BOLIVIA'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY: WHAT'S AT STAKE

UNCLAS LA PAZ 001981 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY: WHAT'S AT STAKE REF: LA PAZ 1877 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) On July 13, twenty of the Constituent Assembly's (CA) twenty-one commissions issued their reports, most issuing a majority and minority version. The reports in total contain 708 articles. The majority Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) and the opposition (led by PODEMOS) only agree on 255. In contrast, the current constitution consists of 234 articles. While at present there are 453 articles of disagreement, this cable looks at the top ten general differences between the MAS and the opposition. These differences include: ¶I. Vision for the Country - Plurinational vs. Intercultural II. Autonomy ) Indigenous vs. Departmental III. Justice ) Traditional vs. Communitarian IV. The Economy ) Social Communitarian vs. Traditional ¶V. Resource Rights ) Indigenous vs. State Control VI. The Presidency ) One vs. Unlimited Terms VII. The Legislature ) One Chamber vs. Two VIII. The Branches of Government ) Four vs. Three IX. The Capital ) La Paz vs. Sucre ¶X. Security ) The Police vs. the Armed Forces All these areas of disagreement need to be ironed out, in theory, by August 6. Within the CA the MAS and opposition have agreed to extend their mandate until December, but Congress has yet to approve the extension. End Summary. -------------- -------------- ¶I. Vision for the Country - Plurinational vs. Intercultural -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) One of the most fundamental disagreements between the MAS and PODEMOS is their different "vision for the country." The MAS proposes creating a "plurinational" state, whereas the opposition argues for an "intercultural" state. The opposition states that recognizing and promoting the country's diversity, its interculturalism, should serve as the basis for unifying and integrating Bolivia. The MAS generally describes plurinationalism as the recognition and self-determination of Bolivia's 36 indigenous groups (including Bolivians of African descent). Jubenal Quispe, a lawyer and MAS-sympathetic academic, describes the plurinational model as the only viable option to replace the failed "single nation society theory" since, in his opinion, in Bolivia multiple nations coexist within the same space. Quispe and the MAS frequently link plurinationalism to the "decolonization" of Bolivia. According to the MAS, efforts to "integrate" the indigenous -- via western education, military service, and other reforms -- failed because the "criollo and mestizo elites" could never (and will never) overcome the indigenous peoples' resistance. Proponents of plurinationalism claim their theory is the only one that can unify a country like Bolivia. The opposition decries plurinationalism, stating it will "Balkanize" rather than unite the country. -------------- II. Autonomy ) Indigenous vs. Departmental -------------- ¶3. (U) Autonomy, or the decentralization of state power, is perhaps the most polemical and core issue facing the CA. On July 16, "indigenous" CA members from the MAS and affiliated parties threatened to pull out of the CA if the plurinational model and indigenous autonomy are not incorporated in the new constitution. The opposition is primarily interested in codifying the concept of departmental autonomy (reftel). Meanwhile, the MAS wants to grant Bolivia's 36 indigenous groups autonomy. The four eastern department (Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija) prefects and civic committees are the spearhead of the departmental autonomy movement. Indigenous groups such as the CIDOB and CONAMAQ are the base (and at times the shock troops) for the MAS' proposal. The two visions are difficult to reconcile as the indigenous territories that the MAS proposes would overlap with the existing nine departments. Furthermore, the MAS has yet to clearly define its vision of autonomy. (Note: The eastern departments only fully articulated their vision on July 2, reftel. End Note). The MAS has not expressly stated what government responsibilities indigenous autonomous units would exercise and in which manner these competencies would be exclusive or shared with other levels of government within Bolivia. Recognizing the power of the other's constituency, both PODEMOS and MAS have offered proposals that recognize on paper the other's "autonomy" demands. However, neither party has yielded enough (yet) to satisfy the other's base. -------------- III. Justice ) Traditional vs. Communitarian -------------- ¶4. (U) Linked to indigenous autonomy is the concept of "communitarian justice," which the MAS supports. The simplest definition for communitarian justice is that justice which was practiced by indigenous peoples before the Spanish conquest. Communitarian justice already exists as an alternative form of justice for small claims under the Bolivia Criminal Justice Code. The MAS wants to see communitarian justice achieve the same status as the formal justice system and has even proposed that a group of "indigenous judges" sit on the constitutional tribunal. A driving factor supporting communitarian justice is the failure of the formal justice system to reach all areas of Bolivia, especially rural areas. Proponents of communitarian justice tout its speed and efficiency. Opponents argue that these benefits stem from the fact that traditional legal protections such as habeas corpus, the right to an adequate defense, the right to appeal, and many others do not exist under communitarian justice. Opponents also argue that Bolivia's 36 indigenous groups' lack of a written judicial code will result in arbitrary justice and will encourage more lynchings. Lynchings are not infrequent in Bolivia (though they are said to be prohibited by traditional, communitarian justice.) -------------- -------------- IV. The Economy ) Social Communitarian vs. Traditional -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) The MAS has proposed a vaguely defined "social communitarian" economic model, while the opposition prefers a mixed capitalist model where the state has control over certain limited sectors of the economy (generally hydrocarbons and mining) but market economics would prevail. Under the MAS vision, private enterprise would still be allowed as long it had a "social purpose." However, who determines "social purpose" remains undefined. -------------- -------------- ¶V. Resource Rights ) Indigenous vs. State Control -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) Also, linked closely to the issue of indigenous autonomy is the issue of land and resource rights. The MAS favors giving indigenous groups full rights over the natural resources within their autonomous territories. The opposition argues for the current model where the state is the final arbiter of all land and natural resources, although the opposition favors devolving some of this power to the departments. MAS CA members argue that indigenous peoples can and would use the resources in an eco-friendly manner. The opposition argues that the MAS proposal would negate current concessions and that there is no guarantee that indigenous peoples would exploit resources sustainably. -------------- -------------- VI. The Presidency ) One Term vs. Unlimited Terms -------------- -------------- ¶7. (U) The MAS has proposed that a president may serve an indefinite number of terms, arguing that the "people" via elections, not established term limits, should decide the number of mandates a president may enjoy. The opposition wants to retain the current system in which a president cannot serve consecutive terms. The MAS wants President Morales to enjoy multiple terms in office, while the opposition fears that Morales will use this new privilege to consolidate power and gradually eliminate existing democratic institutions. Both parties have introduced proposals for removing a president from office. -------------- VII. The Legislature ) One Chamber vs. Two -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The MAS has proposed a directly elected 157 member unicameral legislature, while the opposition supports the current bicameral model. Under the MAS model, 27 of the members would be indigenous representatives, three from each of Bolivia's nine departments. Comment: The MAS proposal is a rather transparent attempt to control congress by abolishing the senate, which it currently does not control, and replacing the 27 senators with indigenous representatives, which MAS insiders believe will overwhelmingly be sympathetic to the party. End Comment. -------------- -------------- VIII. The Branches of Government ) Four vs. Three -------------- -------------- ¶9. (U) The MAS favors adding a forth branch of government, sometimes called the "Social Control Branch (Power)", which would be equal in power to the legislative, executive, and judicial branch. According to some proposals, this new branch would control, supervise, and evaluate the management of the national economy, especially the national treasury and the central bank. It would also issue reports and would be the channel for complaints regarding the three other powers. Members of this fourth power would be leaders from social sector organizations whose election to the body would be decided by the "uses and customs" of the organization. The opposition rejects the creation of this fourth power. -------------- IX. The Capital ) La Paz vs. Sucre -------------- ¶10. (U) The opposition generally supports moving the executive and legislative branches from La Paz to Sucre. (Note: The judiciary is already based in Sucre. End Note). The MAS generally supports keeping the capital in La Paz, presumably largely because its base is focused in the highland Altiplano, where in some parts such as El Alto Morales enjoys ninety percent approval. El Alto residents often march on congress to support Morales' policies forcing non-MAS congressional members to think twice before voting against MAS proposals. The four eastern departments want to see the capital moved to reduce El Alto's hold over the GOB. It is worth noting, this issue does not totally follow ideological lines. Delegates from Sucre regardless of party tend to support the move while delegates from La Paz regardless of party tend to oppose it. -------------- ¶X. Security ) The Police vs. the Armed Forces -------------- ¶11. (U) On the issue of security and defense, the MAS and PODEMOS are not pitted against each other, but the police and armed forces are. The police and armed forces are historical rivals in Bolivia; in February 2003 they shot at each other in La Paz's main square the Plaza Murillo leaving one soldier dead. Both the police and armed forces have submitted their own proposals to the CA. Early drafts of the Commission on Security and Defense report had the military only serving an external function and losing to the police its function as guarantor of the constitution. Senior military officials balked at the proposals, making the commission rethink its position towards increasing the police's role. The police, in turn, responded by protesting in front of the commission. Security Commission delegates (in an apparent attempt to minimize the potential for conflict between the two institutions) submitted their report in draft form on July 13, without fully defining the roles of the two institutions. On July 17, the CA Directive (the committee of party leaders that manages the CA's affairs) rejected the report, essentially telling the commission to get back to work. -------------- Comment -- What's Next -------------- ¶12. (U) Many of the CA commissions' reports overlap the work of other commissions. For example, six of the twenty-one commissions issued reports touching on the issue of moving/retaining the capital. Delegates from the different commissions will soon form "mixed" commissions to eliminate these redundancies and try to reach consensus on issues where the MAS and the opposition disagree. If the mixed commissions cannot iron out all the areas of discord (a likely outcome),a special "Consensus Commission" will meet to try to hammer out the remaining problems. All this in theory must happen by August 6, the deadline for ending the CA. Within the CA the MAS and opposition have agreed to extend their mandate until December, but Congress has yet to approve the extension. End Comment. GOLDBERG