. In 1998, annual investment in the gas sector reached US$604 million; by 2006 the figure had fallen to US$198. Moreover, current investments are only directed at field maintenance and not new development. Current production is based in investments made nearly 10 years ago and falling growth rates support this conclusion: From 2003 to 2004 production rose 36%; from 2004 to 2005 it rose 37%; from 2005 to 2006 it rose 14%; and growth for the current year was projected at only one percent before the problems in the Margarita field which may turn the figure negative. Hence, while the government touts rapid earnings growth from gas (a result of favorable market conditions), investments are not being made to fully capitalize on the robust regional demand. ¶4. (C) In the fields, the lack of sufficient investment is manifest in a dearth of new drilling. In the late 1990s, 16 drilling rigs operated in Bolivia; there are now only three. In a conversation with Emboff, Petrobras officials feared that even if new commitments to drill were made, high global demand for rigs could be a significant limiting factor. In general, the standard industry time frame for new Bolivian production to come on line is three years. -------------- Current Contracts -------------- ¶5. (SBU) There are currently three major contractual obligations totaling 38.8MMm3/d that face Bolivia: The Gas Supply Agreement (GSA),which commits up to 30MMm3/d to Sao Paulo, Brazil; Cuiaba, which promises 1.1MMm3/d to an electrical plant in western Brazil; and a 7.7MMm3/d agreement with Argentina. Moreover, the agreement with Argentina is a "ramp-up" contract which increases yearly deliveries until 2010 when Bolivia is committed to supply 27.7MMm3/d to its southern neighbor. Along with these contractual obligations, LA PAZ 00002467 002 OF 003 Bolivian domestic demand has doubled over the last three years from approximately 3MMm3/d to 6MMm3/d. Together with the contractual obligations, Bolivia's current production of 38.3MMm3/d cannot match the demand. (Note: Mining and electricity generation in Bolivia are also heavily reliant on gas for power. For example, the government has promised 8MMm3/d to an Indian firm to develop the large Mutin iron deposit. End note.) -------------- Who Goes Without? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) At the beginning of September, Brazil insisted that the GSA commitments be fully realized and 30MMm3/d be delivered. In August, it had been receiving a slightly lower flow of gas. The Minister of Hydrocarbons and Energy Carlos Villegas stated that the increase was to help Brazil deal with shortages of water, which were leading to electricity shortfalls. However, this contract also has a "delivery or pay" clause, which would subject Bolivia to fines if it did not meet its obligations. Moreover, in order to pass 30MMm3/d through the Sao Paulo pipeline, delivery to Cuiaba was cut to zero until September 14. No such "delivery or pay' clauses exist in the Cuiaba contract. ¶7. (C) In August, Argentina was receiving around 4.6MMm3/d. Local newspapers report that 4.6MMm3/d is enough to match current demand in Argentina, but as Ed Miller of Gas TransBoliviano pointed out, it is also the minimum figure that Bolivia can deliver without incurring 'delivery or pay' penalties. (Note: The contract says that Argentina can request between 4.6MMm3/d and 7.7MMm3/d. End note.) In concert with the increase in deliveries to Brazil however, Argentina had its supply cut to only 2.3MMm3/d. Interestingly, Carlos Villegas claimed that the drop to 2.3MMm3/d will not generate fines from Argentina. The relationship with Argentina appears to be less contractual and more congenial at the moment. Yussef Akly, Strategic Manager and Spokesman for the Bolivian Chamber of Hydrocarbons, believes that this cooperation will continue in the short term. The real test will be in 2010, when 'delivery or pay' clauses will kick in with certainty and there is no chance that Bolivia can meet its commitments. ¶8. (C) More evidence of a special flexibility with Argentina comes from the way pricing has been handled. The new contract was announced with much fanfare in October 2006. The base price was set at US$5 per million BTU. It now appears that for the last five months, Argentina has been paying only US$4.5 per million BTU. This has reduced the total amount paid over the period from US$170 million to only US$150 million. The local press is protesting the loss of the US$20 million, but special relationships come with a price. To date, Argentina has made no public demands for compensation for the shortages of the contractually obligated gas deliveries. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The Bolivian national oil company YPFB will be increasingly forced to choose who gets Bolivia's limited supply of gas: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivian industry or Bolivian consumers. Brazil has shown a willingness to enforce contractual obligations and Petrobras shows no interest in making investments beyond those needed to maintain current production. Argentina, on the other hand, has yet to publicly tighten the screws, but it will be difficult for Bolivia to meet short-term obligations to the country and almost impossible for it to supply the increasing levels of gas stipulated in the contract leading up to 2010. For the LA PAZ 00002467 003 OF 003 moment, politics seem to be softening strict economic demands. As to the domestic market, the stress is starting to show. Headlines trumpet looming gas and electricity shortages and yet the government projects strong growth in the gas powered mining sector. Something has to give; time will tell who takes the hit and who gets the blame. GOLDBERG